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Despite calls for more integrated residual management, research on the 
performance of methods to regulate pollution has paid little attention to cases of multiple 
pollutant control. This study helps rectify this omission in multiple ways. In Chapter 1 I 
describe the many issues that arise in the control of multiple pollutants and identify where 
economics and policy have addressed them. In Chapter 2 I extend a well-known proof 
demonstrating that emissions taxes or cap-and-trade instruments may yield a Pareto 
optimal outcome in a general equilibrium setting to the case where there are multiple 
pollutants in the economy. Chapter 2 also includes an exploration of how changing the 
joint abatement relationship in a deterministic firm-level model affects emissions and 
allowance prices when taxes and/or cap-and-trade programs are used. 
Chapter 3 extends a model commonly used in the instrument choice under 
uncertainty literature to the case of jointly abated pollutants. In the single pollutant case 
with uncertain abatement costs, Weitzman (1974) and others have demonstrated that the 
expected welfare from an emissions tax is likely not the same as for a tradable emissions 
cap and derive conditions under which each instrument is preferred to the other. I find 
that the criteria identifying the welfare-maximizing instrument in the single pollutant 
framework may be misleading in identifying the optimal set of instruments in a multiple 
pollutant framework. I also show that the optimal instrument for any one pollutant may 
depend on how the other pollutants are controlled. 
A case study is then explored in Chapter 4. A market simulation model of the 
national electricity sector is employed to determine the optimal instrument combination 
to control sulfur dioxide and mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants. There are 
important, but uncertain, relationships in the abatement of these pollutants. The analysis 
shows that the optimal instrument combination consists of controlling mercury by a tax 
and sulfur dioxide by a tax. The cost of selecting a suboptimal instrument mix is between 
$90 and $190 million (2004 $) in 2020 depending on which suboptimal mix is adopted. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE BASICS OF MULTIPLE POLLUTANT 
CONTROL 
1.1 Introduction 
The typical approach in U.S. environmental policy is to regulate pollutants 
individually. Yet there have been calls, both distant (Ayres and Kneese, 1969) and 
recent (National Research Council, 2004), for a more integrated approach to residual 
management. While the reasons for this recommendation are manifold, accounting for 
health and ecosystem interactions as well as control relationships among pollutants 
are the driving considerations. At the same time, many questions remain about how 
integrated pollution management should occur in practice and what regulatory 
methods are appropriate. To make this advice practicable, one needs to have an 
understanding of how the choice of regulatory techniques influences environmental 
and social welfare outcomes.  
In this chapter, I describe what is meant by multiple pollutant control and 
offer some examples. I also briefly describe how economists have treated issues that 
arise in the control of pollutants that have joint effects and control costs and what is 
being done in the regulatory community to address these issues. The balance of this 
chapter outlines the questions considered in the remaining chapters of this 
dissertation, the general theme of which is an exploration of the desirability of 
competing market-based pollution control instruments, cap-and-trade and tax policies, 
when the regulator is uncertain of the abatement costs of jointly controlled pollutants. 
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1.2 Issues in Multiple Pollutant Control 
1.2.1 Emissions versus Pollution: A Distinction 
To decompose the various ways multiple pollutant issues present 
themselves we run into a nomenclature problem. The word “pollutant” is commonly 
used synonymously with “emissions”. In the following discussion a distinction is 
made between emissions, which is some byproduct that is disposed of in a common-
property resource, and a pollutant, which is the bad that influences the quality of 
goods and the performance of production technologies that in turn affect welfare. 
While this definitional distinction is only important in this Chapter, it helps us 
decompose many of the issues that arise in multiple pollutant control. 
1.2.2 Joint Pollution Damages 
The easiest way to identify the issues that may arise when regulating 
multiple pollutants is to start with general forms of the joint damage and control costs 
functions. Let a damage function of Z pollutants be represented by: 
 ( )1,..., ZH z z  (1.1) 
This damage function represents the willingness to pay or lost profits of those 
individuals or firms affected by the levels of z1,…,zZ to avoid exposure to these 
pollutants.1 If there is any synergy in the damage caused by two pollutants then: 
                                                 





















where i i′≠ . There is nothing restricting the sign of this cross-partial. There may be 
cases where increasing one pollutant increases the marginal damage of the other and 
cases where it reduces the marginal damage of the other. 
Often, it is not simply the case that the level of a pollutant zi equals the sum 
of emissions over all sources of zi. It may be the case that different types of emissions 
interact in the environment and form what are sometimes referred to as secondary 
pollutants. Furthermore, the damage caused by a particular quantity of emissions may 
be a function of the emitter’s location. Both of these extensions imply a more 
complex relationship between emissions and the level of zi. The general relationship 
between the pollutant zi  and a vector of L types of emissions is represented by: 
 ( )1,...,i i Lz Z s s≡  (1.3) 
As discussed below, there are important examples where ( ).iZ  is not only an 
interactive function of emissions (i.e. not additively separable) but is also non-
convex. That said, often ( ).iZ  takes an additively-separable form of the arguments sl, 
where sl is the same substance as zi and l indexes different emitters. When ( ).iZ  is 
linear in the arguments sl: 
                                                                                                                                           
This form also implies separablity in the willingness to pay for the qualities of the goods that are 
affected by zi. While this is not a case of multiple pollutant control per se, it is the sort of problem that 











≡∑  (1.4) 
the parameter φl (where 0 1lφ≤ ≤ ) is often called a dispersion or transfer coefficient. 
The most well known relationship of this type is between emissions and the 
concentration of a pollutant at a monitoring site (Montgomery 1972).  
A regulatory function similar to ( ).iZ  indicates the influence of different 
types of emissions on some indicator of environmental quality. If one were to be 
pedantic we would recognize that in most regulatory applications of ( ).iZ  the variable 
zi actually is an indicator of environmental quality in that it does not exactly 
correspond to the arguments influencing the damage function. Using the receptor site 
example, the damage to someone affected by emissions from various sources depends 
on the concentration of the pollutant where she is, not at the receptor site.  
1.2.3 Joint Emission Control Costs 
We now move to the joint control of multiple emissions. To understand the 
origins of joint control costs we begin with the profit maximization problem of a 
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2 Note that we are ignoring the potential for emissions caused by households. Presumably accounting 
for this possibility is relatively unimportant to the following discussion. 
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where ( ).kf  is the production function of the firm, xkn are private inputs to production, 
and each skm represents an input, or emissions, of type m that is disposed of in the 
environment.3,4 Emissions essentially represent the use of an environmental service 
and impose uncompensated costs on other agents in the economy. The parameters pk 
and ck1,…,ckN are respectively the prices of the product and inputs used by firm k. For 
the moment we assume that these prices are fixed.  
Now let us suppose that a particular regulation Γm on the emissions of type 
m is under consideration. The regulation Γm consists of individual restrictions 
( )km kmsΓ  on the emissions of type m from each firm k. The restrictions ( )km kmsΓ  are 
also a function of regulatory parameters and may be a function of other choice 
variables in the firm’s objective function.5,6  For each firm k, the total cost of 
                                                 
3 We assume that the production function yields convex production sets and that the production of yk 
requires at least one privately priced good xn (as otherwise production of yk would be unconstrained 
given our assumption of constant prices). We write the production functions as if each yk may be a 
function of every type of emissions m to keep the problem general, but it is of course possible that 
0k kmf s∂ ∂ ≡ for some k and m. 
4 Each sl in (1.3) corresponds to some skm if only one type of emissions from all firms is being 
controlled.  
5 In their most general form these restrictions may even be a function of other emission types, but then 
the question of whether the problem is one of joint emission control is trivial. 
6 Identifying forms where ( )km kmsΓ  is some firm-level quantity restriction, like a performance 
standard, is straightforward. For a cap-and-trade program Γm must also contain some balancing 
restriction across all regulated firms. Where ( )km kmsΓ  represents a charge, say tkm per unit of emissions, 
the restriction is of the form: 
0km km kmF t s− ≥  
where the profit of source k must also be adjusted by the fee paid, Fkm. However, this fee must then be 
redistributed to agents in the economy and therefore is counted against profits for firm k but not 
towards the cost of the regulation.   
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complying with ( )km kmsΓ  is the profit from the solution to (1.5) minus the profit from 
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So, the cost of the regulation Γm across all K firms is: 
    ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1
1 1
, ,..., , ,..., , ,..., , ,..., |
K K
m k k k kN k kM k k k kN k kM km km
k k
C y x x s s y x x s s sπ π
= =
Γ ≡ − Γ∑ ∑  (1.7) 
where the first term on the right is the sum of all of the solutions to (1.5) while the 
second term is the sum of all of the solutions to (1.6).7,8 Now we can define the 
fundamental problem of joint emission control. Consider the case where a regulation 
Γm′ on emissions of type m′ (e.g. a cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide) was 
imposed prior to Γm (e.g. a performance standard on mercury). For our purposes, the 
definition of a joint emissions control problem is when the cost function for the 
regulation Γm given Γm′: 
                                                 
7 Often, rather than a function of the form (1.7), emissions control costs are measured as changes in the 
cost of producing particular levels of yk from imposing Γm. Provided that output levels do not change 
considerably as a result of imposing Γm, such a measure is roughly equivalent to (1.7). Both measures 
ignore possible changes in consumer surplus from increasing the firms’ costs. 
8 There is an analogue to the single pollutant-multiple harm scenario (i.e. footnote 1) in the emission 
control cost case. It is where there are multiple source types emitting one particular type of emissions. 
Often, separate regulations are established for each type of emitter without regard for how the other 




 ( )'|m mC Γ Γ  (1.8) 
is different than (1.7). If ( ) ( )'|m m mC CΓ Γ > Γ  then these pollutants are substitutes in 
their control. If ( ) ( )'|m m mC CΓ Γ < Γ  they are complements in their control.9 
An even more general form of the joint emission control cost function 
would allow goods and input prices to change.10 There, a joint emission control 
problem may arise when there are two competing technologies with different 
emission profiles generating the same product. If emissions from one of the 
technologies is subject to regulation, emissions from the competing technology will 
increase. This example demonstrates that it is not even necessary for a subset of the 
regulated sources to be emitting both types of emissions for a joint emission control 
problem to exist. While technological relationships between the use of inputs in the 
production of goods provides the clearest example of a joint emission control 
problem, such technical relationships are not a requisite. 
There is one notable variety of joint emission control that is not captured 
by this definition. Emissions from one source may reduce the production possibilities, 
                                                 
9 For a joint abatement problem to exist given our assumption that input and output prices do not 
change, both emission types must be used by at least one of the regulated sources. However, it is not 
necessary that ( )2 . 0k km kmf s s ′∂ ∂ ∂ ≠  for some k for there to be a joint emission control problem. The 
production function may be separable in skm and skm′ but as the optimal levels of other inputs and output 
change, as a result of imposing Γm′, the demand for skm may change. In this case imposing Γm′ will 
change the cost of Γm. 
10  We can now explain the purpose of holding output and input prices constant. This is so we can 
distinguish the situation where different types of emissions are being regulated from the situation 
where multiple firms with the same emission type are being regulated. In the later case, adding one 
element ( )k m k ms′ ′Γ  to Γm may result in a non-additive change in the cost of Γm if the restriction on firm 
k affects the prices faced by the other firms. However, this example is not one we would normally 
associate with a joint emission control problem. 
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and thus affect the emissions, of another source. A setting often invoked in Baumol 
and Oates (1988) is that the source harmed by soot is a laundry, which in turn must 
increase its use of detergent to maintain production levels. What is not acknowledged 
is that the increased use of detergent will result in increased phosphorous emissions. 
If the phosphorus emissions affects the firm releasing the soot we have a case of 
“reciprocal externalities” (Cornes and Sandler, 1985). The optimal regulations on 
phosphorous and soot should therefore be jointly determined. Rarely is this sort of 
problem considered in a regulatory setting, but it has been acknowledged as 
applicable to transboundary pollution control. 
So far, we have couched the joint emission control cost function in 
(perhaps excessively) general terms. We have been open to any type of regulation and 
any sort of interaction that causes the joint determination of emission levels. In the 
balance of this dissertation, we typically will be thinking of joint emission control 
problems that derive from relationships in production technologies. We will also have 
a narrow focus on the types of regulations under consideration. As economists have a 
well-reasoned preference for market-based regulations in a single pollutant 
framework, this research focuses solely on the performance of such policies.  
In the key analytical contribution of this dissertation (Chapter 3), rather 
than apply an emissions control cost function of the form (1.7), I follow the 
convention in the literature on the choice of environmental regulations under 
uncertainty and use an analytical model that focuses on the abatement of emissions. 
Abatement is defined as the difference between emissions absent a regulation and 
emissions with a regulation. When a cap-and-trade or emission tax regulation is being 
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evaluated, it is fairly easy to understand and thus model these regulations in 
abatement space. In a deterministic model with a single emission type, a requirement 
of a minimum level of abatement is equivalent to a restriction on the allowable 
amount of emissions.11 However, when jointly controlled emissions are under 
consideration, this equivalence no longer holds. The uncontrolled level of one type of 
emissions depends on how intensely the other emission types are regulated.12  It also 
does not hold when there is uncertainty in the control costs of the regulated sources. 
These complications, primarily the latter one, will require us to operate in emissions 
space in the empirical portion of this dissertation.  
1.3 Multiple Pollutant Control in the Economics Literature 
In their simplest forms, the key issue with joint pollution damages or joint 
emission control costs is that optimal regulations must be simultaneously chosen. 
However, the importance of accounting for joint damages or control costs in the 
choice of regulations depends on the particular problem at hand. Often, the regulator 
may not jointly select regulations because the administrative cost of such an approach 
outweighs the benefits of integration.  
Beyond the mere acknowledgement that efficiency requires the 
simultaneous choice of regulations in multiple pollutant control settings, more 
interesting and practical problems arise that deserve inquiry. However, there is 
                                                 
11 Of course in reality the world is uncertain. Therefore, regulations usually are not a function of 
abatement because it is impossible to observe what emissions would be absent a particular regulation. 
12 It is even more complicated to view the effect on abatement of regulations other than emission cap-
and-trade and tax programs. The form of the abatement cost function (i.e. costs measured in abatement 
space) depends on the forms of the regulations on all of the emission types. 
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relatively little normative and positive analysis of multiple pollutant control issues in 
the economics literature.13 The only theoretical studies that consider the implications 
of joint damages beyond a stylized general equilibrium setting, and the first notably in 
the context of the choice of environmental regulation under uncertainty, are Yohe 
(1977) and Kolstad (1987). I am aware of no empirical studies that truly consider 
joint damages of the form (1.1) where (1.2) holds.14 Of those that do consider 
multiple benefits, many are like the analysis in Banzhaf et al. (2004). In this paper the 
authors jointly estimate the optimal levels of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOX) emissions from the electricity sector. However, the analysis is simplified in 
that the marginal damage of each pollutant is constant and therefore the optimal 
emission levels can be identified independently of each other (at least with respect to 
the damages they cause). 
Most economics studies that consider integrated pollution management 
address complications that arise when different emission types determine the level of 
a secondary pollutant (i.e. examples of ( ).iZ ) or an environmental indicator. In these 
examples particular attention is often paid to the possibility of a non-convex 
relationship between emissions and the pollutant or indicator of interest.15 Beavis and 
                                                 
13 Notably, however, Helfand, Berck and Maull (2003) saw fit to include discussions regarding 
multiple pollutant control issues in their chapter on pollution policy in the Handbook of Environmental 
Economics. They discuss the regulatory implications of multiple emissions that affect a set of 
environmental indicators, media-specific agencies, and using uniform regulations to control pollutants 
with heterogeneous damages and costs. 
14 In the U.S. regulatory impact analyses are often required of new environmental regulations. These 
analyses typically estimate the damage reduction expected from the regulation. In my experience these 
analyses strictly consider damage functions of the form described in footnote 1.  
15 For a brief discussion of the implications of non-convexities in the emissions/pollutant relationship 
see also Klassen (1996), p. 22. 
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Walker (1979) use an analytical model to assess the impact of multiple and 
interactive pollutants in general on the regulator’s ability to use emission taxes to 
achieve environmental targets at least cost. Endres (1986) also explores this setting 
and considers how the presence of such non-convexities affects the identification and 
relative performance of emission tax and cap-and-trade policies designed to attain a 
given environmental target at minimum cost.  
Of the cases where ( ).iZ  is not additively separable, perhaps the most well 
known example is the formation of ozone. Ozone is generated by a complex chemical 
reaction of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and NOX in the atmosphere. Holding 
the emissions of one of these two substances fixed, as emissions of the other 
substance is increased the concentration of ozone may rise and then fall. This non-
convexity implies that there may be multiple optima in the problem of determining 
the combination of VOCs and NOX that achieves a particular ozone concentration at 
least cost. Economic studies that evaluate the control of ozone include Repetto 
(1987), Braden and Proost (1996), Kim et al. (1998), Simpson and Eliassen (1999) 
and Schmieman et al. (2002).16 A common environmental indicator affected by a 
complex interaction of multiple pollutants is the concentration of dissolved oxygen in 
water. Studies that have evaluated policies for attaining a dissolved oxygen standard 
include Elofsson (2003), Lence (1991), and Carmichael and Strzepek (2000).17 There 
                                                 
16 The innovation in Simpson and Eliassen (1999) and Schmieman et al. (2002) is that they consider 
additional environmental targets of the form (1.3) that are also affected by NOX emissions. 
17 The studies of water quality management focus on different normative questions. Elofsson is 
particularly interested in how correlated stochastic emissions should be regulated, Lence is interested 
in setting optimal exchange rates for a single market covering multiple emissions while Carmichael 
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is also a significant literature on establishing optimal exchange rates for an emissions-
trading program that is designed to maximize welfare or attain an environmental 
indicator when ( ).iZ  is non-linear (Bushnell and Friedman, 1994; Farrow et al., 2005; 
Førsund and Nævdal, 1998; Horan and Shortle, 2005; Hung and Shaw, 2005; 
Klaassen et al., 1994; and Schaltegger and Thomas, 1996). 
On the cost side, some positive analyses have explored how a regulation to 
control one pollutant affects the emissions or cost of controlling other pollutants. The 
application that has generated the most interest from economists is the ancillary 
reduction in local pollutants that results from reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) as part 
of a climate change policy (Boyd et al., 1995; Burtraw et al., 2003; Ekins, 1996; Feng 
et al., 2007; Michaelis, 1992). Related research explores political economy questions 
when the jointly controlled pollutants have different spatial effects. Caplan and Silva 
(2005) ask whether an efficient mechanism employing tradable emissions permits 
exists for the regulation of local and global pollutants that are complements in their 
control when participation in the global regulatory regime is voluntary. Caplan (2006) 
asks the same question but with the mechanism employing emission taxes. List and 
Mason (1999) consider a situation where the central government has the authority to 
regulate the global pollutant (i.e., participation is involuntary) but where the local 
authority is more sensitive to the effect of the level of one pollutant on the damages 
caused by the other. Thus, even when the local regulator does not account for the 
entire change in damages from indirectly changing the level of the global pollutant, it 
                                                                                                                                           
and Strzepek focus on the effect of non-linear interactions between emissions in designing cost-
minimizing regulations. Beavis and Walker’s (1979) analytical exploration was motivated by the 
example of dissolved oxygen and “isodeath” functions across multiple pollutants.  
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may be optimal for the local government to have the authority to regulate the global 
pollutant because of its information advantage.  
Stepping away from political economy questions and evaluating the 
performance of market-based policies, Lence et al. (1988) use an engineering cost 
model to explore the performance of multiple and combined allowance markets for 
jointly controlled emissions. In their application they find that the cost of sequentially 
imposing caps for each emission type is low. While not a case of joint control costs as 
defined above, Montero (2001) identifies conditions where it is preferable to integrate 
pollution markets when the regulator is uncertain of the separate abatement costs of 
multiple emissions and this uncertainty in abatement costs may be correlated across 
the different emission types. Lutter and Shogren (2002) propose the use of tariffs on 
internationally traded CO2 allowances where the tariff level is a function of the 
change in local emissions due to the seller’s abatement of CO2. Finally, Eskeland 
(1997) conducts an empirical study evaluating the cost-effectiveness of regulatory 
proposals that yield reductions in jointly abated emissions.18 
Another multiple pollutant control setting of interest to economists, which 
has a similar flavor to the questions raised above with respect to jointly controlled 
                                                 
18 Eskeland observes that in the management of jointly controlled emissions “not even cost-
effectiveness analysis can be conducted without a value-based priority between emitted pollutants” (p. 
1639). Davies and Mazurek (1998) make a similar claim stating that “degree of risk is the only such 
scale” to set rational priorities in the regulation of jointly controlled emissions (p. 17). However, any 
environmental indicator could satisfy the need for a common index for a cost-effectiveness analysis. 
That said, Eskeland’s or Davies and Mazurek’s welfare-based approaches are clearly appealing, but 
may be impractical. 
   A study similar to Eskeland’s is Lutter and Burtraw (2002) who consider the optimal mix of SO2 and 
NOX emissions to achieve a given level of dollarized environmental damages. The objective function 
in this case does not require that these emissions are jointly controlled or yield joint benefits. However, 
these pollutants are indeed jointly controlled. 
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emission with different spatial effects, is when different types of emissions are 
substitutes that can be emitted into different media. Oates and Schwab (undated) take 
a normative approach to this problem and investigate how different agency structures 
(integrated or media-specific regulators) and regulatory approaches affect emissions 
and welfare. Greenstone (2003) offers an empirical exploration of this theme by 
estimating the effect of recently adopted air quality regulations on emissions to 
waterways. Aillery et al. (2005) is an addresses this issue empirical through the study 
of the costs and benefits of regulating emissions from manure. 
Kolstad (1987) and Mendelsohn (1986) ask whether it is worthwhile to 
tailor regulations to emissions that have heterogeneous damages or control costs. 
They both explore this question in a theoretical framework and use similar models.19 
Their analyses are general as, for example, the differences in damages may be 
because a particular type of emissions comes in a variety of forms (species) or is 
emitted in different locations. The papers differ in that Kolstad (1987) allows for joint 
benefits while Mendelsohn (1986) provides empirical evidence of the cost of 
homogeneous regulation. 
1.4 Multiple Pollutant Control In Practice 
1.4.1 Examples of Multiple Pollutant Control Problems 
Examples abound where emissions jointly affect the level of a pollutant or 
some environmental indicator or that are jointly controlled. Examples of joint damage 
                                                 
19 These models are also quite similar to the one I used in Chapter 3 
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functions are more difficult to come by.20 Typically, where such effects have been 
identified the combination of the two pollutants has a linear influence on damages. 
That is, the combined effects are modeled using a linear function like (1.4). An 
example is the effect of different types of particulate emissions of a certain size on 
human health. 
Examples of emissions that contribute to a secondary pollutant or an 
environmental indicator have already been mentioned (i.e. ozone and biological 
oxygen demand). Another example can be found in the control of SO2, NOX and 
mercury (Hg). Hrabik and Watras (2002) show that increasing SO2 and NOX 
deposition increases the damage from Hg by converting Hg to a form more readily 
taken up by aquatic species. Yet another example is that SO2 emissions lead to 
regional cooling, offsetting the effect of pollutants that cause global warming.21 Even 
emissions that cause global warming have different impacts on climate change. For 
example, one ton of methane has 23 times the global warming potential as one ton of 
CO2 (EIA, 2006). 
On the cost side, there are numerous examples where emissions are jointly 
controlled. The example of interest in this dissertation is that technologies designed to 
                                                 
20 It is easy to identify examples of emissions that cause multiple harms, however (i.e. footnote 1). For 
example, NOX and SO2 both contribute to particulate pollution and acid deposition and NOX 
contributes to the formation of ozone. Often, emitters face multiple regulations on the same type of 
emissions with each regulation justified by a different effect. The regulation of VOCs is an example. 
States regulate sources of VOCs based on their contribution to ozone pollution while the federal 
government sets standards for VOCs that are toxic (the federal government even has multiple sources 
of legal authority for setting these standards) (Evans and Kruger, 2007). Note that in practice, however, 
the federal regulation is often the same as the state regulation as the states often simply take credit 
from federal regulations towards their ozone control obligations. 
21 In this case the environmental indicator is temperature. 
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reduce SO2, NOX and particulates from coal-fired power plants also lower Hg 
emissions. As alluded to above, reducing CO2 emissions from electricity generators 
leads to reductions in NOX, SO2 and other emissions. In these cases, the different 
types of emissions are complements in their control. An example where the jointly 
controlled emissions are substitutes is in the case of NOX and carbon monoxide 
emissions from gasoline engines.22 NOX control often makes combustion less 
efficient, which leads to an increase in carbon monoxide (Hass, 1975). While these 
examples address air emissions from fossil fuel combustion, many examples also 
exist for water pollution.  
1.4.2 Regulatory Responses 
Many European countries have already begun adopting more holistic 
approaches to regulating pollution (Hersch, 1996; Davies and Mazurek, 1998; Davies, 
2001).23 This approach is generally referred to as “integrated pollution control”, but 
as noted in Hersch (1996) the approach takes a variety of forms. At its most 
ambitious, it entails regulatory approaches that broadly consider the 
interconnectedness of ecological and economic systems. In reality, the integration is 
much less ambitious and typically focuses on the adoption of cross-media approaches 
to facility permitting. The European Union has required its members take such an 
approach to permitting in a 1996 Directive (European Union, 1996). The basic goals 
                                                 
22 For a whole slew of examples where pollutants are substitutes in their control, see Neligan (1975). 
23 That said, Simpson and Eliassen (1999) and Schieman et al. (2002) point out that when it comes to 
transboundary pollution control, the European approach has historically been of a single pollutant-
single harm nature. This too is changing. A 1999 Protocol addresses the transboundary control of SO2, 




of cross-media permitting include eliminating the incentive for regulators responsible 
for one media to adopt controls that shift emissions to another media, and improving 
the identification of emission sources at a facility (Davies and Mazurek, 1998). 
Notably, this endeavor is limited as it is focused solely on integration within facilities 
and not in setting environmental priorities and targets over multiple media. The hope, 
however, is that this more modest approach will ultimately lead to a regulatory 
system that does a better job of establishing priorities and encouraging pollution 
prevention (Davies, 2001). 
In the U.S., the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “has conducted 
pilot efforts at integrated approaches for more than twenty years” (Davies and 
Mazurek, 1998, p. 18). There are a few current initiatives to evaluate the pros and 
cons of integrated pollution control and multiple-pollutant management.24 These 
include a study of the benefits and drawbacks of integrated pollution permitting in the 
United Kingdom (U.S.EPA, undated). The EPA also administers a grant program for 
developing countries that supports the adoption of regulations that integrate the 
control of emissions that cause global warming and those that cause local damages 
(U.S.EPA, 2007a). In response to the National Research Council (2004) report 
referenced at the beginning of this chapter, the EPA is encouraging states to adopt a 
“multipollutant control strategy” by “selecting a control strategy that optimizes the 
mix of control for multiple [air] pollutants” that should include at least ozone, 
particulates, and toxic air pollutants (Page, 2005).  
                                                 
24 Tellingly, these efforts themselves are not clearly integrated. 
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There are also efforts in the U.S. that, while not explicitly part of integrated 
or multiple pollutant initiatives, are still relevant to this discussion. For example, Title 
V of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments requires integrated air pollution permits 
for large stationary sources (U.S.EPA, 2007b). Some of the justifications for this 
initiative are reminiscent of those made in favor of integrated permitting in Europe. 
There are also examples of rules that acknowledge the benefit of integrating the 
control of multiple types of emissions and pollutants. For example, federal ozone 
regulations allow states to avoid tightening NOX or VOC emissions if such an 
approach may lead to an increase in ozone. While not yet proposed, the EPA is 
considering establishing a combined (secondary) ambient air quality standard for 
NOX and SO2.25  
1.5 A Preview of the Dissertation 
While there are many complications in multiple pollutant control that 
deserve more attention from the economics discipline, I select only one to address in 
this dissertation. An important research vein in environmental economics is the 
normative study of methods for regulating pollutants. This research is grouped under 
the rubric “instrument choice.” As noted above, typically economists advocate the use 
of price (tax) or quantity instruments (cap-and-trade programs) to achieve pollution 
control targets. The value of these instruments is in the incentives they provide to 
achieve collective emission reductions at least cost and their superiority in motivating 
technological development. In simple contexts, a regulator is indifferent between a 
                                                 
25 Personal communication with Marie (Lisa) Conner, Economist, Office of Air Quality Planning and 
Standards, U.S.EPA, May 2, 2007.  
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tax and a quantity approach (Baumol and Oates, 1988). However, complications may 
arise that differentially support these two instruments. One important complication 
that yields differences in the performance of these instruments is when the regulator 
is uncertain of the abatement costs of the polluting sources.26 Beyond the general 
theme of multiple pollutant control, the dissertation is specifically interested in how 
our understanding of instrument choice is affected when the regulator is uncertain of 
the abatement cost of jointly controlled pollutants. 
The next chapter has two purposes. First, I demonstrate that the means for 
controlling pollution typically advocated by economists, cap-and-trade and pollution 
taxes, continue to yield Pareto optimal outcomes in an economy with multiple 
pollutants. This assures us that we have a basis to expect that these regulatory 
approaches are likely optimal when we move to an uncertain setting. While the proof 
is straightforward, laying out such a model helps one identify the various 
complications that might affect the regulation of multiple pollutants in a real-world 
setting. Chapter 2 also includes an exploration of how changing technological 
parameters affects emissions and allowance prices when two types of emissions are 
being controlled by taxes and/or cap-and-trade programs. Again, while relatively 
simple, this model will be used to interpret and help assure the reliability of some of 
the results from the simulation exercise described in Chapter 4. 
                                                 
26 Others include the presence of market distortions (Goulder, 2002). More complex instruments, like 




I then explore the implication of abatement cost uncertainty on instrument 
choice in a two-pollutant framework in Chapter 3. The results from this model are 
compared to the findings from the single pollutant model most frequently attributed to 
Weitzman (1974). Weitzman and others have derived conditions under which a tax 
policy is preferable to a quantity policy and vice-versa. In this chapter I find that the 
well-known conditions that identify the optimal type of instrument to control one 
pollutant are no longer sufficient in the multiple pollutant case. However, a lesser-
known way of identifying the optimal instrument in a single pollutant case is helpful 
for understanding the multiple pollutant case. I also evaluate whether our intuition 
regarding the optimal instrument to control one pollutant is still valid at the extremes 
of the shapes of the joint abatement cost function and the slopes of the abatement 
benefit functions. Along the way, the results are related to general equilibrium 
welfare analysis and the theory of second-best. 
The motivation for this entire analysis derives from an important policy 
case. Regulations recently adopted by the EPA use cap-and-trade programs to control 
Hg, SO2 and NOX emissions from the electricity sector. Technologies designed to 
abate SO2, NOX and particulates from coal-fired power plants also reduce Hg 
emissions, but the extent to which they do so is uncertain. Chapter 4 explores the 
performance of different instrument combinations to control these pollutants using a 
detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector (this model is described in the 
Appendix). An important ancillary contribution of this work is that it also provides 
the first estimate of the efficient level of Hg emissions from the electricity sector. 
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The final chapter concludes with a summary of the main findings of the 
dissertation and a brief discussion of directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: JOINT ABATEMENT IN A DETERMINISTIC 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
In the first part of this chapter I demonstrate that the regulatory approaches 
that may yield Pareto optimal outcomes in a single-pollutant economy, pollution tax 
and cap-and-trade programs, can also be used to generate Pareto optimal outcomes in 
an economy that generates multiple pollutants. This proof requires only a simply 
extension of a well-known general equilibrium model of an economy that generates a 
single pollutant. However with this result established, we can comfortably assume, 
when we introduce uncertainty in later chapters, that these regulatory approaches are 
those that would otherwise be recommended.   
The second half of this chapter introduces a simple deterministic joint 
abatement model at the firm level. The model is designed to capture the essence of 
the technological relationship that motivates the analysis in the empirical portion of 
this dissertation. With this model we can explore how changing the abatement 
relationship affects emissions and allowance prices when either an emissions tax or 
cap-and-trade program is used to control each pollutant. The results from the 
analytical model will be compared to the results from the simulation exercise 
described in Chapter 4. 
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2.2 Achieving Pareto Optimality with Multiple Pollutants 
2.2.1 The Model 
In considering the challenge of regulating multiple pollutants, our first task 
is to establish that the regulatory instruments we traditionally believe can be used to 
generate a socially efficient outcome are applicable to the control of multiple 
pollutants. In a general equilibrium setting Baumol and Oates (1988) show that there 
exists a tax on the emissions of a single pollutant that assures a Pareto optimal 
outcome in a market setting. However, when there are multiple pollutants, is there 
now a set of emission taxes that can be used to assure a Pareto optimal outcome? The 
following analysis addresses this question. 
The model used herein follows very closely the notation, order, 
assumptions and derivation in Baumol and Oates, Chapter 4 (1988). The primary 
difference is that now more than one pollutant is being emitted.1 Otherwise, we 
assume that the model and its characteristics, in particular those that assure a unique 
maximum in a single pollutant case, are the same. The following analysis also retains 
the “undepletable” characteristic of the pollutants.2 That is, the level of pollution 
affecting an individual or firm is the same level that affects all other individuals and 
firms. There is also no uncertainty and the model is static. Our final assumption is one 
that would not have meaning in the Baumol and Oates model: that the different 
                                                 
1 Tietenberg (1973a) and Ruff (1972) perform a very similar analysis to the one provided here. They 
both use general equilibrium models of a slightly different form to demonstrate the existence of a set of 
taxes on multiple pollutants that yield an efficient distribution of resources.  
2 Freeman (1984) demonstrates that this assumption is not critical to the results. 
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pollutants do not interact in the environment. More will be said about this last 
assumption below. 
The model is described by the following: 
xij : the amount of good (resource) i consumed by individual j, (i=1,.....,n), (j=1,...,m) 
yik : the amount of good (resource) i produced (used)
3 by firm k, (k=1,....,h) 
ri : the total quantity of resource i available to the community 







=∑ total emissions in the community of pollutant l 
( )1 1,...., , ,.....,j j nj pu x x z z : individual j’s utility function 
and  
( )1 1 1,...., , ,...., , ,....., 0k k nk k kp pf y y s s z z ≤  : firm k’s production set 
We retain all of the assumptions in Baumol and Oates that assure a unique 
solution to this problem exists. Namely, that the preference functions are increasing in 
all xij, quasi-concave, and twice differentiable. Furthermore, we assume each firm’s 
feasible production set is convex and twice differentiable.4 
A Pareto optimum can be found by maximizing the utility of a single 
individual, for convenience individual 1, subject to the restriction that there is no 
                                                 
3 Note there is no sign restriction on yik as it may be either an input to the firm, perhaps manufactured 
by another firm, or an output of the firm. 
4 Note that Baumol and Oates say nothing about the change in the preference functions or the feasible 
production with respect to an increase in zl. We acknowledge here that the change may either be 
positive or negative. Therefore, the model may also represent the presence of both negative and 
positive externalities. Of course, for each zl that on net has a positive external effect, the optimal tax on 
zl will actually be a subsidy.  
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reduction in welfare of any other individual. The optimum is subject to the limitations 
on the production sets of the firms and the availability of resources. Our problem is 
then to maximize: 
 ( )1 11 1 1,...., , ,.....,n pu x x z z  (2.1) 
 subject to: 
 ( ) *1 1,...., , ,.....,j jj nj pu x x z z u≥  ( )2,....,j m=  








− ≤∑ ∑  
 for all 0ijx ≥ , 0kls ≥ , 0lz ≥  
This problem can be solved using the Lagrangian: 
 ( ) ( )*. .j j kj k i i ij ik
j k i j k
L u u f r x yλ µ ω
⎛ ⎞
⎡ ⎤= − − + − −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦
⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (2.2) 
where each λj, µk, and ωi is a Lagrange multiplier. The optimality and complementary 
slackness conditions associated with the real choice variables for this problem may be 
found in the second column of Table 2.1.5 Again following Baumol and Oates, we 
simplify cross partial expressions so that j ji iju u x≡∂ ∂ , 
k k
i ikf f y≡∂ ∂ , etc. 
                                                 
5 We suppress the complementary slackness conditions associated with the utility, production set, and 
resource balancing restrictions and their respective Lagrange multipliers. 
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The specific distinction between this model and the one found in Baumol 
and Oates can be found in the last row of the second column of Table 2.1. Rather than 
there being a single pollutant that is controlled (i.e. p=1), there is now a set of control 
conditions, one for each pollutant l. Collectively the conditions found in the second 
column of Table 2.1 are necessary for a Pareto optimum, whose existence and 
uniqueness is guaranteed given our assumptions regarding the form of the utility 
functions and the production sets. 
Table 2.1: Optimality Conditions with Multiple Externalities 
Choice 
Variable 
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2.2.2 Characterizing a Market Equilibrium with Multiple Pollutants 
Before we interpret the necessary conditions for a Pareto optimal outcome, 
and in particular what they say about the optimal pollution tax levels, we first explore 
the market conditions faced by consumers and producers. In this setting, we allow the 
regulator to impose a unique tax per unit of emissions on each pollutant l.6 
Consumers minimize their expenditures subject to their given utility identified above 
( * ju ). Thus the Lagrangian for the representative individual j is: 
 ( )* .j jj i ij j
i
L p x u uα ⎡ ⎤≡ + −⎣ ⎦∑  (2.3) 
 subject to: 0ijx ≥  
where αj is a Lagrange multiplier and the real choice variables are each xij. The 
optimality and complementary slackness conditions associated with the real choice 
variables for this problem are reported in the first row of the third column of Table 
2.1.  
On the production side, the representative firm maximizes its profits 
subject to market prices and technological restrictions on its production possibilities. 
Furthermore, the regulator may impose a tax 
lz
t on the representative firm’s emissions 
of each pollutant skl. The Lagrangian for the representative firm k is:  
 
                                                 
6 Unlike the treatment in Baumol and Oates, we avoid considering whether or not it is desirable to 
compensate or punish those exposed to emissions. We take it as a well-established result that they 





k i ik z kkl
i l
L p y t s fβ≡ − −∑ ∑  (2.4) 
 subject to: 0kls ≥  
where βk  is a Lagrange multiplier and the real choice variables are yik and kls . As in 
Baumol and Oates we use the notation k  to represent the firm that generates the 
particular share of pollutant l as opposed to the firms that are affected by it. The 
optimality conditions for the representative firm’s input and output choices are 
reported in the second row of the third column of Table 2.1. The optimality and 
associated complementary slackness conditions for this firm’s emission of pollutant zl 
given the tax 
lz
t are reported in the third row of the third column of Table 2.1. 
2.2.3 Comparing the Efficient and Market Outcomes 
As in the case where a single pollutant is being emitted, there exists a set of 
prices and optimally chosen taxes that replicate the social optimum. These are found 
in the last column of Table 2.1. We see in the cell in the lower right corner that, as in 
the single pollutant case, the regulator ought to choose a suite of taxes, where the tax 
on each pollutant l equals the sum of the marginal damages imposed on every agent 
in the economy from an additional increment of that pollutant at the efficient 
outcome. Described more succinctly, the optimal tax for each pollutant should equal 
the marginal social damage of that particular pollutant. Conditional on the regulator 
selecting these optimal tax levels, the economy will replicate the Pareto optimal 
distribution of resources and goods. 
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We can interpret the conditions for the optimal tax levels more cleanly if, 
as Baumol and Oates do, we view these conditions by considering their level relative 
to the value of one particular resource in this economy: time (i.e. labor and leisure). 
Let i* represent this particular resource. Furthermore, we assume that each individual 
and each firm employs some of this resource so that * 0i jx >  and * 0i jy > . As such, the 
optimality conditions with respect to the use of labor/leisure hold with equality for 
each consumer and producer, implying: 
 * *
* *




λ µ= =  
Taking this information and incorporating it into the expression for the optimal tax 
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u u represents the compensation in the form of an amount of the 
good *i jx  required to maintain individual j’s utility given an increase in j’s exposure to 
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A similar expression can be derived for the compensation to firm k in terms of the 
input *i jy  (which takes on a negative value) to keep the firm on its production frontier 













∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑  (2.7) 
The expression on the right side of (2.7) equals the compensation, measured by the 
value of labor *iω , required by each agent affected by the pollutant zl to offset the 
damages they experience from the marginal emission of zl. The marginal 
compensation required is actually the marginal damage to each agent.7 While we have 
not demonstrated so here, presumably it can also be shown that a set of tradable 
permits lz  (l=1,….,p) exist that yield prices equal to the optimal taxes. 
While these results are not surprising, sometimes a simple model is 
powerful in allowing one to see what components of reality are missing and in turn to 
demonstrate areas for research. For example, as described in Chapter 1, partial 
equilibrium modes have considered complications where the emissions that the 
individuals and firms are exposed to is not simply equal to the sum of emissions 
released by the firms. This may be due to the distance between emitters and those 
affected by pollution, or because the emissions form a secondary pollutant that in turn 
affects the individuals and firms. Both of these extensions imply a more general form 
                                                 
7 Indeed, the term “compensation” here is a measure of the real welfare loss measured by the minimum 
willingness to accept of each affected individual and firm to be indifferent to its loss from the marginal 
contribution of zl. It is not a claim that the individuals or firms should receive some payment for the 
damages they incur as a result of zl.  See footnote 6. 
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of the relationship between the exposure of individual j to some pollutant zjv and a 
subset of the different discharges from the firms. In this model we could represent 
this general form ( )11 1 1,...., ,..., ,....,jv jv p h hpz Z s s s s= , (v=1,…,r). Note that there may be r 
of these pollutants and that r is not necessarily equal (or less than) p, the number of 
emission types. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the interactions may generate non-
convexities such that they are multiple local maxima to the problem (2.2).8,9  
Another component missing from this model is any uncertainty on behalf 
of the regulator about the nature of damages and the demand for pollution by the 
regulated sources. Weitzman (1974) showed that in the presence of uncertainty 
regarding the abatement cost (benefit of pollution) of the emitting firms that the 
regulator may no longer be indifferent to using tax or quantity instruments to control 
pollution. As described in the previous chapter, the bulk of this dissertation considers 
extending the Weitzman model to multiple pollutants. But before we get to that point, 
we first consider an explicit and deterministic model of the abatement decisions of a 
                                                 
8 Tietetenberg (1973b) uses a general-equilibrium model with a more general relationship between 
pollutants and the externalities of the form ( ) ( ). .jv jv vz Z Z≡ ≡ for all j (he refers to the pollutants skl. as 
“waste products” and the zv as pollutants) to show that a set of taxes can be used to generate a Pareto 
optimal outcome. Despite his use of a general form of ( ).vZ , he does not acknowledge that the form of 
the ( ).vZ functions themselves may create the possibility of multiple maxima or violate sufficiency 
conditions. Perhaps this is because he only interpreted ( ).vZ capturing a spatial relationship between 
the skl’s and zvl that may change over time and so he does not consider the possibility that ( ).vZ  may 
not be additively separable. Ruff (1972) does consider the case where ( ).vZ  is not additively separable 
but also does not acknowledge that the relationship between emissions may yield non-convexities even 
though he is particular interested in the control of smog (ozone). 
9 Another potential source of multiple local maxima in this problem is that the externalities themselves 
may introduce non-convexities in the social production possibilities set (see Chapter 8 of Baumol and 
Oates). While it is not technically accurate to suggest that increasing the number of pollutants increases 
the possibility that such non-convexities exist, the notion has some intuitive appeal. 
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firm emitting multiple pollutants. This model will be used to inform the market 
simulation exercise that follows in Chapter 4. 
2.3 Analytical Model of Joint Abatement 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation describes a market simulation exercise that 
explores a case where a regulator is choosing between tax and quantity instruments to 
control two pollutants but is uncertain of the joint abatement control costs of the 
regulated sources. That analysis is presented for a particularly policy-relevant case 
study: the control of mercury (Hg) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from coal-fired 
power plants. There are pollution control technologies designed to control Hg and 
technologies designed to abate SO2 from these plants. However, the pollution control 
technologies designed to abate SO2 emissions also abate Hg emissions, although the 
extent to which they do is uncertain.10 We assume that this uncertainty only maintains 
for the regulator and that the regulated sources will know the effect of these controls 
on their Hg emissions by the time they make compliance decisions, if not earlier.  
While the regulatory setting is uncertain from the perspective of the 
regulator, the market simulation model is deterministic. In order to capture the effect 
of uncertainty from the regulator’s perspective, the simulation model is solved for a 
                                                 
10 The actual policy setting is even more complicated than described here. Technologies used to control 
other common pollutants also have an uncertain effect on Hg emissions. To keep the discussion simple 
we only focus on the effect of SO2 controls at this point.  Chapter 4 describes the actual technology 
setting in detail. 
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number of possible outcomes of the effect of SO2 controls on Hg emissions. The 
regulator assigns a probability weight to each possible outcome. 
Before we get to the market simulation exercise, however, it is informative 
to understand in a simple model how changes in certain parameters affect emissions, 
prices and abatement intensity in this particular context. The following model is 
framed around the particular technology setting described above. There is a control 
specifically designed to abate SO2 and another specifically designed to abate Hg. The 
control designed to abate SO2 also abates Hg. In particular, we are interested in how 
changing the effectiveness of the SO2 control in reducing Hg emissions affects the 
use of the abating inputs, the emissions of the pollutants if taxes are used, and the 
allowance prices if cap-and-trade programs are used. Restricting the model to 
represent a particular technology setting is both its strength and weakness. While it 
helps us judge and understand the reasonableness of the results from the simulation 
model, it does not provide a particularly broad insight into the regulation of multiple 
pollutants. 
2.3.2 Characterization of Firm Problem 
The following model provides some perspective into how we should think 
about the effect of changing the impact of SO2 controls on Hg emissions. We start 
with a representative firm that is minimizing the cost of controlling two pollutants 
that arise from the given use of a dirty input, x. The two pollutants are m and s. 
Heuristically, we can think of x as coal, m as Hg and s as SO2.  
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The total emission of s is proportional to x and can be reduced by a 
pollution control technology. The function ( )lσ  represents the “emissions 
modification factor” of this abatement technology where l is an input to the abatement 
process. The emissions modification factor is the percent of emissions that remain 
uncontrolled after the technology has been applied.11 The input l is also chosen 
heuristically as lime is a key input to technologies called “scrubbers” that abate SO2. 
Emissions of s can be expressed as:12 
 ( )s x lσ=  (2.8) 
Similar to the emission of s, the emission of m is also proportional to x. A 
technology designed to abate m is characterized by the modification factor ( )aµ . Here 
the variable name a is chosen because activated carbon is the major variable input to 
reducing Hg emissions. At the same time, the input l also reduces emissions of m by 
the modification factor ( )lδ γ , where γ is some non-negative scalar. Changes to the 
scalar γ will be used to mimic the effect of changing the effectiveness of l in abating 
m.  The total emission of m can thus be represented as: 
 ( ) ( )m x a lµ δ γ=  (2.9) 
                                                 
11 The emissions modification factor equals 1 minus the removal efficiency of the technology. The 
term removal efficiency, which equals the percentage of uncontrolled emissions that are abated, is 
more commonly used to describe the effectiveness of an abatement technique. 
12 A more accurate representation of emissions is: 
( )ss x lα σ=  
where 0<as<1 such that s is a share of the weight of x. However, for expositional convenience we 
assume as=1. 
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Note the simple multiplicative form of these abatement technologies. This 
captures the idea that the abatement technologies are in sequence and that the use of 
one does not influence the performance of the other. This is a somewhat realistic 
assumption in the case of Hg and SO2 controls. The use of scrubbers usually does not 
interfere significantly with the operation of an activated carbon injection (Hg 
removal) system and vice-versa. Where this assumption is a bit unrealistic is that the 
performance of a Hg control technology is somewhat dependent on the concentration, 
not just the total quantity, of the pollutant in the flue gas stream. 
All of the emission modification factors are assumed to have the following 
properties:  
 (.) 0g ′ <  (2.10) 









1ln 0d g i g i g i g i
d i g i
′′ ′⎡ ⎤= − >⎣ ⎦  (2.12) 
 (0) 1g =  (2.13) 




=  (2.14) 
where (.)g  is { (.)σ , (.)µ , (.)δ } and i is { l, a, γl }. The first two assumptions apply 
the intuition that the percentage reduction in emissions, 1 (.)g− , increases at a 
decreasing rate with an increase in the abating input i. Abatement technologies 
generally have these characteristics (at least over a meaningful range) as physical and 
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chemical limits (such as reactive mixing) are approached. Figure 2.1 provides a 
graphical representation of (.)g . 
The third restriction requires a bit more explanation. What is being 
assumed is that the percentage change in the emissions modification factor decreases 
at an increasing rate as i increases. Thus, it gets more and more difficult, not just in 
absolute but in percentage terms, to lower the emissions modification factor with an 
additional unit of i. This restriction has intuitive appeal as the emissions modification 
factor itself is a percentage representation (the percentage of uncontrolled emissions 
that remain).  
Figure 2.1. Graphical Representation of (.)g  
 
The last two assumptions simplify the problem but are not necessary for 
the results that follow. As these functions should be thought of as emission 
modification factors, which are percentage representations, it is natural to treat them 
as bounded between 0 and 1. Even if (2.13) did not hold in practice, as long as the 
remaining assumptions hold, the function g(.) could be normalized as such. The 
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assumption (2.14) is additionally overly prescriptive as the maximum efficacy of the 
technology simply must be non-negative. Indeed, (.)g  may even have a minimum at 
some finite i, but considering such possibilities would unduly complicate the problem 
at this point. 
Each pollutant may be controlled by either a single-valued tax or quantity 
restriction. There are thus four possible instrument mixes that the firm may face and 
they are summarized in Table 2.2 While this model has been described as the case of 
an individual firm, we can also think of it as representing the control of a group of 
regulated sources. Therefore we may then think of the shadow values on the quantity 
restrictions, either s  or m , as the respective allowance prices of these pollutants. 
 
Table 2.2: Potential Instrument Mixes 
  m instrument 
  tax quantity 
ta











,mt s  ,m s  
 
We are primarily interested in how increasing γ changes the use of the 
abating inputs l and a as well as the emissions and/or allowance price of the two 
pollutants. We begin by considering the case where both pollutants are controlled by 
a tax.  
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2.3.3 Both Pollutants Controlled by Tax Instruments 
Let us start by analyzing the firm’s problem when each pollutant is 
controlled by a tax. Further, let us simplify the analytics and assume that the use of 
the polluting input, x, equals 1.13 The input l is available at a constant cost, lp , while 
the per unit price of a is ap . The firm’s problem is thus: 




l a s mp l p a t l t a lσ µ δ γ+ + +  (2.15) 
The necessary conditions for this problem are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )





p t l t a l
p t a l
σ γµ δ γ
µ δ γ
′ ′+ + =
′+ =
 (2.16) 
To be confident that these first-order conditions yield a global minimum, it is 
sufficient to know that the following Hessian matrix: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




t l t a l t a l
t a l t a l
σ γ µ δ γ γµ δ γ
γµ δ γ µ δ γ
′′ ′′ ′ ′⎡ ⎤+
⎢ ⎥′ ′ ′′⎣ ⎦
 
is positive definite. That is, the following two restrictions must hold: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 0m st a l t lγ µ δ γ σ′′ ′′+ >  (2.17) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 0m m st t a l a l a l t l a lγ µ δ γ µ δ γ µ δ γ σ µ δ γ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′− + >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ (2.18) 
Our assumptions (2.10) through (2.12) assure that (2.17) and (2.18) are satisfied. 
                                                 
13 This assumption is maintained throughout the remainder of the analysis. 
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Again, we are interested in how changing γ affects the use of the abating 
inputs. Applying standard comparative statics techniques we have: 
    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )








t l l a a a
l l ldl
d t a l a l a l t l a l
δ γ γ δ γ
γδ γ µ µ µ
γ δ γ δ γ
γ γ µ δ γ µ δ γ µ δ γ σ µ δ γ
⎡ ⎤′′⎡ ⎤
′ ′′ ′− + −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥′ ′⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦=
⎡ ⎤′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′− +⎣ ⎦
 (2.19) 
    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 22
0m s
m s
a l t a l lt lda
d t a l a l a l t l a l
µ δ γ γ µ δ γ σ
γ γ µ δ γ µ δ γ µ δ γ σ µ δ γ
′ ′ ′ ′′⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦= <
⎡ ⎤′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′− +⎣ ⎦
 (2.20) 
The denominator of both of these expressions is positive as long as the 
second-order condition (2.18) holds. The numerator of (2.20) is negative implying 
that the use of the abating input a falls as the effectiveness of l in abating m increases. 
Perhaps surprisingly, as can be seen in (2.19), an increase in the effectiveness of l in 
abating m does not necessarily imply an increase in the use of the abating input l. The 
numerator may be positive or negative. Note that a necessary condition for the 







( ) ( )
2
1
l l l a
l l l a a
δ γ γδ γ µ
γδ γ δ γ µ µ
′′ ′⎡ ⎤
+ >⎢ ⎥′ ′ ′′⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (2.21) 
While the right side of (2.21) is clearly positive and less than one given assumption 
(2.12), the left side can take any sign and may be greater than one. 
This ambiguity actually has intuitive appeal. On one hand, there is an 
incentive to use more l given that it is more effective in abating m; the tax burden of 
emitting m can be lowered. On the other hand, less l can be used to achieve the same 
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level of abatement, so reducing its use is desired. On net, these competing effects 
imply that the change in the use of l is ambiguous.14  
We are also interested in how increasing γ changes the emissions of the two 
pollutants. The change in the emission of s (which is defined in (2.8)) is: 







where l γ∂ ∂  is defined by (2.19). We see that the change in s is ambiguous as the 
change in l is ambiguous. If the use of l rises or falls, the emission of s decreases or 
increases. The change in m, however, is unambiguous (taking the definition of m from 
(2.9)): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a ldm a l d a l d l a l dµ δ γ γ γµ δ γ γ µ δ γ γ
γ γ
∂ ∂′ ′ ′= + +
∂ ∂
 (2.23) 
The cross-partials in this expression can be substituted with the comparative statics 
expressions (2.19) and (2.20) to yield: 
    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






l l t l l t a l a a adm
d t a l a l a l t l a l
δ γ δ γ σ γµ δ γ µ µ µ
γ γ µ δ γ µ δ γ µ δ γ σ µ δ γ
⎡ ⎤′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦= <
⎡ ⎤′′ ′′ ′ ′ ′′ ′′− +⎣ ⎦
 (2.24) 
The denominator of this expression is positive given the second order conditions of 
this problem. In the numerator the first and second bracketed expressions are positive, 
while the term multiplying these bracketed expressions is negative, given our 
                                                 
14 The possibility that the use of l may fall with an increase in its effectiveness in abating m is most 
easily seen in the case where ( ) 1aµ ≡  and 0st = . Appendix 2.A reports this case. 
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assumptions (2.10)-(2.12). Therefore, the emission of m falls as the effectiveness of γ 
increases, as would be expected. 
2.3.4 Summary of Effects of Changing Technological Relationship 
Appendix 2.B records a similar analysis for the three other instrument 
mixes this firm may face. The collective results of this analysis are summarized in 
Table 2.3. The variables λs and λm are the shadow values on the emission constraints 
on m and s. As noted above, we can interpret this firm-level problem as representing a 
composite abatement cost function for multiple regulated sources and that the shadow 
values represent the prices of tradable allowances. 
Table 2.3: Effect of an Increase in γ on the Variables of Interest 
 Instrument Mix 
Variable ,m st t  , sm t  ,mt s  ,m s  
D l ? ? 0 ?÷ 
D a ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
D s ? ? --- --- 
D m ∞ --- ∞ --- 
D λs --- --- ? ? 
D λm --- ∞ --- ∞ 
÷ The asymmetry in claims regarding D l when s is 
controlled by a quantity is due to the number of 
constraints equaling the number of choice variables in 
the case where both pollutants are controlled by a 
quantity. See Appendix 2.B for details. 
 
The message of this analysis is that changing the nature of the 
technological relationship between the level of l and the emissions of m does not have 
a clear effect on the emissions of s if s is controlled by a tax, or the shadow value of 
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s  if s is controlled by a quantity. There are two competing influences on the use of l 
as γ increases. The first is to increase the use of l as it has a greater impact on the 
level of m. The countervailing influence is that the level of l already chosen (before γ 
increased) has a greater effect on m so now less l is desired. As these competing 
influences affect the marginal benefit of using l to control m, they also have an 
ambiguous effect on the shadow value of the constraint on s when s is controlled by a 
quantity. 
Furthermore, we see in Appendix 2.B that, conditional on m being 
controlled by a tax, the direction of change in l (and thus s) if s is controlled by a tax 
is dictated by the same expression that indicates whether λs rises or falls. These 
expressions are (2.21) and (2.46) respectively. Perhaps more importantly, conditional 
on s being controlled by a tax, the direction of the change in the level of l as γ 
changes may depend on whether m is controlled by a tax or quantity. That the 
direction of l may depend on whether m is controlled by a tax or quantity as can be 
seen from a comparison of the expressions (2.21) and (2.38). This is true even if the 
quantity restriction on m is chosen such that its shadow value equals the level of the 
tax.  
An ancillary observation from this analysis is that increasing the abatement 
effectiveness of l on m unambiguously either lowers the emission of m or the shadow 
value of a quantity restriction on m. Also, the use of a falls if γ increases regardless of 
how the pollutants are controlled. These results will be helpful in evaluating the 
results from the simulation modeling in Chapter 4. 
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Appendix 2.A Single Pollutant Example 
How does changing the effectiveness of the abating input l change the use 
of that input when only m is being regulated? Here we ignore the level of emissions 
of s (assume it is not regulated) and assume no unique technology for abating m exists 
(so ( ) 1aµ ≡ ). Again, we let x be the exogenously-determined polluting input, pl be 
the price of the abating input, and ( )lδ γ be the emissions modification factor which 
has all of the restrictions (2.10)-(2.14). In this setting and with an emissions tax on m 
the firm minimizes: 
 ( )l mp l t x lδ γ+  (2.25) 
We again simplify this problem and assume that the use of the polluting 
input, x, is 1. The first-order condition for this problem is: 
 ( ) 0l mp t lγδ γ′+ =  (2.26) 
The second order condition of this problem is satisfied: 
 ( )2 0mt lγ δ γ′′ >  (2.27) 
Now we check to see what happens to the choice of the abating input l if 
the abating effectiveness of γ increases. Using (2.26), which implicitly defines the 
optimal level of l as a function of γ, we have:  
 





γ δ γ δ γ






In the numerator of (2.28) we see the competing influences of the effect of 
increasing γ on the optimal level of l. The first part of the numerator is negative. This 
part captures how increasing the effectiveness of l increases the inframarginal 
abatement of m, suggesting that the use of l may be lowered. The bigger γl is already, 
the stronger this influence. The second part of the numerator is positive and captures 
the benefit of increasing the use of l on the margin to reduce the total tax payment 








γ γ γ δ γ
′⎡ ⎤
= − +⎢ ⎥′′⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (2.29) 
Where we can see that the effect of increasing γ on l depends on the elasticity of 
( )lδ γ′  with respect to γl. Note that the bracketed term in (2.29) is familiar as it is 
present in the expressions (2.19), (2.35) and (2.45) which indicate the sign of dl dγ  





                                                 
15 Despite the ambiguity in the level of l as γ increases, the level of m strictly falls as l increases: 
( ) ( )2 0dm d l lγ δ γ γδ γ′ ′′=− < . 
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Appendix 2.B Alternative Instrument Combinations 
2.B.1 m controlled by a Quantity, s controlled by a Tax 
In this case the pollutant m is controlled by a quantity and the pollutant s is 
controlled by a tax. Here the firm faces the restriction: 
 ( ) ( )a l mµ δ γ ≤  (2.30) 
where m  is the quantity restriction on the pollutant m. The firm’s problem can be 
expressed: 
 ( ),min :l a l a sp l p a t lσ+ +  (2.31) 
subject to the restriction (2.30). This problem can be represented by the Lagragian: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , m l a s mL l a p l p a t l a l mλ σ λ µ δ γ≡ + + + −  (2.32) 
The first-order conditions for this problem are16: 
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These conditions describe a unique global minimum provided that the following 
bordered Hessian is positive-definite (has a negative determinant):  
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′ ′⎡ ⎤
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⎢ ⎥′ ′ ′ ′′⎣ ⎦
 
which indeed it is: 
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⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤′ ′′ ′−⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤=− <′ ′′ ′+ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥′ ′′+⎣ ⎦
 (2.34) 
The two central bracketed terms are positive given our assumption (2.12) and the last 
term in the bracketed expression is positive given our assumption (2.11). Notice that 
we introduced the label mH  to represent the second-order condition (2.34). This 
expression presents itself in the comparative statics expressions. 
We now turn to the question of how the use of abating inputs l and a, as 
well as the shadow value on the emission restriction m, change as γ increases. These 
expressions can be summarized: 
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l l ldl
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δ γ γ δ γ
λ γ δ γ µ µ µ µ
γ δ γ δ γ
γ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤′′
′ ′′ ′− − +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥′ ′⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦= (2.35) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0s m
m
a l a lt l a lda
d H
µ δ γ µ σ γλ µ δ γ
γ
′ ′ ′′ ′⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦= <  (2.36) 
 




l a a a lt l a ld
d H
λ δ γ µ µ µ σ γλ µ δ γλ
γ
⎡ ⎤′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦= <  (2.37) 
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We see in (2.36) and (2.37) that the use of the abating input a falls as does 
the shadow value of the emission constraint m  when γ increases. The numerator in 
both of these expressions is positive given our assumptions (2.10)-(2.12) and the 
denominator as we have already established is negative. Neither finding is surprising 
as it is now easier to abate m.  
As in the case where both pollutants are controlled by a tax, we see in 
(2.35) that the effect of increasing g on the use of the abating input l is indeterminate. 






( ) ( )
( )2
2 1
l l l a a
l l l a
δ γ γ δ γ µ µ
γ δ γ δ γ µ
′′ ′′⎡ ⎤
− + >⎢ ⎥′ ′ ′⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (2.38) 
then the use of l increases with an increase in γ, otherwise the use of l falls or stays 
the same.17 The logic is as before. Now that each unit of l has a greater effect in 
reducing the emission of m, less l is needed to maintain a given level of m. However, 
the greater effectiveness of l allows the firm to substitute away from a, suggesting 
that more l will be used. On net the effect on l, and consequently on s (following 
(2.22)), is indeterminate.  
2.B.2 m Controlled by a Tax, s Controlled by a Quantity 
Next we consider the case where the firm faces a tax on the pollutant m and 
a restriction on the pollutant s that it be no greater than s . The restriction on s can be 
expressed: 
                                                 
17 Note that the right side of (2.38) must be greater than 1 given (2.12). We have not imposed any 
restriction on ( )lδ γ  that would prevent the left side of (2.38) from being greater than 1. 
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 ( )l sσ ≤  (2.39) 
The firm’s problem can solved via the Lagrangian: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , s l a s mL l a p l p a l s t a lλ λ σ µ δ γ⎡ ⎤≡ + + − +⎣ ⎦  (2.40) 
This problem has the following first-order conditions18: 
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If the determinate of the following bordered Hessian is negative, these first-order 
conditions describe a global minimum: 
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⎢ ⎥′ ′ ′′⎣ ⎦
 
The determinate is indeed negative: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )2 0s mH t l l aδ γ σ µ′ ′′=− <  (2.42) 
given our assumption (2.11). Note that we labeled the determinant sH  as s is being 
controlled by a quantity. We use this expression in summarizing the comparative 
statics analysis of the choice variables when γ is increased: 
 0dl
dγ
=  (2.43) 
                                                 
18 Again we assume the constraint binds and ignore the complementary slackness condition.  
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Given that we are assuming that the constraint on the emission of s binds, it 
is expected that the level of l does not change in response to an increase in γ. We see 
in (2.43) that this is the case. It is also unsurprising that the use of a falls with an 
increase in γ as we see in (2.44).  
We see in (2.45) that the effect of increasing γ on the shadow value of the 
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δ γ γ δ γ µ
γ δ γ δ γ µ µ
′′ ′⎡ ⎤
+ >⎢ ⎥′ ′ ′′⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (2.46) 
otherwise it decreases or stays the same. This ambiguity arises from the same 
competing effects that make the effect of changing γ on l ambiguous when s is 
controlled by a tax. In one sense, the value of using l to abate m has fallen because 
less l is needed to achieve a certain level of m. This effect increases the shadow value 
of the constraint on s as there is a shift in the burden of using l to the control of s. On 
the other hand, the marginal unit of l has an added benefit in reducing m, which 
suggests that on the margin the benefit of using l shifts to controlling m. This effect 
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lowers the shadow value of the constraint on s. On net these effects suggest that the 
change in l is ambiguous. 
Finally, we also want to know how the emission of the optimal level of m 




( ) ( ) ( )
2( ) 0





′ ⎡ ⎤′′ ′= − <⎣ ⎦′′
 (2.47) 
Again this is an unsurprising, but comforting, outcome. 
2.B.3 Both Pollutants Controlled by a Quantity 
Finally we have the case where both pollutants are controlled by a quantity. 
The restrictions on emissions are expressed in (2.30) and (2.39). Note that except in a 
very unique case do these constraints simultaneously bind at the firm’s optimal choice 
of l and a as there are as many constraints as there are choice variables. As such the 
construction of a constrained optimization problem absent particular parameter values 
(such that we could identify which constraint binds) would not be meaningful.  
An alternative method for dealing with this problem is to make the model 
even more realistic and impose yet another method for abating one or both of the 
pollutants. The simplest change would be to introduce a second abatement technology 
for the control of s, solving our degrees-of-freedom problem.19 Carrying out this 
                                                 
19 In the case of controlling SO2 and Hg from coal-fired electricity generators the obvious change 
would be to have choice in the type of coal used. Different coal types have different Hg and sulfur 
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analysis would generate more dense expressions than already seen. At this point our 
intuition is sufficient for arguing through this case. 
For our purposes the most meaningful case is the one where the constraint 
on m binds. This is the case where increasing γ would have an effect on the choice 
variables a and l.20 With an increase in γ, both a and the shadow value of the 
constraint on m fall. More importantly for this discussion, the change in l is 
ambiguous. Now, if we assume that a constraint on the emissions of s indeed does 
bind (because some technology exists to control s in addition to ( )lσ ), then as l rises 
or falls the shadow value of the constraint on the emission of s will decrease or 
increase. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
contents. In this case we could have the dirty input x be a function of quality attributes that have a cost. 
This would make the problem quite complicated. 
20 This case is analogous to one where m is controlled by a quantity and s is controlled by a tax set 
equal to zero. 
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYTICAL MODEL OF INSTRUMENT 
CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY WITH JOINT 
ABATEMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Weitzman (1974) was the first to demonstrate that when a planner is 
uncertain of the collective cost function of regulated sources, the expected welfare 
from an optimal price instrument is different from the expected welfare from an 
optimal quantity instrument. Furthermore, he shows that neither approach is 
necessarily superior, and identifies conditions sufficient for determining the preferred 
instrument given a particular regulatory setting. While Weitzman was speaking to a 
contemporary debate about whether price or quantity controls are preferable for 
managing a centrally planned economy or the production logistics of a firm, he 
recognized the applicability of his analysis to the choice between an emissions tax 
and a cap-and-trade program. Others who independently replicated his main results 
include Upton (1971), Adar and Griffin (1976) and Fishelson (1976). 
Significant attention has been paid in the environmental economics 
literature to Weitzman’s and related analyses as of late, perhaps in response to the 
increasing adoption of incentive-based control polices. Stavins (1996) explores the 
likelihood and effect on instrument choice of a correlation between abatement cost 
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uncertainty and uncertainty in the benefits of abatement.1  Recent extensions of the 
instrument choice under uncertainty literature include evaluations of tax and quantity 
instruments for the control of a stock pollutant (Hoel and Karp, 2001; Newell and 
Pizer, 2003). Other recent studies compare alternative regulatory instruments, such as 
index quantities (Newell and Pizer, 2006; Quirion, 2005) and non-linear taxes 
(Kaplow and Shavell, 2002; Shrestha, 2001) to the simple “single-valued” tax and 
quantity approaches.2 
As Weitzman acknowledges, his analysis is germane to “one particular 
isolated economic variable that needs to be regulated” (P. 477).3 This chapter extends 
a standard instrument choice model to the control of multiple pollutants to see the 
extent to which insights from the single pollutant analysis continue to apply. While 
                                                 
1 Weitzman (1974) shows that uncertainty in the benefits of abatement do not influence the welfare 
ordering of the tax and quantity instrument except in the case where the uncertainty in benefits is 
correlated with the uncertainty in costs. One example of such a correlation occurs in the control of 
emissions from power plants. With warm weather, abatement costs are high when the damage caused 
by some of the pollutants from combustion is high. 
2 While there has been renewed interest in nonlinear taxes, there was significant interest in this 
approach after Weitzman’s study was published. For examples, see Ireland (1977), Karp and Yohe 
(1979) and Yohe (1981).  
   Attention has also been paid to approaches that use a mix of quantity and price instruments. The 
most well known is Roberts and Spence (1976), who note that a tradable allowance system (i.e a 
quantity instrument), with a price ceiling where additional allowances may be purchased (i.e. a tax) 
and a floor where the regulator may buy back allowances (a subsidy), outperforms both a single-valued 
price or quantity instrument. Weitzman (1978b) proposes a single-valued tax combined with a source-
specific penalty from not obtaining a quantity target.  Kwerel (1977) proposes a system where a 
tradable quantity instrument is used along with a subsidy where the regulator purchases surplus 
allowances. Dasgupta et al. (1980) develop a more general form of these last two possibilities and 
show that such schemes may, theoretically, yield an optimal outcome despite the information 
asymmetries of the sort described below. 
3 Other papers in the instrument choice literature that considers circumstances other than when an 
“isolated” economic variable is being regulated are Yohe (1976b, 1977a, 1981). None of these studies 
analyzes the choice of regulation when more than one variable is actually being regulated, however.  
While Koenig (1985) considers the simultaneous regulation of emissions and production (in the form 
of regulating exports), he assumes that the emissions are proportional to production. See also the 
studies described in footnote 16. 
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attention has been paid in the literature to the control of multiple pollutants, these 
studies employ a deterministic framework and rarely consider implications for 
instrument choice.  
The following section reviews the Weitzman single pollutant analysis, both 
graphically and analytically, and the key relationship that determines whether price or 
quantity controls are preferable. It also reviews an interpretation of the Weitzman 
analysis that is attributable to Yohe (1978). Yohe’s interpretation facilitates 
understanding of the results that derive from the multiple pollutant case. The balance 
of the chapter lays out an extension of the single pollutant model to the case where 
two jointly-controlled pollutants are subject to regulation.  
In the two-pollutant case, each pollutant may be controlled by a tax or 
quantity. The expected welfare expressions for each of the four possible instrument 
mixes are derived in turn, starting with the case where each pollutant is controlled by 
a quantity instrument. As there are four possible mixes, it is a challenge to compare 
expected welfare. Furthermore, as we will see, the expected welfare expression for 
the case where both pollutants are controlled by a tax is particularly complicated. 
Fortunately, the expected welfare expressions for the other three mixes are simple and 
familiar. Thus, the focus of the expected welfare comparisons is to simplify the 
expected welfare expression for the case where each pollutant is controlled by a tax. 
Finally, we look at special cases where the abatement benefit and cost functions take 
extreme forms to see which instrument mix is preferred in those settings. For 
example, we identify the optimal mix of instruments when the marginal benefit of 
abating each pollutant is constant. 
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The two-pollutant model demonstrates three related results. First, it shows 
that the relative efficiency of an instrument to control one pollutant depends on how 
jointly abated pollutants are being controlled.  Second, the instrument suggested by 
the analysis for a single pollutant may be inappropriate if joint abatement is not 
explicitly considered. Third, it demonstrates that pair-wise comparisons of the 
expected welfare yielded by a subset of instrument combinations do not necessarily 
suggest the optimal combination of instruments. A consequence of these results is 
that all instrument combinations must be evaluated before the one that maximizes 
expected welfare is identified. However, the analysis confirms that when the shapes 
of the marginal abatement cost and benefit curves are at their extremes, the optimal 
instrument mix comports with intuition. For example, the optimal instrument mix 
when the marginal abatement cost of each pollutant is constant places a tax on each 
pollutant.  
3.2 Review of the Single Pollutant Case 
3.2.1 Graphical Analysis of Weitzman Result 
To set the stage for the multiple pollutant case, we first graphically review 
the instrument choice analysis for a single pollutant. We assume a setting where the 
regulator, who wishes to maximize the expected net benefit of abatement, knows the 
benefit of abating pollution, but is uncertain of the costs of reducing pollution. While 
the regulator does not know the costs of abatement, she does have well-informed 
expectations regarding these costs. Furthermore, the regulated sources know their 
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control costs (the following section describes the information setting in greater 
detail).  
The regulator may choose to control pollution using an abatement target (a 
quantity instrument) or may set a tax on pollution (a price instrument).4  The 
regulated sources are assumed to minimize the cost of controlling pollution so that 
they abate up to the point where the marginal cost of further control equals the tax. In 
Figure 3.1 we see the marginal benefit of abatement curve (labeled MB) and the 
expected marginal abatement cost curve (labeled E[MAC]) from the problem that the 
regulator faces. The variable m represents the level of abatement of the pollutant. The 
tax that maximizes expected welfare is t* while the quantity that maximizes expected 






                                                 
4 We are operating in abatement space, as opposed to emission space, as that is the tradition in this 
literature. 
5 It is a special case where it happens that the welfare maximizing tax level is set at the point where the 
expected marginal abatement cost equals marginal benefits. For convenience, we assume this is the 
case in the graphical analysis and, as we will see, in the analytical problem described in the following 
section. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the realized welfare for each instrument once the actual 
marginal abatement cost curve (labeled MAC) is revealed to the regulator. Figure 3.2 
shows that abatement costs are lower than the regulator expected, but as we will see, 
whether costs are higher or lower than expected does not affect the relative 
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The regulator now sees that the optimal level of abatement is m**. If the regulator had 
chosen the quantity m*, the welfare loss, relative to maximized net benefits, is equal 
to the area of the triangle labeled Λm. However, if the regulator had chosen to impose 
a tax t*, abatement would be equal to m(t*), and the welfare loss relative to maximized 
net benefits would equal the area of the triangle labeled Λt.  
In this case, we see that welfare would be higher if the tax instrument had 
been adopted. If the true marginal abatement cost curve were closer to the expected 
marginal abatement cost curve, the welfare losses relative to the optimum from both 
instruments would be smaller, but the tax instrument would still yield the higher 
welfare. Furthermore, if costs were actually higher than expected, such that the MAC 
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curve were above the E[MAC] curve, the tax would still outperform the quantity 
instrument.  
That the tax yields the highest welfare does not hold in general, however. If 
the marginal benefit of abatement curve pivoted around the expected optimum such 
that its slope were made steeper, we would see that the area of the triangle Λm would 
decrease while the area of the triangle Λt would increase. Eventually, the areas of the 
two triangles would be the same. This occurs when the slope of the marginal benefit 
curve equals the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. If the marginal benefit 
curve were made steeper than the marginal abatement cost curve, then the welfare 
loss from the tax instrument would be greater than for the quantity instrument.  
This is the basic insight of Weitzman (1974). Neither instrument 
necessarily outperforms the other in the face of abatement cost uncertainty. Whether a 
tax or a quantity instrument is preferred depends on the relative slopes of the marginal 
benefit and the marginal abatement cost curves. With either instrument the regulator 
is essentially forming a demand curve for abatement. In the case of a tax, this demand 
curve is perfectly flat, whereas it has infinite slope when a quantity policy is used. 
This explains why the tax policy performs best when the marginal benefit of 
abatement is relatively flat. When the marginal benefit curve is relatively flat, the tax 
policy generates a demand curve closer in shape to the marginal benefit curve than 
the quantity policy does. The opposite holds when the marginal benefit curve is 
relatively steep. We now show this result analytically. 
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3.2.2 Analytical Derivation of Weitzman Result 
We begin with the collective abatement cost function of regulated sources 
by the function, which is represented by ( ; )C m θ  where θ, from the perspective of the 
regulator, is a vector of random variables. While unknown to the regulator, we 
assume that the information θ is known to the regulated sources when compliance 
decisions are made. We can consider this a simple case of asymmetric uncertainty 
where the regulator does not expect that the benefit of collecting this information is 
worth the cost. Alternatively, θ can be thought of as variables that fluctuate from 
period to period, and it is particularly difficult for the regulator to respond to these 
changes by continuously adjusting the instrument level.6  
The abatement cost function is assumed to have the following quadratic 
form:7 
 ( ) [ ] 212; m m mmC m c m c mθ θ≡ + +  (3.1) 
The parameters cm and cmm are assumed to be non-negative, with the latter being the 
slope of the marginal abatement cost function. Rather than complicate the problem 
                                                 
6 The model shown here is actually static. So the idea here is that it captures a time frame in which the 
regulator cannot adjust the instrument. This is a fairly reasonable assumption over relatively short time 
horizons as regulations are rarely adjusted very quickly. Papers that have considered the choice of 
price and quantity instruments in the case where the regulator can learn about θ over time include 
Moledina et al. (2003), Costello and Karp (2004), and Karp and Zhang (2005, 2006). These papers 
differ in their assumptions about the behavior of the regulatory and regulated entities (for example, 
whether the regulator or regulated entities are myopic). 
7 Rather than assuming a functional form for (3.1) we could explicitly follow Weitzman (1974) and 
approximate ( );C m θ with a second-order Taylor series expansion with unknown variables only in the 
first order terms. While the interpretation is slightly different, the parameters that determine the 
optimal mix of instruments are the same. Weitzman’s approach is more general, but is only valid with 
“small” errors and in the neighborhood of the optimal level of abatement. The approach here provides 
global results, but relies on a restrictive functional form. The approach taken here is closest to the 
demonstration in Baumol and Oates (1988) and Adar and Griffin (1976). 
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with a number of unknown variables, we assume there is a sole random variable, θm. 
This variable shows up as an additive term in the marginal abatement cost curve for m 
and consequently different realizations of this variable shift the marginal abatement 
cost curve vertically.8 The properties [ ] 0mE θ =  and 2 2m mE θ σ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  are imposed on the 
random variable. We will see that the instrument levels and the expected welfare they 
yield are not influenced by higher moments of θm.
 9 
The benefit of m is: 
 ( ) 212m mmB m b m b m≡ −  (3.2) 
Note that this function is deterministic and is solely dependent on the level of 
abatement. Consistent with the notion that the marginal benefit of abatement falls as 
abatement increases, the parameter bmm is nonnegative. The parameter assumptions 
                                                 
8 One common quibble with Weitzman’s analysis is that uncertainty is additive in the marginal cost 
functions. Others have argued that multiplicative uncertainty, where there is uncertainty in the slope of 
the marginal functions, may be a more realistic or consequential concern (Adar and Griffin, 1976; 
Watson and Ridker, 1984; Malcomson, 1978). As Adar and Griffin discuss, both cases may indeed be 
present and the extent to which either should be considered is an empirical question. (However, with 
multiplicative uncertainty the property of certainty equivalence, which is discussed in footnote 9, no 
longer holds.) Also, Weitzman (1978a) responds to Malcomson’s criticism that a simple approximation 
may be misleading by noting the same but further appeals to his original justification for using the 
Taylor series, Samuelson (1970), which shows that unless the errors are particularly large the first 
order approximation of the stochastic function is a sufficient representation. Yohe (1978) provides 
further evidence that the inclusion of higher-ordered terms is not likely to influence the choice of 
instrument. Regardless, the analysis herein is not intended to take sides in this particular debate. Even 
if multiplicative uncertainty were introduced into this problem, as long as additive uncertainty is 
retained, the relationships embedded in the comparisons below would still be present, albeit buried in 
more complicated analytics. 
9 This functional form exhibits the property of certainty equivalence in that the optimal instrument 
levels in the presence of uncertainty are equal to those that would have been chosen by the regulator 
had he behaved as if he were certain of the abatement cost function with the unknown variable equal to 
its mean. A consequence of this form is that the optimal instruments are not functions of any moments 
of the random variable other than its mean, which allows for straightforward comparisons of expected 
welfare from the competing instruments. 
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for the benefit and cost functions assure a unique solution to the regulator’s problem. 
Further, we impose m mb c>  so that regulatory intervention is desirable. 
We can now explore the regulator’s problem, which is to maximize 
expected welfare: 
 ( ) ( ) ( );W m E B m C m θ≡ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (3.3) 
The quantity of abatement that maximizes this expression is m*. This can be achieved 
directly by a quantity instrument that imposes an abatement target equal to m*.10 In 
choosing the tax that maximizes expected welfare, the regulator anticipates that 
sources minimize their abatement costs and consequently reduce emissions until their 
marginal abatement cost equals the tax. Given some tax tm and a realization of θm, the 
actual level of abatement of m is then determined by the implicit function: 
 m m m mmt c c mθ= + +  (3.4) 
where the right side of (3.4) is the marginal abatement cost of m. Using this 
expression the realized abatement of m, which is unknown to the regulator until after 
the tax is levied, can be expressed as a function of the tax: 
( ) [ ];m m m m m mmm t t c cθ θ= − − . Substituting ( );m mm t θ  into the expected welfare 
function (expression (3.3)) and maximizing with respect to tm yields the optimal tax 
*
mt . Given the functional form of the problem, the expected quantity of abatement 
from using the optimal tax equals the level of abatement achieved by the optimal 
quantity instrument. That is: 
                                                 
10 Implicit in the analytical model is a method for allocating abatement responsibility across regulated 
sources that minimizes their collective abatement cost. We assume that emission cap-and-trade 
programs are used where the emissions allowance market is frictionless and undistorted. Furthermore, 
we assume that the allowance allocation mechanism is non-distortionary.  
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 ( )* * *;m m m mmE m t E m c mθ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ − =⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  (3.5) 
Given the optimal instrument levels, a comparison of the expected welfare 
between the tax and the quantity instruments yields the following expression:11 







W t W m c b
c
σ
− = −  (3.6) 
If this expression is positive, a tax approach is preferred, and, if it is negative, a 
quantity approach is preferred. As we saw in the graphical analysis, the critical 
parameters for instrument choice are the slope of the marginal abatement cost 
function, cmm, and the slope of the marginal benefit function, bmm. Again, if the slope 
of the marginal cost function is greater than the slope of the marginal benefit 
function, the control of emissions by a tax is the preferred policy. If the relative 
magnitude of these slopes is reversed, the quantity instrument is preferred. These are 
the basic results developed by Weitzman (1974). 
A different interpretation of the expected welfare comparison between a 
tax and a quantity instrument that is masked by the comparison in (3.6) will be useful 
when we extend the problem to multiple pollutants. When a tax is used to control 
emissions, the level of abatement will decrease or increase depending on whether 
abatement costs are higher or lower than expected. This adjustment suggests that a tax 
instrument is preferable to a quantity instrument (where the level of abatement does 
not respond to the actual control costs). On the other hand, by using a tax to control 
emissions, the level of abatement is itself uncertain. In contrast, a quantity instrument 
has the advantage in that it avoids uncertainty in the level of abatement. Equation 
                                                 
11 For the sake of brevity ( )mW t  is used in place of ( )( )mW m t . 
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(3.7) illustrates the intermediate expression leading to the formulation in equation 
(3.6) and makes this interpretation, which follows Yohe (1978), transparent:  
 ( ) ( )
2 2
* * 1 1
2 2
m m m
m m mm mm
mm mm mm









In the bracketed expectation term in (3.7), we see one positive and two negative 
arguments.12 The first argument, labeled AA, is positive and captures the direct 
relationship between the uncertain component of abatement costs and the realized 
level of abatement when a tax is used. In particular, if abatement costs are higher than 
expected, the level of abatement will fall and vice-versa. We label the first term the 
abatement adjustment effect. 
The second two terms, labeled AU, in the bracketed expression in (3.7) 
capture the penalty associated with the uncertainty in the realized level of abatement. 
When a tax is used to control m, so that ( )* ;m mm m t θ= , the level of m is of course 
unknown. However, as reported above, its expected value is m*, which is the optimal 
quantity level. Due to the concavity of the benefit function, the expected benefit from 
controlling m by an optimal tax is then lower than if m were controlled by an optimal 
quantity. Furthermore, the expected benefit of controlling m by a tax decreases as the 
curvature of the benefit function, 12 mmb , increases. Similarly, the third term in the 
                                                 
12 The steps preceding the one shown in (3.7) begin with:  
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )2 2* * * * *1 12 2; ; ; ;m m m m mm m m m m m m m m m mW t E b m t b m t c m t c m tθ θ θ θ θ= − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
where ( )* *;m m m mmm t m cθ θ= − as reported in expression (3.5). 
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bracketed expression in (3.7) captures the cost of uncertainty as it relates to the 
convexity of the abatement cost function. The expected cost of controlling an 
uncertain abatement quantity is greater than the cost of controlling its expected value. 
We label the second and third terms the abatement uncertainty effect. 
The net influence of the abatement adjustment and the abatement 
uncertainty effects dictate which instrument yields higher expected welfare. In the 
single pollutant case this comes down to a comparison of the relative slopes of the 
marginal abatement benefit and cost functions, which, as just noted, has significant 
intuitive appeal. In the literature, comparisons of marginal benefit and cost slopes 
have served as the basis for recommending the use of a particular instrument 
(Nordhaus, 2001; Banzhaf et al. 2004). However, this assumes that other regulations 
affecting emitting sources are held fixed or are not being simultaneously determined. 
As shown below, in a multiple pollutant framework with uncertain and joint 
abatement costs, a comparison of relative marginal slopes may be misleading in 
identifying the welfare maximizing set of instruments. However, differences in the 
magnitudes of the abatement adjustment and abatement uncertainty effects across 
instrument mixes continue to dictate the optimal mix of instruments. 
3.3 The Multiple Pollutant Model 
We now introduce the abatement of a second pollutant, s, into the 
collective abatement cost function:13  
                                                 
13 The variables m and s are chosen heuristically, with m representing the abatement of mercury and s 
the abatement of sulfur dioxide. At certain points in this chapter it will be convenient to use the labels 
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 ( ) [ ] [ ] 2 212, ; 2s s m m ss ms mmC m s c s c m c s c sm c mθ θ θ ⎡ ⎤≡ + + + + + +⎣ ⎦  (3.8) 
The parameters cs, cm, css, and cmm are all assumed to be non-negative. The parameter 
cms captures the joint abatement relationship. If cms is positive, abatement of one of the 
pollutants makes it more costly to abate the other. If on the other hand cms is negative, 
then abatement of one of the pollutants lowers the cost of controlling the other. An 
alternative view is that if cms is positive, the two pollutants are substitutes in 
abatement and if it is negative they are complements in abatement. 
To keep the analysis tractable we assume only two, possibly related, 
random variables, θm and θs. Analogous to the single-pollutant analysis, these 
variables are additive in their respective pollutant’s marginal abatement cost function 
such that a change in one of these variables results in a vertical shift in the marginal 
abatement cost function. Furthermore, we assume that [ ] [ ] 0m sE Eθ θ= = , 
2 2
m mE θ σ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ , 
2 2
s sE θ σ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  and [ ]m s msE θ θ σ= . The sign of the covariance of these 
two errors is unrestricted. We will see that the instrument levels and the expected 
welfare they yield are not influenced by higher moments of these variables. 
Note that the parameter representing the cross partial of the cost function 
with respect to the abatement of the two pollutants (cms) is observed with certainty. 
So, this is more a model with “uncertain costs and joint abatement”, as opposed to a 
model with “uncertain joint costs”. My decision to make cms known to the regulator is 
                                                                                                                                           
m and s to refer to the particular pollutant that is being abated. When m and s are used it should be 
clear from the context whether we are referring to the level of abatement or the name of the pollutant 
being abated.   
 67
mainly for mathematical convenience.14 The expressions for expected welfare found 
below would be dense if cms was observed with error. Furthermore, despite the 
simplicity of the model, this formulation is sufficient to show that the relative-slopes 
condition is misleading in the case where there is uncertainty and jointness in the cost 
function. It also shows that any expected welfare ordering of the different instruments 
mixes is possible.  
The benefit of reducing each of these pollutants is assumed to be unrelated 
to the level of abatement of the other. The abatement benefit function for m is as 
before in expression (3.2). The benefit of abating s is also assumed to have a 
quadratic form: 
 ( ) 212s ssB s b s b s≡ −  (3.9) 
where the parameters bs and bss are nonnegative and bs > cs.
15 
The regulator decides on the appropriate combination of quantity and price 
instruments to control these two pollutants. We first derive the optimal levels of 
abatement where each pollutant is controlled by a quantity. We then consider a policy 
that controls one pollutant by a tax and the other by a quantity. Finally, we consider a 
                                                 
14 Like the single pollutant model, this two-pollutant model exhibits the property of certainty 
equivalence. 
15 The relationship between bs and cs is made to assure that regulating s is desired if m is not regulated. 
However, this assumption is not necessary for the net-benefits of regulating these pollutants to be 
positive. As we see in expression (3.10) (in conjunction with the second-order condition with respect 
to the cost function) we need only that bs > cs or bm > cm to hold for regulatory intervention to be 
desirable. 
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policy where each pollutant is controlled by a tax. Welfare expressions are then 
derived for these instrument mixes and compared.16 
3.3.1 Quantity Instruments 
In the case where quantities are used to control both pollutants, the 
regulator directly chooses the desired levels of abatement. Sources are also assumed 
to fully understand how abatement decisions will affect their emissions, so that the 
abatement constraint is adhered to. The regulator’s problem is to maximize expected 
welfare choosing m and s:  
( ) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]2 21 12 2, m m m mm mm s s s ss ss msW m s E b c m b c m b c s b c s c msθ θ⎡ ⎤≡ − − − + + − − − + −⎣ ⎦  (3.10) 
A cost-minimizing equilibrium in the underlying emissions market is assured, along 
with the sign assumptions for css and cmm, if 
2 0ss mm msc c c− > . This second order 
condition is assumed to hold. The first-order conditions of (3.10) can then be used to 
derive the optimal ex-ante abatement levels from the perspective of the regulator: 
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Before moving on to the cases where a tax is used to control one of the pollutants, we 
note two quick points. With uncertainty in the abatement cost function it is possible 
                                                 
16 Analytical models similar to the one presented here are found in Yohe (1976a) and (1977b). Yohe 
(1977b) discusses the performance of instruments to regulate the production of goods that have joint 
benefits and uncertain, but separate, costs. In an unpublished work, Yohe (1976a) looks deeper at the 
influence of joint benefits on instrument choice and presents an analytical model similar to the one 
presented here to begin to explore the case of uncertain joint production.  However, Yohe does not 
look at the mixed instrument cases and does not identify the possibility that any expected-welfare 
ordering of thhe instrument mixes is possible.  
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that an abatement constraint may become slack if costs are substantially below what 
was expected. That is, actual abatement may be less than the optimal ex-ante level of 
abatement the regulator will impose (i.e. m* and/or s*).17 In the analysis that follows, 
we assume that the actual abatement cost function is sufficiently close to the expected 
function so that there is no possibility that ex-post one of the abatement constraints 
would be slack.  
The second point is that it is possible that the optimal quantity of abatement 
of one of the pollutants is negative. That is, it may be optimal for the emissions of one 
of the pollutants to increase. This may only occur when it is particularly difficult to 
simultaneously abate both pollutants (i.e., when 0msc ). If one of the pollutants 
causes significantly more damage, it may be acceptable for the emissions of the other 
to rise relative to the situation without regulatory intervention.18 
3.3.2 Mix of Instruments 
Now let us consider the case where the regulator controls one pollutant 
with a tax while the other remains controlled by a quantity. Specifically, we consider 
the example where a tax is used to control the pollutant s while a quantity instrument 
is used to control m.19 Affected sources are expected to minimize costs with respect to 
                                                 
17 Pizer (1997) refers to this possibility as “truncation.” 
18 An example from the electricity sector is in the control of nitrogen oxide emissions. Ammonia 
emissions are a byproduct of a common nitrogen oxide abatement technology. In the absence of a 
nitrogen oxide control policy there would be no ammonia emissions. However, if nitrogen oxide were 
controlled with a cap, ammonia emissions would rise. In order to control this rise, the regulator may 
also control ammonia but still allow emissions to become positive. Hence, there is “negative 
abatement” of ammonia.   
19 A symmetric case holds for when m is controlled by a tax and s is controlled by a quantity. 
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the tax on s which implies that abatement occurs until the marginal abatement cost of 
s, given some quantity restriction m, equals the tax on s:  
 s s s ss mst c c s c mθ= + + +  (3.13) 
The realized level of abatement of s can be expressed as a function of the random 
variable θs, the tax level ts, and the level of the quantity instrument m:  
 ( ), ; s s s mss
ss
c t c ms m t
c
θθ + − +=  (3.14) 
The regulator does not observe this level of abatement until after the tax is 
administered because the regulator cannot observe the actual value of θs until then. So 
with uncertainty in the realized s, the regulator chooses m and ts that maximize: 
 ( )
[ ] [ ]
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For the sake of brevity, we do not present the necessary conditions for this problem. 
However, we note that the choice variables that solve this problem are: 
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b c b c c
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + + − + +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦=
+ + −
 (3.16) 
for the optimal tax on s while the optimal abatement quantity of m is defined in 
equation (3.11). Given m*, the realized level of abatement of s given the optimal tax 
*
st  is: 
 ( )* * *, ; ss
ss
s m t s
c
θθ = −  (3.17) 
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Note that the expected level of s, given m* and *st , is equal to the optimal choice of s 
when both pollutants are controlled by a quantity. That is: ( )* * *, ;sE s m t sθ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  where 
s* is defined in equation (3.12).  
Furthermore, we see in (3.17) that the deviation in the actual abatement of s 
is strictly related to the error in the marginal cost of s when m is fixed. That is, the 
error θm does not affect the ex-post level of s when s is controlled by a tax. Looking 
again at the form of the total abatement cost function, focusing on the fact that the 
quantity of abatement of m is fixed at any level m , we have:  
 ( ) [ ] [ ] 2 212, ; 2s s m m ss ms mmC m s c s c m c s c sm c mθ θ θ ⎡ ⎤≡ + + + + + +⎣ ⎦  (3.18) 
As m will not be adjusted by the regulated sources, the error θm does not work 
thorough the joint cost relationship cms to affect in turn the realized abatement of s. 
With m fixed, any realization of θm will only result in direct increases and decreases 
in total costs.20 
3.3.3 Tax Instruments 
When both pollutants are regulated with an emissions tax, we anticipate 
that the regulated sources will abate emissions such that the realized marginal 
abatement cost of each pollutant is equal to its emissions tax: 
 m m m mm mst c c m c sθ= + + +  (3.19) 
 s s s ss mst c c s c mθ= + + +  (3.20) 
                                                 
20 One way that the error θm may influence the abatement of s is if it creates conditions where the 
abatement constraint on m is not binding. In such a case, m may be adjusted in order to influence the 
burden of complying with the tax on s. Again, we have assumed away such cases. 
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These optimality conditions for the regulated sources can be manipulated to show the 
realized abatement levels as functions of the taxes: 
 ( ) [ ] [ ]2, ; ms s s s ss m m mm s
ms ss ms









 ( ) [ ] [ ]2, ; ms m m m mm s s sm s
mm ss ms









We see that given any taxes tm and ts, the level of abatement of both pollutants will be 
affected by different realizations of θm and θs. To find the optimal ex-ante tax levels, 
the regulator maximizes expected welfare with respect to the two taxes given (3.21) 
and (3.22):  
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When each pollutant is controlled by a tax, the optimal tax on s is the same as in 
(3.16). The optimal tax on m is an expression symmetric to (3.16). Conditional on the 
optimal tax levels derived from the solution to (3.23), the realized abatement levels 
are: 
 ( )* * * 2, ; ms s ss mm s
mm ss ms
c cm t t m
c c c
θ θθ −= +
−
 (3.24) 
 ( )* * * 2, ; ms m mm sm s
mm ss ms
c cs t t s
c c c
θ θθ −= +
−
 (3.25) 
where m* and s* are defined by (3.11) and (3.12) respectively. Again, and attributable 
to the functional form of the problem, we see in (3.24) and (3.25) that the expected 
levels of abatement when tax instruments are used exclusively are equal to the ex-
ante optimal abatement levels when quantity instruments are used exclusively. We 
also see how the random component associated with the cost of abating each pollutant 
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affects the realized abatement of the two pollutants. For example, and unsurprisingly, 
if θs is particularly large and positive, which implies a direct shift upward in the 
marginal abatement cost of s, then the optimal abatement of s falls. However, if θm is 
large and positive, then the abatement of s by the regulated sources depends on the 
sign and the magnitude of cms. The larger cms is in absolute value, the larger the effect 
of a particular realization of θm is on the abatement of s. If cms is sufficiently large 
such that the second order condition is just satisfied ( ms mm ssc c c→ ), the deviation 
in actual abatement from expected abatement becomes infinite. 
3.3.4 Expected Welfare for Each Instrument Mix 
Table 3.1 reports the realized abatement of the two pollutants under the 
four possible instrument mixes. We compare the expected welfare these policies yield 
by substituting the ex-post abatement levels in Table 3.1 into the expression for 
expected welfare.  
Table 3.1: Realized Levels of Abatement from Each Instrument Mix† 










































− , *s  *m , *s  
 † m* and s* are defined in expressions (3.11) and (3.12). 
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The expected welfare expressions for the different instrument mixes is 
provided in Table 3.2, where: 
        ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]* * * *2 * *2 * *1 12 2, m m mm mm s s ss ss msW m s b c m b c m b c s b c s c m s= − − + + − − + −  (3.26) 
 
Table 3.2: Expected Welfare from Each Instrument Mix 
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The difference in expected welfare from any two sets of instruments can be 
determined from a comparison of the two appropriate cells in Table 3.2. We will 
often refer to these four policies by the set of instruments used: { }* *,m st t , { }* *, sm t , 
{ }* *,mt s or { }* *,m s . As will be shown shortly, identification of the welfare maximizing 
combination of instruments requires an evaluation of all four cells as no one set of 
instruments strictly dominates another at the outset. We can already see in Table 3.2 
that the relative efficiency of an instrument to control one pollutant depends on how 
the other pollutant is being controlled. For example, the difference in expected 
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welfare from using a tax to control m rather than a quantity depends on whether s is 
controlled by a tax or a quantity, even when these instruments to control s are chosen 
to optimize expected welfare.  
It is fairly straightforward to show that any of the four possible instrument 
combinations may be preferred at the outset. This is easiest to show under the 
condition where 0msc → . In this case, the expected welfare from the { }* *,m st t policy 
converges to: 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]
2 2
* * * *
2 2, , 2 2
m s
m s mm mm ss ss
mm ss
W t t W m s c b c b
c c
σ σ⎡ ⎤
→ + − + −⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
 (3.27) 
The bracketed term in (3.27) is the sum of the terms capturing the difference in 
expected welfare between the mixed instrument policies and the policy where a 
quantity is used to control each pollutant (see Table 3.2). We can see in (3.27) that 
this expression can be either positive or negative depending on the magnitudes of the 
slopes of the different marginal cost and marginal benefit functions. Recognizing this, 
we confirm, at least for arbitrarily small cms, that no instrument mix is strictly 
dominated by one of the others at the outset.21 
                                                 
21 Perhaps surprisingly, despite having information on the correlation between the errors of the 
marginal abatement cost functions, this information does not influence the preferred set of instruments. 
Quite simply, from the perspective of the regulator the two pollution control problems have separated. 
This result may change for more sophisticated regulatory instruments. For example, Montero (2001) 
considers the performance of an integrated multiple pollutant market when there is cost uncertainty in 
the control of each pollutant (i.e., there are two pollutants but they are not jointly abated). He shows 
that, it is possible that using a single cap with a trading ratio between the two pollutants yields higher 
expected welfare than if each pollutant were controlled by a separate quantity instrument. Assuming 
that the two pollutants have identical abatement cost and benefit functions in expectation, and that the 
random variables in the two cost functions are uncorrelated, then integrating the emission trading 
markets is preferred if the slope of the marginal benefit function is flatter than the slope of the marginal 
cost function. This is because the benefit of allowing the firms to adjust their pollution control in the 
face of unexpectedly high cost (what I call an abatement adjustment effect) outweighs the additional 
uncertainty in abatement that comes with integrating the markets (the abatement uncertainty effect). 
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We see in Table 3.2 that when deciding between a policy that uses a mix of 
instruments and one in which quantities are used exclusively, it is sufficient to 
compare the magnitude of the slopes of the marginal benefit and cost curves for the 
pollutant that may be controlled by a tax. That is, with the quadratic and additive 
uncertainty form of the abatement cost function, this comparison reduces to the one 
Weitzman and others identified (equation (3.6)). When the abatement of one of the 
pollutants is fixed, i.e. controlled by a quantity, the uncertainty in the marginal 
abatement cost for the other pollutant is limited to its “own” random variable. 
Therefore in this model, when one of the pollutants is controlled by a quantity, only 
the marginal benefit and cost slopes need to be compared for the pollutant potentially 
subject to the tax. The same cannot be said when comparing the expected welfare 
from the policy that uses a tax to control each pollutant to the expected welfare from 
the other instrument mixes. More will be said regarding these observations below. 
3.4 Expected Welfare Comparisons 
3.4.1 Comparisons Using a Single Random Variable 
3.4.1.1 Comparing the Tax and Mixed Instrument Policies 
Clearly the most complicated expected welfare expression is for the policy 
where a tax is used to control each pollutant. This complication arises because both 
                                                                                                                                           
   A similar possibility presumably extends to the model described here. This is because if Montero’s 
assumptions otherwise held, and the parameter values of the problem are such that that integrated 
pollutant trading dominates separate markets, then simply adding a small cross-partial term should not 
be able to change the result. What is interesting about having integrated pollutant markets is that, as 
with taxes but not with separate markets, there is both an abatement uncertainty and abatement 
adjustment effect, but unlike with taxes there is a fixed total quantity.  
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quantities are allowed to adjust. When there is some deviation in the random variable 
associated with one pollutant that motivates a change in the level of that pollutant, it 
also influences the cost of controlling the other pollutant. With that other pollutant 
controlled by a tax, its level may then also adjust. The simultaneous and reciprocal 
nature of these adjustments is captured in the expression for expected welfare when a 
tax is used to control each pollutant. With this model, it is the policy where taxes are 
used to control each pollutant that really shows how a simple relative-slopes 
comparison can be misleading when multiple pollutants are being controlled.22 
To begin to gain intuition regarding the form of ( )* *,m sW t t , let us consider 
the case where the random variable θs is never particularly large and that the 
correlation in the errors is small. That is, we assume that 2 0sσ ≈  and 0msσ ≈ . Given 
these assumptions we first note from Table 3.1 that, conditional on m being controlled 
by a quantity, the abatement of s when controlled by a tax is approximately equal to 
the abatement of s when controlled by a quantity. That is, one consequence of these 
assumptions is that ( ) ( )* * * *, ,sW m t W m s≈ .23 
 With 2 0sσ ≈  and 0msσ ≈ , the difference in expected welfare between the 
{ }* *,m st t  policy and the { }* *, sm t policy can be expressed: 
                                                 
22 How it can be misleading would depend on the functional form of the problem. My primary concern 
is showing that even with this simple functional form it can be misleading. 
23 In reality we might find this a peculiar outcome. That is, despite there being some random variable 
in the cost function, this variable does not affect the regulator’s choice of instrument to control s when 
m is controlled by a quantity. We would find it particularly odd if cms were unknown to the regulator.  
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 ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]
2 2 2





m s s mm mm ss ss
ssmm ss ms
c cW t t W m t c b b c
cc c c
σ ⎡ ⎤
− ≈ − − +⎢ ⎥
⎡ ⎤− ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (3.28) 
It can be seen in this expression that the { }* *, sm t  policy is preferred to the { }* *,m st t  
policy if the slope of the marginal abatement benefit curve for m, bmm, is steeper than 
the slope of the partial marginal abatement cost curve for m, cmm. By partial we of 
course mean by ignoring, or not acknowledging, the possibility that s is adjusting at 
the same time. Applying the relative slope comparison would then suggest the correct 
instrument. However, if the marginal benefit curve of abating m were flatter than the 
own slope of the marginal cost of abating m (i.e. mm mmc b> ), it may be possible that the 
relative slopes comparison suggests using a tax to control m, when indeed it may be 
appropriate to control m by a quantity.  
To gain some understanding as to why the hurdle for adopting a tax on m is 
now higher, we look at the difference in ( )* *,m sW t t  and ( )* *, sW m t  before terms are 
collected to yield (3.28): 
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⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎦
 (3.29) 
The term 2ss m mm ss msc c c cθ ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦  is the approximate adjustment from the expected level 
of m as a result of the realization of θm when each of the pollutants is controlled by a 
tax. Likewise, 2ms m mm ss msc c c cθ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  is the approximate adjustment from the expected 
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level of s as a result of the realization of θm when each of the pollutants is controlled 
by a tax. These adjustment terms can be seen in the expressions for the levels of m 
and s when each pollutant is controlled by a tax (i.e. the expressions (3.24) and (3.25)
) subject to our assumptions that 2 0sσ ≈  and 0msσ ≈ .   
The first term in (3.29) is positive and captures the benefit of controlling m 
by a tax in that the level of m will, unlike when a quantity instrument is used, adjust 
to mitigate the impact of the difference between expected and actual abatement costs. 
As in the single pollutant case when costs are higher or lower than expected, m will 
adjust accordingly.  
The next two terms in (3.29) are negative and capture the influence of the 
concavity of the abatement benefit functions given that the abatement of both 
pollutants is uncertain. As in the single pollutant case, these two terms are negative. 
The last three terms of (3.29) capture the influence of the convexity of the abatement 
cost function coupled with the uncertainty in the abatement of both pollutants. 
Collectively these three terms are negative. Again, this argument appears in the single 
pollutant case, except that now abatement costs are a function of two pollutants.  
Note that there is no term associated with the abatement of s that is 
analogous to the first term in (3.29).  That is, there is no direct benefit of adjusting s 
in response to the variation in cost associated with controlling m. Therefore, when s is 
controlled by a tax, it is no longer sufficient to compare the slope of the marginal 
benefit of abating m with the slope of the partial marginal cost of abating m when 
determining the optimal instrument to control m. Specifically, even if mm mmc b> , it 
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may be preferable to control m by a quantity in order to avoid the cost of uncertainty 
(in terms of lower expected benefits and higher expected abatement costs) in the 
realized level of s.24 
3.4.1.2 Comparing the Quantity and Mixed Instrument Policies 
In the previous section we learned that the added complication of s 
changing creates conditions where even if mm mmc b> , it may be preferable to control m 
by a quantity to avoid a variation in s. But does this mean that if the conditions are 
such that it is preferable to control m by a tax even when s is controlled by a tax, i.e.: 
 ( ) ( )* * * *, ,m s sW t t W m t>  (3.30) 
then the regulator can improve matters even further by controlling s by a quantity? 
That is, if (3.30) is true with our single random variable case, then must the following 
also be true? 
 ( ) ( )* * * *, ,m m sW t s W t t>  (3.31) 
The answer is no. Note that the expression for the variation in m when each pollutant 
is controlled by a tax explicitly acknowledges that the change in m is influenced by 
the possibility that s may change. The cost of the abatement uncertainty effect 
associated with s when the { }* *,m st t  policy is employed may be smaller than the cost 
associated with a lower abatement adjustment effect of m when the { }* *,mt s policy is 
                                                 
24 One may wonder why the sign of (3.28) is independent of the sign of cms. The intuition is that the 
unknown variable θm can be positive or negative. A positive sign of θm coupled with a negative sign of 
cms is equivalent to θm having a negative sign and cms having a positive sign. At this point in our 
discussion the direction of the joint abatement is irrelevant to the welfare ordering of the instruments. 
As can be seen in the expected welfare expression for the { }* *,m st t policy in Table 3.2, this symmetry no 
longer holds when the two random variables are correlated. 
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employed. To see this note that given ( ) ( )* * * *, ,sW m t W m s≈  the difference in expected 
welfare from using a tax to control s when m is controlled by a tax is:  
        
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ]
* * * * * * * * * * * *
2
* * * *
2
, , , , , ,
, ,
2
m s m m s s m
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m s s mm mm
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W t t W t s W t t W m t W m s W t s
W t t W m t c b
c
σ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− ≈ − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤≈ − − −⎣ ⎦
 (3.32) 
where ( ) ( )* * * *, ,m s sW t t W m t⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  is described in (3.29). We can rewrite the expression 
(3.32) as: 
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⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (3.33) 
As we saw in expression (3.29), a necessary condition for ( ) ( )* * * *, ,m s sW t t W m t> , 
which we are assuming, is that mm mmc b> , or that the abatement adjustment effect of m 
outweighs the abatement uncertainty effect from m and s. We can now acknowledge 
the possibility that (3.33) may be positive, implying that just because a tax is the 
preferred instrument to control m does not mean that it is preferable to control s by a 
quantity.25 
Under what conditions might the expression in (3.33) be positive? It must 











                                                 
25 The most straightforward way to see that (3.33) may be positive is to let bm = bs = 0. See section 
3.4.4.1.  
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The left side of this expression is the variance in m when the { }* *,m st t  is employed and 
the right side is the variance in m when the { }* *,mt s is employed. The left side is 
always larger than the right provided that the second order restriction holds. However, 
it is useful to note that it must be the case that controlling s by a tax must allow m to 
adjust much more when abatement costs are higher or lower than expected for the 
{ }* *,m st t  policy to yield higher expected welfare than the { }* *,mt s policy. It also helps if 
22 2 2
ms m mm ss msc c c cσ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  is relatively small, which is the variance in s when both 
pollutants are controlled by a tax. 
3.4.1.3 Relating Results to General Equilibrium Welfare Analysis 
We return to the expected welfare comparison identifying the optimal 
instrument to control m when s is controlled by a tax (i.e. the difference between 
( )* *,m sW t t  and ( )* *, sW m t ) and note a mathematical relationship. Assuming that a tax is 
used to control s, the rate of change in the additional cost of increasing m is: 
 ( )( )2 2 2, , s mm ss ms ssd C m s m t dm cc c c= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (3.35) 
Notionally we may think of this as the slope of the marginal cost of increasing m 
given some st .
26  If we adopted the expected welfare comparison for the single 
pollutant case (i.e. expression (3.6)) and replaced cmm with this expression for the rate 
of change in costs, would we recover the expected welfare comparison between 
( )* *,m sW t t  and ( )* *, sW m t  (i.e. expression (3.28))? The answer is no. However, if we 
                                                 
26 The constancy of the slope with respect to m given any ts is due to the functional form of the 
problem. 
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added to the slope of the marginal benefit of increasing m an expression capturing the 
change in the marginal benefit of s as a result of the change in m: 
 ( )( ) [ ]22 2, ss ms sssd B s m t dm b c c= −  (3.36) 
then using the single pollutant relative-slopes template (expression (3.6)) would 
indeed yield expression (3.28). 
The relationship in (3.35) has been acknowledged in the literature on the 
measurement of general equilibrium welfare changes from policies affecting private 
goods. A key finding of that literature is that it is possible to measure all of the 
welfare changes from a policy that directly affects a particular market solely in that 
market despite the fact that there are related markets that are indirectly affected (see 
Just et al., 2004 for a discussion). One can measure welfare changes using general 
equilibrium demand and supply functions in the directly affected markets. The slopes 
of the general equilibrium demand and supply curves differ from the slopes of the 
partial equilibrium demand and supply curves. We see that on the supply side of 
abatement, where the emitters internalize the effect of the change in s on the cost of 
controlling m, that the slope of the general equilibrium supply of m is that required to 
make a judgment as to the optimal instrument to control m. Unfortunately, however, 
this does not mean that we can ignore the “market” for s as we could in an example 
where m and s are private goods. This is due to the joint public goods nature of the 
problem. The emitters of the two pollutants do not internalize the change in the 
benefits of abating s and thus the effect of this change does not reveal itself in the 
“market” or space of m. Thus, we need to explicitly add to the partial abatement 
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benefit slope of m the slope of the abatement benefit of s as m changes to recover the 
relative-slopes comparison in the single pollutant analysis. 
3.4.2 Comparing Expected Welfare with Two Random Variables 
We now reintroduce the second random variable θs back into the problem. 
Our purpose is not to carry out a full discussion of how competing abatement 
uncertainty and abatement adjustment effects, accounting for the covariance between 
θs and θm, dictate which instrument is preferred. The discussion above demonstrates 
the utility of comparing the competing abatement uncertainty and abatement 
adjustment effects for the different mixes, but it is harder to demonstrate this welfare 
ordering result without reducing terms. Rather, our purpose is more limited in that we 
first show that perhaps unanticipated expected welfare orderings of the instrument 
mixes are possible. Indeed, parameters may be chosen such that any expected welfare 
ordering is possible. However, in so doing we can allude to how differences in the 
abatement adjustment and abatement uncertainty effects for the different instrument 
mixes are influencing the orderings.  
We start by revisiting Table 3.2 and provide further insight into the 
expected welfare comparison between the policies that use mixed instruments and the 
policy that uses a quantity to control each pollutant. Next, we focus on comparisons 
between the policy that uses a tax to control each pollutant and the three other 
instrument combinations. We conclude this section by considering some special cases 
where the parameters take on particular values that are potentially of empirical 
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interest. For example, is it the case that the { }* *,m st t  policy is preferred when the 
marginal benefit of abatement curves are flat? 
3.4.2.1 Comparing the Quantity and the Mixed Instrument Policies  
One may wonder why the cross-partial of the abatement cost function (cms) 
is not present in the expressions reporting the expected welfare difference between 
the { }* *,m s  mix and the { }* *,mt s and { }* *, sm t  mixes. To understand this, first note that 
the expected value of the term cmsms is captured in the expression ( )* *,W m s , which is 
common to all three of these instrument mixes.  For the { }* *,mt s and 
{ }* *, sm t instrument mixes the variance in the term cmsms, which we can associate with 
the pollutant not potentially subject to a tax, is greater than for the policy where only 
quantity instruments are used. However, the expected value of this term is the same 
for the policies that use a quantity to control at least one of the pollutants. Any 
variation in this term will affect total costs, but by itself does not influence the choice 
of instruments for the pollutant that is potentially subject to a tax.  
3.4.2.2 The Tax Policy with No Covariance in the Random Variables 
It is fairly easy to see that one can pick parameters to create any expected 
welfare ordering of the { }* *,mt s , { }* *, mm t  and { }* *,m s policies. It is a greater challenge 
to show that reasonable parameters can be chosen such that the expected welfare of 
the { }* *,m st t  policy may be placed anywhere among any given expected welfare 
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ordering of the other three instrument mixes. This section and the following thus 
focus on the { }* *,m st t  policy. 
We now let the variance in θs to be significantly large, but continue to 
assume that the covariance between the two random variables is small (i.e. 0smσ ≈ ). 
In this case, expected welfare from using a tax to control each pollutant becomes: 
       ( ) ( )
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
2 2 2
* * * *
2 2 2 22
  1, ,
2
m mm mm ss ss ss ms
m s
s ss ss mm mm mm msmm ss ms
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c b c b c cc c c
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⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− − +⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥= +
⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ + − − +− ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (3.37) 
This is the only expected welfare expression that is affected by the assumption that 
0smσ ≈ . From an inspection of (3.37) a potentially surprising result appears possible. 
Let us say that the parameter values of this problem are such that the two policies that 
use a mix of instruments yield higher expected welfare than the policy that strictly 
uses quantity controls. For this to be true then the parameter values of the problem 
must be such that mm mmc b>  and ss ssc b>  as we see in Table 3.2. However, these two 
restrictions do not appear to assure that the { }* *,m st t policy is the preferred policy 
because of the strictly negative terms in the bracketed expression on the right side of 
(3.37). We will see in the following analysis that this is the case. Might it be possible 
that even when mm mmc b>  and ss ssc b>  that a policy that uses a tax to control each 
pollutant actually yields the lowest expected welfare? The answer is also yes. That 
said, it is also possible that the { }* *,m st t  policy yields the highest expected welfare of 
the four instrument mixes. 
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To see these possibilities more easily, let us start by considering the 
conditions where the { }* *,m st t  policy yields the highest expected welfare. We define 
ms mm ssc c cφ ≡  where φ has the same sign as cms and 1 1φ− < <  to satisfy the 
second-order condition for the affected firms’ problem. The variable φ is a proxy for 
the influence of joint abatement. Furthermore, we define m mm mmb cω ≡  and 
s ss ssb cω ≡ . We assume that 0 1mω< <  and 0 1sω< <  so that the { }* *, sm t and 
{ }* *,mt s policies are preferred to the { }* *,m s  policy. If the { }* *,m st t  policy yields higher 
expected welfare than the two policies that use a mix of instruments, the following 
conditions must both hold: 
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0 1 2 1
0 1 2 1
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m s s m m m
ss
ss






σ φ σ ω ω φ φ σ φ ω φ
σ φ σ ω ω φ φ σ φ ω φ
⎡ ⎤
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤< + − − − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤< + − − − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎣ ⎦
 (3.38) 
The top condition assures that the { }* *,m st t  policy is preferred to the { }* *, sm t policy, 
while the bottom condition assures that the { }* *,m st t  policy is preferred to the 
{ }* *,mt s policy. We see that if ωm and ωs are both sufficiently small, then the { }* *,m st t  
policy is preferred to the other three. That ωm and ωs would be close to 0 suggests that 
it is relatively more important to allow the abatement levels of both pollutants to 
adjust in response to the realized values of θm and θs. Furthermore, it suggests that the 
marginal benefit curves are fairly flat. The benefit of controlling each pollutant with a 
tax is thus particularly important.  
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We can also see that if the following conditions hold then the conditions in 








ω ω φ φ
ω ω φ φ
> − − −
> − − −
 (3.39) 
and thus the { }* *,m st t policy yields a lower expected welfare than the policies that use a 
mix of instruments. We see from (3.39) that if the absolute value of φ, which captures 
the magnitude of joint abatement, is close enough to 1, then it is possible for the 
{ }* *,m st t policy to yield lower expected welfare than the policies that use a mix of 
instruments.27 Recall from our discussion of the expressions for the expected levels of 
( )* *, ;m sm t t θ  and ( )* *, ;m ss t t θ  that the deviation in the realized abatement of the pollutants 
increases as the influence of joint abatement increases.28 If the variation in the 
realized levels of the abatement of both pollutants is large enough, then one of the 
policies that controls one pollutant by a tax and the other by a quantity is preferred to 
all. 
So, we have established the possibility that the mixed instrument policies 
may be preferred to the policy that places a tax on each pollutant when all three of 
these mixes are superior to the policy that controls each pollutant by a quantity. It is a 
relatively straightforward step to show that it is also possible, in the circumstance 
                                                 
27 Also note that as ωm and ωs get closer to one the gain from the abatement adjustment effect is small 
relative to the cost associated with the abatement uncertainty effect. 
28 Strictly speaking, this is only absolutely true for the abatement of both pollutants if there is no 
covariance between θm and θs (which we are assuming at this point). With a positive covariance 
between the random variables in the cost function the variance of the abatement of one of the 
pollutants may fall as the magnitude of joint abatement cms increases. 
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where the mixed instrument policies are preferred to the two policies that use the 
same instrument, for the policy that controls each pollutant by a quantity to be 
preferred to the policy that uses a tax to control each pollutant.29 Using our notation, 
the difference in the expected welfare from the { }* *,m st t policy minus the expected 
welfare from the { }* *,m s policy is: 
( ) ( )
2 2
* * * * 2 2 2 2
22
1, , 1 1
2 1
m s
m s m s s m
mm ss
W t t W m s
c c
σ σω ω φ φ ω ω φ φ
φ
⎡ ⎤
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = − − − + − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤− ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (3.40) 
Clearly this expression may be negative if ωm, ωs and |φ| are large enough. With ωm 
and ωs close to one, the benefit of the abatement of the two pollutants adjusting to the 
difference in expected cost is small, and with φ close to one the variance in the 
expected abatement of both pollutants is quite high. 
For the record, we have shown in this section that the following welfare 
orderings are possible: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * * * *, , , ,m s m sW t t W t s W m t W m s> >  (3.41) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * * * *, , , ,m s m sW t s W m t W t t W m s> >  (3.42) 
And, perhaps most surprisingly, so is the following welfare ordering: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * * * *, , , ,m s m sW t s W m t W m s W t t> >  (3.43) 
We have not explicitly laid out all of the parameter realizations that lead to these 
ordering, but we have shown that increasing the influence of joint abatement relative 
to the differences between the slopes of the partial marginal abatement cost and 
                                                 
29 And thus is a more rapid way to demonstrate the immediately proceeding results. 
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benefit curves leads to the ordering in (3.43) when the random variables are not 
correlated.30 
3.4.2.3 The Tax Policy with Covariance in the Random Variables 
The previous section might lead one to conclude, given some values for 
bmm, bss, cmm and css, that the presence of joint abatement would make it more likely 
that the policy that uses a tax to control each pollutant yields the lowest expected 
welfare. This would be the wrong conclusion, at least without first considering the 
case where the random variables are correlated (i.e. 0smσ ≠ ). This returns us to the 
full expression for the expected welfare from the{ }* *,m st t instrument mix. We will see 
that in this case it is possible for the { }* *,m st t policy to yield the highest expected 
welfare even when the policy that controls each pollutant by a quantity, { }* *,m s , is 
preferred to both policies that use a mix of instruments. 
To simplify our analysis we again turn to the variables ωm, ωs and φ as 
defined above. However, we now assume 1mω ≥  and 1sω ≥  so that the 
{ }* *,m s policy is preferred to both policies that use a mix of instruments. The 
expected welfare difference between the{ }* *,m st t policy and the { }* *,m s policy can 
then be expressed: 
                                                 
30 The careful reader will note that the possibility of an ordering similar to (3.43), with ( )* *, sW m t  and 
( )* *,W m s  yielding approximately the same expected welfare, was identified in the section 3.4.1.2. 
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 (3.44) 
This is still a difficult expression to handle. To see more clearly the possibility that 
the { }* *,m st t  policy may be preferred given our assumptions regarding the values of ωm 
and ωs, let ωm =ωs = 1 so that the regulator is indifferent between the{ }* *, sm t , 
{ }* *,mt s and { }* *,m s policies. 31 Then, for expression (3.44) to be positive, the 
following condition must hold: 




m ss s mm s mm m ssc c c c
ρ





where ρms is the correlation coefficient between the two random variables. The right 
side of (3.45) is clearly positive, so we see that the condition is violated unless σms 
and cms have the same sign (i.e. msρ φ  is positive). We will see why shortly. But first, 
to understand the conditions under which (3.45) holds, note that the bracketed term 
on the right is minimized when 2 2 1s mm m ssc cσ σ =  in which case it equals 2. Therefore, 
we see that if the absolute value of φ is sufficiently small and the absolute value of ρms 
is sufficiently large (and again they both have the same sign), then it is possible for 
(3.45) to hold and thus for the following ordering: 
 { } { } { } { }* * * * * * * *, , , ,m s m sW t t W m s W t s W m t> = =  (3.46) 
to hold.  
                                                 
31 It is left to Appendix 3.A to demonstrate the possibility that the { }* *,m st t policy may yield the highest 
expected welfare even when ωm>1 and ωs> 1. 
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Now we return to the question as to why σms and cms must have the same 
sign in order for the policy that uses taxes exclusively to yield the highest expected 
welfare when the other three instrument mixes yield the same expected welfare. The 
answer can be seen in the variance of the abatement levels when each pollutant is 
controlled by a tax. For a moment let us consider the abatement adjustment and the 
abatement uncertainty effects. With the { }* *,m s policy yielding higher expected 
welfare than the { }* *, sm t and { }* *,mt s policies, it must be the case that for each policy 
where one of the pollutants is controlled by a tax that the cost of the abatement 
uncertainty effect is greater than the benefit of the abatement adjustment effect. For 
the abatement uncertainty effect to be “large”, the variance in level of the pollutant 
controlled by a tax must be large. Thus, if it is indeed the case that the { }* *,m st t yields 
higher expected welfare than the three other possible mixes, then it must be the case 
that the abatement uncertainty effect is relatively small than when only one of the 
pollutants is controlled by a tax.32 Appendix 3.B shows that a sufficient condition for 
{ }* *,m st t  to yield higher expected welfare is that the variance in abatement for both m 
and s is smaller under this policy than when each is the sole pollutant controlled by a 
tax. In order for the variance in the abatement quantities to be smaller when both 
pollutants are controlled by a tax, the influence of the correlation between the random 
variables must offset the effect of the joint abatement relationship. This occurs when 
                                                 
32 The small abatement uncertainty effect comes at a cost of a smaller abatement adjustment effect. 
What is happening when both pollutants are controlled by a tax is that there are two relatively small 
abatement adjustment effects offsetting two small abatement uncertainty effects. 
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the σms and cms terms have the same sign. Furthermore, with both terms having the 
same sign, the covariance between ( )* *, ;m sm t t θ  and ( )* *, ;m ss t t θ  is smaller (than if they 
had the same magnitude but different signs), which reduces the abatement uncertainty 
effect associated with the term -cmsms. 
To be clear, our focus on the possibility that the { }* *,m st t  policy may yield 
the lowest expected welfare when the correlation of the random variables was small, 
and how it could be the best policy when the correlation was large, in both cases 
despite the expected welfare ordering of the other instrument mixes, was to isolate the 
importance of the correlation. While the presence of joint abatement itself would 
suggest that taxes are less preferred, the correlation in the random variables may 
offset or exacerbate the influence of joint abatement. It is probable that the random 
variables errors are correlated as they are generated by the same underlying primal 
cost-minimization problem. 
3.4.3 Relating Results to Theory of Second-Best 
Expected welfare orderings such as that found in expression (3.43), where 
the { }* *,m st t policy has the highest expected welfare followed by the { }* *,m s policy, 
yields an observation related to other analyses of second-best regulatory conditions. 
Say the regulator was restricted to using a quantity instrument to control s for some 
reason.33 With this welfare ordering, m should then be controlled with a quantity 
                                                 
33 Admittedly, the impetus for using a quantity to control s may suggest yet another distortion that will 
differentially affect the performance of the tax and quantity instruments. 
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instead of by a tax if expected welfare is to be maximized subject to this restriction. 
Generally speaking, the second-best literature focuses on how levels of regulatory 
instruments vary in the presence of preexisting distortions. The most common 
example in the economics of environmental policy is in the double-dividend literature 
which shows that the optimal pollution tax in the presence of preexisting labor tax 
distortions is less than the optimal suggested by the Samuelson conditions (i.e. 
marginal social benefit equaling marginal social cost of pollution) (Goulder, 2002). In 
the context of instrument choice under uncertainty, a study by Quirion (2004) shows 
that the comparative advantage of a tax over a quantity policy increases in the 
presence of a distortionary labor tax even when the quantity is auctioned off. In the 
analysis presented here, it is the instrument itself that may be suboptimal given a 
distortion in the choice of the instrument to control the other pollutant. An ordering of 
the form in (3.46) indicates that using a tax to control m is suboptimal given some 
exogenous restriction that s must be controlled by a quantity. Presumably the optimal 
instrument to control m may also be affected if there is a restriction on the level of the 
instrument to control s. To my knowledge, this is the first demonstration where the 
regulatory instrument itself changes in a second-best setting where there is an 
exogenous restriction on the instrument used to control a related pollutant. 
A study that finds a similar result is Oates and Schwab (undated). Recall 
from Chapter 1 that in their model there are two media-specific agencies, each 
regulating one pollutant. There is a dirty input that generates both pollutants, so the 
pollutants are substitutes, and a pollution abatement technology. They find that, 
conditional on one of the agencies imposing a technology standard, the other agency 
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should tax both the pollutant is responsible for and the dirty input. This result is 
similar to the findings of the optimal pollution tax literature. That literature finds that, 
if the optimal pollution tax can not be imposed (say, for political reasons), it may be 
optimal for the regulator to tax a polluting input. If the optimal tax could have been 
adopted, then it is not necessary to regulate the dirty input. The distinction in Oates 
and Schwab is that one regulator is imposing a suboptimal regulation on one 
pollutant, so the regulator of the other pollutant taxes both that pollutant and the dirty 
input that created it. 
One distinction between my findings and those in Oates and Schwab is that 
in the model here there is the intent that the level of the instrument that is 
exogenously determined is intended to maximize (expected) welfare. In Oates and 
Schwab the regulator that moves first may not necessarily be interested in 
maximizing welfare and thus may impose a suboptimal method of control (like a 
technology standard) or may not pick a pollution tax or quantity level that accounts 
for how the level of the jointly abated pollutant changes.  
However, the Oates and Schwab framework suggests another question that 
may be explored with the model herein. That is, what if the two pollutants were 
regulated by different agencies, and the instruments were adopted in sequence rather 
than simultaneously? While not explored here, given our second best findings, one 
can imagine that the instrument mix that results from the sequential adopting of 
controls may not be the optimal mix from simultaneously adopting the controls. This 
is particularly true if the regulator that moves first does not account for how the 
instrument it selects may influence the level of the other pollutant.   
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3.4.4 Special Cases 
In this section we consider some special cases that may be of empirical 
interest. The key question is whether the intuition drawn from the single pollutant 
setting extends to the two-pollutant setting when the shapes of the marginal benefit 
and cost functions are at their extremes. Generally speaking, we will see that it does. 
3.4.4.1 Constant Marginal Benefits 
We first explore the case where the slopes of the two marginal benefit 
functions are zero. That is, where bmm = bss = 0. It is immediately clear from Table 3.2 
that in this case the mixed instrument policies yield higher expected welfare than the 
policy that strictly uses quantities. Presumably, however, in this case the policy that 
uses a tax to control each pollutant set equal to bm or bs yields the highest expected 
welfare. We will show that this is indeed true. We’ll compare ( )* *,m sW t t  to ( )* *,mW t s  
and it will be clear that the finding will hold (symmetrically) for a comparison 
between ( )* *,m sW t t  and ( )* *, sW m t . Again, ρms is the correlation coefficient between the 
two random variables and we use the definition ms mm ssc c cφ ≡  where 1 1φ− < < . 
For ( )* *,m sW t t  to be greater than ( )* *,mW t s  it must be true that the following expression 
is strictly positive: 
 ( ) ( )
2 2 2
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Note that if it is at all possible for ( )* *,mW t s  to be greater than ( )* *,m sW t t , then it must 
be possible when ( )* *,m sW t t  is at its lowest level. As such, we will compare expected 
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welfare, assuming the conditions |ρms|=1 and 0msρ φ > , which minimizes (3.47). 
Expression (3.47) then becomes: 
 ( ) ( ) 2* * * * 2
1 1, ,
2 1m s m s mm m ssmm ss




⎡ ⎤− = −⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
 (3.48) 
There is no reason to suspect that the squared bracketed term on the right side of this 
expression is an imaginary number, so we take it as positive. Therefore, the entire 
expression is positive and the expected welfare from the { }* *,m st t  policy cannot be less 
than the expected welfare from the { }* *,mt s policy. A symmetric result derives from a 
comparison between the { }* *,m st t and the{ }* *, sm t  policy. 
What if only one of the marginal benefits where constant, say bss = 0, 
which instrument mix would yield the highest expected welfare? In the single 
pollutant case this would argue for a tax to be used to control s, but with joint 
abatement this simple result is no longer clear. Right off we see that it is possible that 
( )* *,mW t s  may be larger than ( )* *, sW m t . That is, despite bss = 0, it may be relatively 
more important to tax m than s. However, this does beg the question as to whether, if 










− >  (3.49) 
which is required for ( ) ( )* * * *, ,m sW t s W m t> when bss = 0; then must it also be true that 
( ) ( )* * * *, ,m s mW t t W t s> ? The answer is yes, and the preceding proof demonstrates this. 
Note that bmm = 0 maximizes the left side of (3.49) (without violating the constraint 
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that bmm be non-negative). We already showed that ( ) ( )* * * *, ,m s sW t t W m t>  when bmm = 0 
(and bss = 0) is positive in expression (3.48). 
3.4.4.2 Infinite Marginal Benefit Slopes 
The next special case to consider is when the slope of the marginal 
abatement benefit curve becomes infinitely steep. We will assume that mmb →∞ . In 
the single pollutant case this would suggest that m should be controlled by a quantity. 
With our two-pollutant problem, this finding holds when s is controlled by a quantity. 
However, it is not immediately clear from looking at Table 3.2 whether this result 
holds when s is controlled by a tax. That is, must the following expression be strictly 
positive when mmb →∞ ? 
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⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
 (3.50) 
The answer is yes. To see this, first note that the first and third terms on the right side 
of (3.50) do not contain bmm and thus are not relevant in the limit. The second term 
therefore determines the sign in the limit and is clearly conditional on the bracketed 
term in the numerator. The bracketed term in the numerator is strictly positive given: 
        
22 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2m ss s ms ms ms ss m ss s ms m s ms ss m ss s msc c c c c c c c c cσ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ⎡ ⎤+ − ≤ + − = −⎣ ⎦  (3.51) 
That is, as the covariance must be less than m sσ σ , the expression on the left must be 
less than the expression in the middle, which we see is a perfect square.  
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3.4.4.3 Constant Partial Marginal Costs 
We now analyze the case where the slope of the partial marginal abatement 
cost function of m approaches zero, i.e. as 0mmc → . In this case the only expected 
welfare relationship that is clear from an inspection of Table 3.2 is that 
( ) ( )* * * *, ,mW m s W t s> . In the single pollutant case this is the result we would expect, 
that m be controlled by a quantity. We see that if ss ssc b> then ( )* *, sW m t  is greater 
than ( )* *,W m s . This does not change the instrument used to control m, of course. 
What is not clear, however, is that, even when it is advantageous to control s by a tax 
when 0mmc → , must it be true that it can never be the case that it is advantageous to 
control m by a tax? That is, must it always be true that ( ) ( )* * * *, ,s m sW m t W t t>  when 
0mmc →  and ss ssc b> ?    
Before we explore this question, note that with the cost function this extreme 
case is a little more difficult to analyze because one must assure that the second order 
condition is satisfied. Thus, we must also say something about the magnitude of cms in 
our comparisons. To get around this issue we again use our proxy variable 
ms mm ssc c cφ ≡ . To return to the question at hand, the issue is whether the following 
expression is strictly positive: 
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 (3.52) 
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when 0mmc →  and ss ssc b> . The large bracketed term on the right of this expression 
will dictate the sign of (3.52) as 0mmc →  (the expression multiplying the bracketed 
term is strictly positive). The bracketed term converges to the non-negative 
expression 2 2m mm ssb cσ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  as 0mmc → , implying that it is never advantageous to control 
m by a tax when 0mmc → .
34 
3.4.4.4 Infinite Partial Marginal Cost Slopes 
Our next special case considers the situation where the slope of the partial 
marginal abatement cost function approaches infinity, so that mmc →∞ . In the single 
pollutant case this condition would argue for controlling m by a tax. This clearly 
holds for the two-pollutant case when s is controlled by a quantity. However, if we 
inspect the relationship between the two mixed instruments policies as mmc →∞ : 
 ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ]
2 2
* * * *
2 2, , 2 2
s m
s m ss ss mm mm
ss mm
W m t W t s c b c b
c c
σ σ
− = − − −  (3.53) 
we see it is possible for the { }* *, sm t  mix to yield higher expected welfare if ss ssc b>   
because the far right term in (3.53) converges to 0 as mmc →∞ . Of course, this again 
begs the question, if ( )* *, sW m t  is greater than ( )* *,mW t s  when mmc →∞ , must it then 
be the case that ( )* *,m sW t t  is strictly greater than ( )* *, sW m t  when mmc →∞ ? This 
would return us to the single pollutant result that regardless of how s is controlled, it 
is best to control m by a tax when mmc →∞ . Given the form of the cost function it is 
                                                 
34 An interesting ancillary result is if the regulator is restricted to using a tax to control m despite the 
fact that 0mmc → , it is always better to control s by a tax despite the relative magnitude of css and bss. 
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indeed best to control m by a quantity in this case. This can be seen in the following 
expression: 
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Note that the right-most term in (3.54) converges to zero as mmc →∞ (the denominator 
has a squared cmm term while the largest exponent on cmm in the numerator is 1). Thus 
the sign of this expression is dictated by the first term on the right side of (3.54).  This 
term converges to zero as mmc →∞ , but notably is non-negative for all values of cmm, 
so even as the limit is approached it is optimal to control each pollutant by a tax. 
What is the cause of this indifference at the extreme value of cmm? 
Basically, as mmc →∞  changing the intercept of the partial marginal abatement cost 
of m has little effect on the location of the curve (this explains why 2mσ  nor σms are not 
in the first term on the right side of (3.54)). The random variable changes the 
intercept of this function, so as it varies the curve does not move considerably. In the 
extreme case of mmc →∞ , the error essentially becomes irrelevant.
35 Clearly we are 
bounded to the restrictions from the form of the abatement cost function and how it is 
influenced by the source of randomness in this case. 
                                                 
35 Note that this is true in the single pollutant case.  As mmc → ∞  indeed it is best to control m by a tax, 
but the difference in the expected welfare from the two competing instruments converges to 0. 
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3.4.4.5 Equal Partial Marginal Benefit and Cost Slopes 
While an informative exercise, the four cases just discussed do not indicate 
any surprising results nor deviate from what would be expected in a single pollutant 
case. We now revisit one example where indeed the intuition from the single pollutant 
case no longer holds when there is joint abatement. This is the case where the slopes 
of the marginal benefit functions equal the respective slopes of the partial marginal 
cost functions. In the case where there is no joint abatement, when cmm= bmm and css= 
bss the regulator is indifferent to whether a tax or a quantity is used to control each 
pollutant as all four instrument mixes yield the same expected welfare. In the joint 
abatement setting, expected welfare is still the same for the { }* *,mt s , { }* *, sm t and 
{ }* *,m s policies. However, expected welfare from the { }* *,m st t  policy is different from 
that from the other three mixes, and it is possible that it yields higher or lower 
expected welfare than the other three instrument combinations. We showed in section 
3.4.2.3 that σms and cms must have the same sign for the { }* *,m st t  policy to be preferred. 
A further inspection of expression (3.45) showed that the absolute value of the 
correlation coefficient of the random variables needs to be relatively large and the 
magnitude of the joint abatement relationship, φ , needs to be relatively small for this 
relationship to hold. 
3.4.4.6 Summary of Special Cases 
The results of this section are summarized in Table 3.3. 
 
 103
Table 3.3: Summary of Special Cases 
Case Conditions Expected Welfare Maximizing Instrument Mix
  with 0smc =  with 0smc ≠  
Perfectly elastic 
marginal benefits 
0mmb =  
{ }* *,m st t    if ss ssc b>  
{ }* *,mt s   if ss ssc b<  
{ }* *,m st t    if ss ssc b>  
{ }* *,mt s   if ss ssc b<  
Perfectly inelastic 
marginal benefits 
lim  mmb →∞  
{ }* *, sm t  if ss ssc b>  
{ }* *,m s  if ss ssc b<  
{ }* *, sm t  if ss ssc b>  




lim  0mmc →  
{ }* *,m st t    if ss ssc b>  
{ }* *,mt s   if ss ssc b<  
{ }* *,m st t    if ss ssc b>  




lim  mmc →∞  
{ }* *, sm t  if ss ssc b>  
{ }* *,m s  if ss ssc b<  
{ }* *, sm t  if ss ssc b>  
{ }* *,m s  if ss ssc b<  
Marginal benefits 
and partial cost 
slopes are equal. 
mm mmb c= , 
ss ssb c=  
All mixes yield 
same expected 
welfare 
The { }* *,mt s , { }* *, sm t and 
{ }* *,m s policies yield same 
expected welfare. Generally 
speaking, the { }* *,m st t policy 
yields the highest expected 
welfare if the correlation 
coefficient of the random 
variables is larger, but has 
the same sign, as the joint 
abatement relationship. 
 
3.5 Summary of Analytics 
There are two key implications to draw from this analysis, and they arise 
despite the fact that we are using a particular functional form. The first is that, in the 
presence of joint abatement, a simple comparison of relative slopes without 
accounting for the way in which other pollutants are controlled may be misleading. 
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This was most easily seen in the example where the regulator is deciding on how to 
control m where there is only one error, θm, and the pollutant s is controlled by a tax. 
The appropriate comparison is not the relative slopes of the marginal benefit of m and 
the marginal cost of m. The effect on s, which varies, must also be accounted for. 
However, a weighting of the abatement adjustment and abatement uncertainty effects 
from using tax instruments continues to identify the optimal instrument mix. 
The second is that pairwise comparisons of instruments, even when they 
consider the way in which the other pollutant is controlled, do not necessarily suggest 
the combination of instruments that yields the highest expected welfare. For example, 
if both policies with mixed instruments yield higher expected welfare than the policy 
that strictly uses quantity instruments, it is not necessarily true that the policy that 
strictly uses taxes is preferred. Indeed, it may be the worst option of the four. This 
result implies that the optimal method of controlling one pollutant may be conditional 
on the way the other pollutant is controlled.  
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Appendix 3.A Further Exploration of Welfare Orderings  
In section 3.4.2.3 we showed that the following welfare ordering was 
possible: 
 { } { } { } { }* * * * * * * *, , , ,m s m sW t t W m s W t s W m t> = =  (3.55) 
In this appendix we want to demonstrate the possibility that the policy that uses a tax 
to control each pollutant may be preferred when the policy that uses a quantity to 
control each pollutant strictly yields the second highest expected welfare. For 
convenience let mm mm ss ssc b c b ω− = − =  where ω is negative. This implies that 
( ) ( )* * * *, , sW m s W m t> and ( ) ( )* * * *, ,mW m s W t s> . We simplify further by letting 
mm ssc c c= =  and 
2 2 2
m sσ σ σ= = . These conditions are not necessary for the result to 
hold, but they make the possibility easier to see. Again we use the definition 
msc cφ =  where 1 1φ− < < .  For the expected welfare from the { }* *,m st t  policy to be 
higher than the expected welfare from the { }* *,m s policy, the following constraint 









σ ω ρ φ φ φ ρ φ ρ φ
φ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + + − + >⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (3.56) 
It is not transparent that this expression can be positive for negative ω. However, if let 












If ω is only slightly negative, it is possible for (3.57) to hold if φ is positive and c is 
large. 
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Appendix 3.B Reduced Variance in Quantities Sufficiency 
Condition 
In this Appendix we show that a sufficient condition for the following 
welfare ordering to hold: 
 { } { } { } { }* * * * * * * *, , , ,m s m sW t t W m s W t s W m t> = =  (3.58) 
is that the variances in the abatement quantities for the policy that uses a tax to 
control each pollutant are lower than when each pollutant is the one solely controlled 
by a tax. Recall that we showed tat expression (3.58) (i.e., expression (3.45)) holds if 
the following is true (where ms mm ssc c cφ ≡  and 1 1φ− < < , 1mm mm ss ssb c b c= =  and 
ρms is the correlation coefficient between the random variables): 




m ss s mm s mm m ssc c c c





Where this expression is the same as expression (3.46).  
Now we compare the variances in the quantities when each pollutant is 
controlled by a tax and when only one pollutant is controlled by a tax. In order for the 
covariance in m to be smaller when each pollutant is controlled by a tax compared to 
when only m is controlled by a tax, the following relationship must hold: 
 ( )( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2 2
* * * *
2 22
2var , ; var , ; s ms m ss ms ms ss mm s m
mmmm ss ms
c c c cm t t m t s
cc c c
σ σ σ σθ θ + −< ⇒ <
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
(3.60) 
Using our simplifications/restrictions this condition reduces to: 
 2 2 2 2 21 2
2
sm
m ss s mm s mm m ssc c c c
ρ φ σ σ σ σ
φ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤> − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  (3.61) 
The condition symmetric to (3.61) for s is: 
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 2 2 2 2 21 2
2
sm
m ss s mm s mm m ssc c c c
ρ σ σ φ σ σ
φ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤> + −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  (3.62) 
If (3.61) and (3.62) both hold then the following condition also holds: 
 2 2 2 2 23sm m ss s mm s mm m ssc c c c
ρ φ σ σ σ σ
φ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤> − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (3.63) 
Note that the right side of (3.63) is greater than the right side of (3.59) as 
2 23 1 1φ φ⎡ ⎤− < +⎣ ⎦ . 
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CHAPTER 4: INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL WITH 
JOINT ABATEMENT: AN APPLICATION TO AIR-
QUALITY REGULATION 
4.1 An Application to the Electricity Sector 
The control of mercury (Hg), sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOX) pollution from the electricity sector presents a relevant and ripe regulatory 
context for analyzing the effect of uncertain joint abatement costs on instrument 
choice. Federal regulations affecting these pollutants have recently been promulgated 
and legislative proposals are currently being considered that would lead to reductions 
in these pollutants. At the same time, there is considerable uncertainty as to the effect 
of post-combustion technologies designed to abate SO2, NOX and particulate matter 
emissions on Hg emissions. The preceding analysis indicates the need for careful 
analysis of integrated instrument choice when pollutants are jointly abated and 
control costs are uncertain. 
In this chapter we carry out such an analysis using a detailed linked partial-
equilibrium simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector. We use this model to 
estimate the effect of using competing instrument mixes to control Hg and SO2 
emissions from this sector on expected welfare. By linked we mean that the model 
captures the relationship between multiple markets for electricity and the fuels used to 
generate electricity over time and space. This model was developed at Resources for 
the Future to analyze the effect of changes in environmental and pricing rules on this 
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sector. The following analysis represents the first time it has been used explicitly to 
model the effect of uncertainty on the optimal level and performance of a regulation.1  
The modeling approach herein is unlike most others concerned with the 
effect of uncertainty on instrument choice in a particular regulatory setting. Previous 
studies have captured uncertainty through stochastic components of estimated cost 
functions (Watson and Ridker, 1984) and distributions of parameters drawn from 
deterministic computable general equilibrium models applied to reduced form 
analytical models (Newell and Pizer, 2003; Hoel and Karp, 2001). Pizer (2002) 
incorporates stochastic variables in a reduced form general equilibrium model to 
estimate the welfare gains of controlling carbon by a tax or quantity instrument. In the 
model used here, uncertainty is represented through correlated variations in control 
technology parameters across emitting sources in a detailed market simulation 
model.2 
The study described herein is most like Kolstad (1987) and Dowlatabadi 
and Harrington (1990). Kolstad (1987) uses a market simulation model of SO2 
emitting industries in the four-corners region of the U.S. to compare the properties of 
a tax, quantity and command-and-control policy. In the Kolstad (1987) model the 
source of uncertainty in the cost of controlling emissions comes from uncertainty in 
                                                 
1 The model has been used to explore how uncertainty in, for example, natural gas prices affects the 
performance of a planned pollution control policy. That is, in the form of sensitivity analyses (see for 
example Burtraw et al., 2003a). The study described in Burtraw et al. (2006b), which was initiated 
after this study, also uses this model to evaluate the performance of a pollution control policy when 
there is uncertainty in a particular component of the model. 
2 There is at least one empirical study of the performance of landing fees and harvest quotas for the 
management of fish stocks that incorporates parameter uncertainty into a reduced form harvest model 
(Hannesson and Kennedy, 2005). This study considers the management of a single species. 
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the final (inelastic) demand for goods. Similarly, Dowlatabadi and Harrington (1990) 
use a regional model of electricity generators meeting a demand target at least cost. 
They consider the effect of uncertainty in various parameters (fuel input, demand, 
plant performance, etc.) on the production cost of given competing regulatory 
approaches (permits, tax, and plant-level performance standards) to control SO2. 
Their model does not consider the benefits of abatement (which varies with the tax 
and standards policy) when evaluating the competing instruments. Neither of these 
studies (nor the ones in the previous paragraphs) considers the joint selection of 
instruments when multiple pollutants are being controlled. 
For reasons described below, the following analysis is somewhat limited 
given the challenge of accounting for parameter uncertainty in an otherwise large and 
deterministic market model. However, the key components required for a more 
thorough analysis are identified. Furthermore, the following presentation does 
demonstrate how the relative efficiency of an instrument to control one pollutant 
depends on how other jointly abated pollutants are being controlled and provides a 
sense of the extent of welfare loss that might be expected from choosing the wrong 
mix of instruments. An important ancillary contribution of this work is that it also 
provides the first estimate of the efficient level of Hg emissions from the electricity 
sector. 
In the next section we briefly describe the current regulatory environment 
for the control of these pollutants. This is followed by a discussion of the uncertainty 
surrounding Hg emissions and its control. We then describe how the benefits and 
costs of emissions are measured. With this information, we (roughly) identify the 
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optimal levels of the instruments and estimate and compare the expected welfare for 
each instrument mix. We then discuss the effect of the different instrument mixes on 
allowance prices, emissions, the adoption of pollution control technologies, and the 
distribution of welfare. 
4.2 Policy Background 
In May 2005 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted the 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which uses cap-and-trade programs to control SO2 
and NOX emissions (Federal Register, 2005a). The rule comes into effect in 2009 and 
is intended to facilitate regional compliance with tighter particulate and ozone 
ambient air quality standards by reducing inter-state transport of these pollutants. The 
affected sources are large electricity generating and industrial sources in the eastern 
and central U.S. Coal-burning power plants bear the largest burden of this regulation 
as they account for nearly all of the SO2 and 75% of the NOX emissions from the 
electricity sector.  
The Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) was also finalized in May 2005 and 
applies a cap-and-trade program for Hg emissions to coal-burning power plants 
(Federal Register, 2005b).3 Hg is a neurotoxin where fetal exposure has been shown 
                                                 
3 That Hg is controlled with a cap-and-trade program is controversial for at least two reasons. The first 
is simply that Hg is a toxic pollutant with potentially local effects and therefore may be a poor 
candidate for emissions trading on a national-scale (Bellas and Lange, 2005). The second is based on a 
legal interpretation of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Some have argued that the Amendments 
require a technology-based performance standard to control Hg once it was designated as “hazardous” 
by the EPA in 2000. The EPA addressed this possibility and actually proposed a rule that would have 
required compliance with a performance standard at the same time it proposed the rule embodying a 
cap-and-trade approach. However, given the EPA’s interpretation of how the standard should be set, 
projected emissions from the proposed standards rule is greater than from the proposed cap-and-trade 
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to cause IQ loss. The EPA was under court order to develop this rule after 
determining in December, 2000 that Hg emitted from these sources qualifies as a 
hazardous pollutant subject to regulation under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
That said, one should not interpret the close timing of the adoption of CAIR and 
CAMR rules as mere serendipity. It was indeed acknowledged by the EPA that the 
affected sources could better plan their compliance strategies if adoption of these 
rules was coordinated.4 
Most of the Hg emitted by coal burning facilities is in one of two species or 
forms. “Elemental” Hg is relatively inert and has a wide deposition pattern, while 
“oxidized”, or “speciated”, Hg deposits close to its source and is easily converted to 
methylmercury in aquatic systems (Landis et al. 2004). Methylmercury accumulates 
in the tissue of predators, including humans, and is known to disrupt fetal 
development and neurological function. Despite the differing effect of the two forms, 
the CAMR rule employs an emissions trading program that does not differentiate 
between them. 
A highly debated element of CAMR was the total allowance allocation. 
The EPA believes that technologies specifically designed to control Hg emissions 
will not begin to be commercially viable until after 2010. As such, the EPA was 
                                                                                                                                           
rule. Using this difference in the emission level between the two proposed rules as justification, the 
EPA reversed the designation of Hg as hazardous, which allowed the Agency to regulate Hg under a 
section of the CAAA that allows emissions trading as a regulatory option. While both the CAIR and 
CAMR rules are under judicial review, the latter is by far the most contentious. 
4 Many of the details of these programs are nontrivial, but also are not particularly relevant to the 
analysis herein. Key design elements include; decentralized allowance allocation, restrictions on 
banking, integration with Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the geographic extent of 
each market, and separate trading programs for annual and seasonal NOX emissions. For a summary of 
the two rules see Burtraw et al. (2006a). 
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reluctant to impose a cap from 2010 to 2018 on Hg tighter than the level of emissions 
already anticipated.5 One particularly significant source of uncertainty in estimating 
future Hg emissions is the extent to which post-combustion controls for conventional 
pollutants abate Hg.6 
There are two ways this source of uncertainty manifests itself in projections 
of Hg emissions. The first, which received the most attention during the development 
of CAMR, is through the effect of NOX and SO2 control retrofits expected for 
compliance with CAIR. The ancillary Hg reduction from these controls is often 
referred to in the regulatory process as their Hg “co-benefit”. When a wet SO2 
scrubber is used in combination with a selective catalytic reduction (SCR) system, the 
most common NOX post-combustion control, they can reduce Hg emissions up to 
98%.7 At this point the combined effect of these two controls on Hg emissions is 
relatively well known (EPRI, 2004).8  
                                                 
5 EPA decided on an annual allocation of 38 tons of Hg emissions from 2010 to 2017. This is the 
expected amount of Hg emissions in 2010 given the CAIR rule. Starting in 2018 the allocation will be 
15 tons. While the allocation from 2010 to 2017 is based on expected Hg emissions absent CAMR, the 
Hg allowance price is not expected to be zero as the CAMR allowances may be banked for future use. 
Thus, Hg emissions are actually expected to be below the cap from 2010 to 2017 as affected sources 
rely more on post-combustion controls to abate NOX and SO2 than they would absent the CAMR rule 
(2005a). 
6 It has been known for a long time that post-combustion controls have an important effect on Hg 
emissions. Watson (1978) predicted Hg emissions to 2025 assuming that SO2 scrubbers reduce Hg by 
about a third. Watson also assumed that by 2000 all boilers firing high sulfur coal would be retrofit 
with scrubbers while all boilers that fire low-sulfur coal would be retrofit by 2015.  
7 Wet scrubbers more readily collect Hg when it is in its oxidized form. An SCR system does not 
reduce Hg independently but converts a significant share of elemental Hg to oxidized Hg. This 
conversion explains why the collection of Hg by SO2 scrubbers improves when an SCR system is 
present. 
8 When the EPA began considering whether to regulate Hg emissions from power plants, few coal 
boilers in the U.S. had SCR systems. As such, relatively little was known about the effect of SCRs on 
Hg emissions. Since then approximately a third of the U.S. coal-fired capacity has installed this 
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The amount of Hg currently emitted by coal-fired boilers also is uncertain. 
This is the second, and somewhat neglected, way Hg emissions projections are 
affected by uncertainty regarding the influence of controls designed to abate other 
pollutants.  Even with the tighter restrictions on NOX and SO2 emissions required by 
CAIR, a considerable share of the coal-fired generating capacity, about 25% in 2020 
by EPA’s central estimate, will not have NOX or SO2 post-combustion controls 
(U.S.EPA 2005b). The extent to which additional SO2 and NOX controls will be 
adopted depends in part on how much Hg would be emitted and thus how much must 
be abated. One way to view uncertainty in the marginal abatement cost function in the 
instrument choice literature is that the regulator is unsure of the baseline level of 
emissions. For a discussion of this interpretation see Newell and Pizer (2000). 
4.3 Characterizing Uncertainty in Mercury Emissions 
In 1999 the EPA requested coal chemistry analyses from 80 randomly 
selected coal-fired boilers to better understand the effect of conventional pollutant 
controls on Hg emissions. These data show that the percentage of Hg reduced is a 
function of the type of post-combustion technologies used to control SO2, NOX and 
particulate emissions as well as the boiler’s design and type of coal that is fired 
(U.S.EPA 2002a). 
The EPA uses these data to estimate representative Hg removal efficiencies 
for different boiler categories for the purpose of regulatory modeling (U.S.EPA 
2002a; 2005d). The removal efficiency equals one minus the ratio of Hg emitted to 
                                                                                                                                           
technology. These retrofits are in response to the recently enacted summertime NOX cap-and-trade 
program that affects electricity generators in 19 midwestern and eastern states and Washington, D.C. 
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the Hg embodied in the coal. The boiler categories are defined by each unique 
combination of boiler design, coal rank, and SO2, NOX and particulate pollution 
control listed in Table 4.1. The representative removal efficiency for each category is 
equal to the unweighted average Hg removal efficiency from all of the flue gas 
measurements taken from the boilers in that category. For those categories where no 
boiler was surveyed, EPA assumes that the Hg removal efficiency from a similar 
category is applicable. In the following analysis we adopt EPA’s approach for 
grouping boilers and estimating their representative removal efficiencies, with the 
exception of those categories that include both a wet SO2 scrubber and SCR control 
where our estimates of the representative removal efficiencies are drawn from EPRI 
(2004). 
Table 4.1: Characteristics that Define Boiler Categories for Hg Removal Efficiencies 
Boiler Design 
(Firing Type) 










Hot-Side (HS) Electrostatic 
Precipitator (ESP) 
Cold-Side (CS) ESP  















The data show that even within a particular boiler category the Hg 
reduction varies considerably. For example, the average Hg removal efficiency of 
pulverized coal boilers that fire bituminous coal and have a cold-side electrostatic 
precipitator but no SO2 or NOX controls is 46% with a standard deviation of 23%. 
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This is a non-trivial uncertainty given that currently about 75GW of coal-fired 
capacity (about a quarter of the total U.S. coal-fired capacity) fits this description. 
The estimated variance in the removal efficiencies for each of the boiler 
categories may simply suggest that the boilers in each category have different, but 
similar, removal efficiencies. If the removal efficiencies vary across boilers, but on 
average agree with the regulator’s expectations, then the different instrument mixes 
will, generally speaking, yield the same welfare level. This is because the shape of the 
social abatement cost function is known (provided there is a sufficiently large number 
of sources) even when the ordering of polluters along the function may be 
unknown.9,10 When the removal efficiencies are correlated among boilers in each 
category, and across categories, then this is no longer the case. Rather, the shape of 
the expected social abatement cost function is itself uncertain and thus the different 
instrument mixes would no longer yield the same expected welfare. This is the way 
we will interpret the sample variances of the removal efficiencies for each boiler 
category. Furthermore, we will assume that these removal efficiencies are perfectly 
                                                 
9 Admittedly, uncertainty in the variance itself could matter to the performance of a particular 
instrument mix (and thus across mixes) given that different boilers in the same category can have 
different utilization rates (i.e., those blessed with a higher removal efficiency and thus lower Hg 
emissions may operate more). In reality we would likely see a greater variance in the utilization rates 
the greater the variance in the removal efficiency. However, the model only uses a single removal 
efficiency for each category.   
10 The presence of such randomness and the inability of the regulator to identify each source type being 
the primary justification for employing incentive based regulatory policies. 
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correlated across the categories: when the removal efficiency for one category is high 
so are the removal efficiencies for all other categories.11 
These are not completely baseless assumptions for how one can interpret 
the variances in the removal efficiencies. For example, one would expect that if, for 
example, fabric filters contribute to greater Hg removal than expected within one 
category then the actual removal efficiency would also be higher than expected for 
other categories that have boilers controlled by fabric filters. Admittedly, this is not 
the way the data were analyzed, with representative removal efficiencies estimated as 
functions of individual boiler attributes. But it seems, even if the variance in the 
observed data may overestimate any common source of error across all of the boilers, 
that common sources of error are likely to exist.  
4.4 Framework for Analysis 
In the following analysis net benefits are analyzed in emissions space. This 
is different from the theoretical analysis in Chapter 3, where the analysis focused on 
levels of abatement. However, the analysis is fundamentally the same. Emission 
benefits are equivalent to a reduction in abatement costs while the social damage 
from emissions is equivalent to the forgone benefits of abatement as emissions 
increase. Changing to emissions space simplifies the description of the problem and 
                                                 
11 This approach bounds the effect of uncertainty on welfare provided the model is monotonic in the 
same direction for all of the removal efficiencies, which we would expect it is. For a proof of this 
conjecture, see Kurowicka and Cooke (2006). 
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allows us to present welfare estimates without having to impose a particular 
counterfactual emissions baseline from which to measure abatement.12 
4.4.1 Emissions Benefits 
4.4.1.1 The Electricity Sector Model (Haiku) 
A simulation model of the electricity market in the contiguous U.S. is used 
to estimate the benefits of SO2 and Hg emissions. The model, developed by 
Resources for the Future and known as “Haiku”, yields partial-equilibrium welfare 
changes expected to result from imposing environmental and electricity pricing 
policies on the sector. Haiku is an iterative tâtonnement model in the prices for both 
outputs and major inputs to this sector.13 Welfare is measured as the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus in the electricity market adjusted by any changes in government 
revenues.14 The model also captures the effect of these policies on the production and 
prices of key inputs to the sector such as coal and natural gas. The model allows for 
dynamic investment and compliance behavior and is usually solved for two to four 
simulation years over a 25-year time horizon. 
                                                 
12 Recall that Newell and Pizer (2000) note that one interpretation of uncertainty in an abatement cost 
function is that there is uncertainty in the baseline level of emissions. By operating in emissions space 
we avoid this problem. We also avoid the problem, also noted by Newell and Pizer, that uncertainty in 
the baseline level of emissions also means that there is uncertainty in the benefit of abatement that is 
therefore correlated with uncertainty in the abatement cost function. Admittedly, as we will see, the 
slopes of our damage functions make this last concern irrelevant.  
13 For additional description of Haiku see the Appendix of this dissertation. For references to its use in 
peer-reviewed literature see Banzhaf et al. (2004). For each unique combination of model parameters, 
the version of the model used herein takes approximately 50 hours to solve (converge) on a computer 
with a 2GHz processor with 1GB of RAM.  
14 As suggested by Harberger (1964, 1971) the use of a partial equilibrium model will fully measure 
the welfare change from imposing a policy affecting the electricity sector, provided income effects are 
small and distortions in related markets are insignificant. Parry, 2005, suggests that distortions in the 
labor market are important for measuring the welfare consequences of policies affecting this sector.  
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The model divides the contiguous states of the U.S. into 20 regional 
electricity markets roughly defined by historic regional electricity reliability council 
boundaries with some further spatial disaggregation. Electricity demand is price 
responsive and distinguished by consumer class (residential, industrial, commercial), 
season (summer, winter, spring/fall), and time of day (baseload, shoulder, peak, and 
superpeak). As such there are 720 distinct retail electricity markets in each simulation 
year. Interregional trade is modeled endogenously subject to transmission capacity 
constraints between regions. The wholesale electricity market is assumed to be 
competitive so that prices are based on the relationship between the marginal cost of 
generation in different regions. Retail markets can be characterized by either average 
(cost-of-service) or marginal cost pricing. Deviating from reality, the following 
analysis assumes that the retail electricity pricing structure in each region is 
competitive with time-of-day pricing. This is an attempt to avoid unanticipated results 
driven by suboptimal pricing policies that are endemic in the electricity sector and 
generate second-best welfare ordering effects when new policies are imposed (Parry, 
2005).  
Electricity generators are represented by “model plants” defined by nine 
criteria: location, vintage (existing or new), prime mover, fuel, relative operating cost 
(for those generators using natural gas or nuclear fuel), and, for coal-fired boilers, 
coal demand region, capacity, and the expected presence of SO2 and NOX post-
combustion abatement controls in 2010. Up to 85 economic and design variables are 
used to characterize a model plant. These variables are usually weighted averages of 
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observations drawn from the individual generators the model plant represents. The 
total capacity of a model plant is the sum of the capacity of its constituent generators.  
Electricity generator dispatch at any instance is determined by a model 
plant’s short-run operating cost. Capital stock investment and retirement, as well as 
investment in pollution control technologies, are determined by the expected 
profitability of generation assets over time. Assumptions regarding the performance 
of new generation capacity and pollution control technologies are drawn from a 
variety of sources. 
4.4.1.2 Modeling Pollution Abatement Options 
Haiku tracks emissions of SO2, NOX, Hg and carbon dioxide from each 
model plant. Considerable emphasis is placed on the ability of the model to represent 
the common compliance options available to electricity generators to reduce these 
pollutants. To comply with regulations controlling SO2, NOX, and Hg, coal-fired 
model plants may install post-combustion controls, reduce their generation, or change 
the coal they fire. The different coal types are characterized by their rank (heat 
content), location where they are mined, and sulfur and Hg contents. The post-
combustion technologies for SO2 control include wet and dry scrubbers. The coal 
model plants may adopt SCR or Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction (SNCR) 
technologies to abate NOX emissions. Typically, the coal model plants may install 
activated carbon injection (ACI), which is specifically designed to abate Hg. 
However, in the following analysis ACI is not available as a control technology under 
the stark assumption that it will not be commercially available. Finally, we note that 
plant managers are presumed to make investment decisions knowing the operating 
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and pollution control costs, including the Hg removal efficiencies, of their plant and 
all other generators. 
4.4.2 Emission Damages 
The damage functions for SO2 and NOX are drawn from Banzhaf et al. 
(2004). Banzhaf et al. link the Haiku model to an atmospheric transport and health 
effects model to estimate efficient emission taxes for the control of SO2 and NOX in 
2010.15 The damage functions they trace out are non-convex and thus yield non-linear 
marginal damage functions. The non-convexity arises because of the incongruity of 
the instrument, a nationally uniform fee, and the varying local effect of the 
pollutants.16 However, the authors find that the marginal damage functions for the 
two pollutants are generally flat. Using their central estimates, the marginal damage 
from a ton of SO2 in 2010 is about $3,911 while the marginal damage from a ton of 
NOX is about $1,229 (all prices and welfare measures reported herein are in 2004 
$).17  
The marginal damage function for Hg is drawn from Rice and Hammitt 
(2005). They estimate the annual benefit of Hg reductions expected from the adoption 
of a particular legislative proposal to control SO2, NOX and Hg emissions from the 
                                                 
15 While a variety of health afflictions are accounted for in the calculation of damages, their analysis 
does not capture the benefits of improved ecosystem health. 
16 As the emissions fee increases, the damage caused by the marginally controlled source, depending 
on its location, may be higher or lower than the previously controlled source. 
17 Despite the expectation that damages will increase with population growth between 2010 and 2020, 
the respective years of interest in the Banzhaf et al. and the present study, no attempt is made here to 
adjust the marginal damage estimates accordingly. A similar criticism can be made for the Hg damage 
estimate used below, which is an average of the average damage estimates for 2010 and 2020. 
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electricity sector. Their analysis is limited to human health effects and assumes that 
the sole pathways for Hg intake are commercial and freshwater fish consumption. 
The authors identify a variety of human health afflictions that may be caused by Hg, 
from IQ losses due to fetal exposure to cardiovascular damages that lead to premature 
mortality. They provide an ordinal ranking of the likelihood that Hg causes these 
different health effects. This ranking is based on their interpretation of the strength of 
scientific consensus regarding these potential effects. The following analysis assumes 
that all of the potential consequences of Hg exposure that the authors identify actually 
occur. The more speculative benefits, which are those associated with premature 
mortality, are included in the emission damage estimates to help ensure that the 
influence of different instrument mixes on expected welfare can be identified. They 
were also included to calculate a likely lower bound on the efficient level of Hg 
emissions. 
Rice and Hammitt assume that “equilibria currently exist between 
deposited Hg and fish methylmercury concentrations and between fish 
methylmercury concentrations and methylmercury exposures to individuals who 
consume these fish” (xvi). Further, they assume that any changes in deposition will 
“lead to linear and proportional changes in fish Hg concentrations.” These 
assumptions abstract from the notions that Hg is a stock pollutant, that there is a lag 
between Hg deposition and fish uptake, and that fish consumers can influence their 
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own exposure.18 The study also abstracts from the complication that Hg is emitted in 
multiple forms, and the shares of these different forms may change as total emissions 
change. However, it is the only study that provides detailed estimates of the possible 
impact of changes in Hg deposition on both IQ and cardiovascular health. While Rice 
and Hammitt account for the effect of emission location on damages, our analysis 
ignores spatial heterogeneity in damages. The consequence of all of these 
assumptions is that the implied marginal damage of Hg is constant.  
While we are assuming that all of the potential damages Rice and Hammitt 
(2005) identify actually occur, for consistency a lower value of a statistical life is 
used. In particular, the value of a statistical life used herein is drawn from Mrozek 
and Taylor (2002) ($2.46 million). This is the same value of a statistical life used in 
Banzhaf et al. (2004) and is 40% of the one used by Rice and Hammitt (2005) and by 
EPA (U.S.EPA 2005a).19 In the following analysis the marginal damage per pound of 
Hg is $40,940 or $2,560 per ounce.20 
                                                 
18 Hoel and Karp (2001) and Newell and Pizer (2003) explore instrument choice in the presence of 
abatement cost uncertainty for a single stock pollutant. Both find that as the persistence of the pollutant 
increases, ceteris paribus, quantities are favored. Intuitively, increased persistence increases the slope 
of the marginal damage function, as current emissions would have an even greater effect on future 
damages.  
19 For a more detailed description of the adjustment to the Rice and Hammitt (2005) estimates using 
the value of statistical life used in Banzhaf et al. (2004), see Palmer et al. (2005). 
20 This level of marginal damages is much higher than estimated elsewhere. For example, the EPA 
estimated that the average damage of the Hg remaining after CAIR comes into effect is about $3,400 
per pound in 2020 (U.S.EPA 2005c; U.S.EPA 2006; Griffiths et al., 2006). The central estimate from 
Gayer and Hahn (2006) is clearly even lower (although difficult to determine exactly as they report 
damages over multiple periods). Both of these newer studies only consider IQ loses due to prenatal 
exposure when estimating damages. Of course, the Rice and Hammitt estimate for damages associated 
with lost IQ is also lower ($5,066 per pound). 
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Constant marginal damages clearly take some of the excitement out of the 
instrument choice analysis. Emissions taxes set equal to constant marginal damages 
cannot be improved upon on efficiency grounds.21 In part, constant marginal damages 
are an artifact of the underlying epidemiological and valuation analyses, which often 
only estimate or have sufficient power to report average effects. Therefore, the form 
of the damage functions assumed presently is not necessarily a true representation of 
the relationship between emissions and health and ecosystem damages.22 
4.4.3 Expected Welfare 
4.4.3.1 Determining Optimal Instrument Levels 
Now we bring together the benefits and the costs of emissions to determine 
the optimal levels for the different instrument mixes and compare their performance. 
We simplify the analysis to the choice of instruments to control Hg and SO2 
emissions from coal-fired boilers. The pair { },m sI I identifies the instruments 
controlling Hg and SO2 where the subscripts indicate the particular pollutant and each 
instrument I can either be a cap Q or a tax T on emissions.  
Where quantity policies are used to control SO2 or Hg, all allowances are 
allocated via an efficient auction, where the auction price is equal to the marginal 
value product of emissions across affected generators, and allowances may not be 
                                                 
21 With taxes equal to marginal damages, all of the prices in the model would be considered equal to 
their respective input’s opportunity cost regardless of the realization of the Hg removal efficiencies. 
22 Even assuming the form is correct, of course there is significant uncertainty in the level of marginal 
damages of emissions for all three pollutants. However, we have ignored uncertainty in the level of 
damages as this uncertainty, unless it is correlated with the uncertainty in the benefits of emissions, is 
irrelevant to determining the optimal mix of instruments (although not necessarily the levels of these 
instruments). More will be said about uncertainty in the level of damages in Chapter 5.  
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banked. Allocation via an auction is assumed to keep symmetry between the 
treatment of tax revenues and the rents accruable to the emission allowances.23 
For each model plant there is a performance parameter indicating the 
expected Hg removal efficiency given every possible pollution control and coal type 
combination that the plant may use. The model selects the cost minimizing 
combination of controls and fuel type to comply with a particular regulation given 
this information. It is the regulator’s uncertainty in the values of these removal 
efficiencies that we are interested in capturing. The regulator will be able to observe 
whether the removal efficiencies are higher or lower than expected by observing the 
prices of the tradable allowances prices if the pollutants are controlled by quantities 
or the emission levels of the pollutants if they are controlled by taxes.24 
The vector of Hg removal efficiencies is represented by θ. The expression: 
 ( ), ;m sw I I θ  (4.1) 
                                                 
23 An alternative justification typically invoked for assuming that allowances are allocated when 
comparing tax and quantity policies for electricity generators is that given average cost pricing 
grandfathering allowances (giving them away for free) leads to additional distortions in the market (see 
Parry, 2005). However, we are presently assuming marginal cost pricing of electricity. 
24 So, implicit in our modeling is that the regulator may observe total emissions with near certainty 
after the regulations are adopted. That is, some mechanism for monitoring emissions at each facility 
has been put in place that is more sophisticated than the approach that the EPA used to estimate the Hg 
removal efficiencies (see Section 4.3). This is a reasonable assumption. The CAMR program includes 
a set of detailed requirements describing how Hg emissions should be monitored. The measurement of 
SO2 and NOX emissions from coal-fired boilers is already quite sophisticated given requirements of the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.   
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represents total welfare from a particular instrument mix given some removal 
efficiency realizationθ .25 Welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and government revenues from the pollution instruments minus the 
total pollution damages.26  
Optimally, we would like to solve for the level of instruments that 
maximize expected welfare for each instrument pair { },m sT T , { },m sQ Q , { },m sT Q and 
{ },m sQ T : 
 ( ) ( ), , ;m s m sW I I E w I I θ⎡ ⎤≡ ⎣ ⎦  (4.2) 
and compare the results to determine which mix yields the highest expected welfare. 
Given the complexity of the model, such an approach is essentially impossible. An 
alternative method is to solve the model for multiple draws from the removal 
efficiency distribution using a number of different possible caps (or taxes) on each 
pollutant type and then use the resulting observations to estimate a stochastic and 
                                                 
25 A more accurate, but cumbersome, representation of welfare is as a function of the level of 
emissions, q, where emissions are influenced by a cap or a tax: ( ) ( )( ), ; , , ; ;m s m sm sw q I I q I Iθ θ θ .  
26 In the analytical model in the previous chapter the abatement cost function could be taken as an 
approximation of the cost to producers given that any change in production and output price, and thus 
to consumer surplus in the final product markets, was negligible. In this analysis the effect on 
consumer welfare is non-negligible and thus must be accounted for. There are two observations worth 
mentioning. First, the fact that Weitzman did not consider more general changes when measuring 
welfare effects is relatively unimportant. The fundamental point of Weitzman’s analysis is that under 
uncertainty the instruments yield different expected welfare. That we also have to account for changes 
in consumer surplus does not change this. Second, we will also make an assumption of fixed demand 
below for modeling convenience, but this also allows us to think of the objective function in the 
electricity sector model as one of minimizing the cost of production. Thus the combined change in 
producer and consumer surplus given a change in θ equals the change in cost of producing a certain 
amount of electricity.   
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continuous joint emissions benefit function.27 With this function in hand, one could 
then consider the expected welfare from a variety of emission damage functions. 
Given the solution times of the model, even this method would be resource intensive 
(but admittedly not impossible). Instead, our approach is to consider the performance 
of the different instrument mixes in the neighborhood of the social optimum given 
our deterministic pollution damage functions. Furthermore, rather than solving the 
model for multiple draws from the removal efficiency distribution, we solve the 
model using a few choice sets of removal efficiencies and assign probability weights 
to them. 
Before moving on to the calculation of expected welfare, we note some 
important assumptions in the following analysis. First, we limit the analysis to 
estimating welfare in the year 2020 to avoid complications that arise from analyzing 
emission profiles over time. For this reason we also prevent allowances from being 
banked. We further abstract from differences in the temporal emission profiles by 
ignoring emission reductions leading up to full compliance with the regulations. Also 
note that while our focus is on instrument choice for Hg and SO2 control, the results 
are conditional on assumptions regarding the presence of other environmental 
regulations. We impose a tax on NOX emissions from coal-fired boilers equal to the 
central estimate of marginal damage ($1,229) reported in Banzhaf et al. (2004). As 
such, we should think of NOX emissions as any other input with a completely elastic 
supply (while we calculate the revenues collected from the NOX tax, this amount is 
                                                 




exactly equal to the opportunity cost of emitting NOX). At the same time, we remove 
the influence of existing regulations that directly influence emissions of the pollutants 
of interest, such as the Title IV SO2 trading program and the recently adopted CAIR 
and CAMR rules. However, pollution control technologies already adopted in 
response to these regulations are taken as given. They may be supplemented but 
cannot be removed. 
Given constant marginal damages, presumably the policy where each 
pollutant is subject to a tax yields the highest expected welfare. That is, despite the 
modeling limitation preventing us from determining the optimal instrument levels for 
all four instrument mixes, we know the optimal tax levels for the{ },m sT T mix. 
Therefore we first estimate welfare from this policy, assuming that the removal 
efficiencies equal their expected value,θ : 
 ( ), ;m sw T T θ  (4.3) 
Tables 4.2a and 4.2b summarize the key results from estimating (4.3) using 
Haiku. For comparison, the tables include the results for 2020 of EPA’s electricity 
sector analysis of the combined CAMR and CAIR rule. Although there are significant 
differences between the regulatory programs being modeled, the general concordance 
in the results between the models provides confidence in the reasonableness of their 
projections.28 ,29 The significant difference in the average electricity price is in part 
                                                 
28 The reader keenly interested in the policy implications of this comparison might immediately note 
the similarity in Hg emissions and prices across the two policies. However, too direct a comparison is 
inadvisable for a few reasons. First, SO2 emissions under the CAIR policy are much higher. If SO2 
emissions under CAIR were lower, then Hg price would also be lower. Furthermore, Hg emissions are 
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attributable to our assumption that electricity is priced at marginal cost throughout the 
electricity system.  
We see that at these tax levels the model predicts that 98% of the coal 
capacity has SO2 scrubbers. The share that does not have scrubbers is prevented from 
installing them.30 Further, we see that a large share of the coal capacity is controlled 
by the combination of wet scrubbing and SCR. The expectation was that changing the 
removal efficiencies would result in more or less adoption of these controls. 
However, their ubiquity (particularly of scrubbers) at the efficient tax levels 
significantly tempers their importance as marginal control options when the Hg 
removal efficiencies are adjusted. That said, the utilization of coal plants with 
                                                                                                                                           
falling for CAMR after 2020 as a bank of Hg allowances is being drawn down. In part, the future 
scarcity of Hg emissions is reflected in the Hg allowance price, explaining why Hg emissions between 
the two models are close despite lower SO2 reductions in the CAIR/CAMR EPA analysis.  
    Another relevant comparison is the central case in Banzhaf et al. (2004), which used an earlier 
version of the Haiku model. In that analysis, SO2 emissions are about 1.05 million tons at a tax of 
$3,911 while NOX emissions were 1.4 million tons at a tax of $1,229 (see Table 1 in Banzhaf et al.). 
The Banzhaf et al. emission estimates are in the ballpark of the estimates here. Important differences 
between the analyses are that Banzhaf et al. did not impose a Hg policy and had lower electricity 
demand (given its focus on 2010) and natural gas prices. 
29 One may wonder what levels of abatement are implied by the taxes imposed. Learning this 
information would require an additional run of the model (it is not enough to look at the amount of 
these pollutants in the coal consumed as the types of coal consumed change with the regulation) and 
assumptions about the regulations that would be in place absent these taxes. However, for SO2 and 
NOX emissions, we may look to Banzhaf et al. (2004) for a rough approximation as to baseline levels 
of these pollutants. The baseline level of SO2 is approximately 8.5 million tons while the baseline level 
of NOX is approximately 3.7 million tons. These estimates are rough because they simulate an earlier 
regulatory year and assume different relative fuel prices than the version of the model used herein. 
Furthermore, the uncontrolled level of SO2 assumes that a NOX tax ($1,229) is in place and the 
uncontrolled level of NOX assumes that an SO2 tax ($3,911) is in place. The abatement levels are those 
reductions that would occur beyond the Title IV SO2 and NOX acid rain programs and the NOX SIP 
Call (so, the baseline emissions levels are not actually uncontrolled). 
   Banzhaf et al. (2004) do not report Hg emissions. However, note that even if the taxes on all three 
pollutants were zero, the level of uncontrolled Hg emissions would still vary with the assumed Hg 
removal efficiency levels. This is because existing controls, like those reducing particulates, would still 
have an uncertain effect on Hg emissions. 
30 Boilers associated with capacity less than 100 megawatts may not install post-combustion controls. 
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different combinations of controls does change with changes to the removal 
efficiencies. 
While we have described the optimal tax levels, we have not determined 
the optimal instrument levels for the other three instrument mixes. As discussed 
above, determining the optimal instrument levels for these three mixes would be 
extremely resource intensive. That said, theoretically the optimal taxes when both 
pollutants are controlled by a tax are those that should be used when a variety of 
instruments are being used (i.e { },m sT Q or{ },m sQ T ).31 This leaves us with the task of 
finding “optimal” quantities for the other three instrument mixes. We take the 
resulting emissions of SO2 and Hg in 
Table 4.2a as the optimal levels of the quantity instruments. That is, we 
take as optimal the levels of instruments that maximize: 
 ( ), ;m sw I I θ  (4.4) 
instead of those that maximize (4.2). By not using the optimal quantities, 
we are imposing a bias against the instrument mixes that use quantity restrictions. If 
chosen optimally, they would yield welfare at least as great as reported below. 
 
                                                 
31 As we saw in Chapter 3, with constant marginal damages, a tax equal to the marginal damage for a 
pollutant cannot be improved upon when the other jointly controlled pollutant is controlled by a 
quantity. This is because varying the tax level for the pollutant controlled by a tax cannot influence the 
level of emissions of the pollutant controlled by a quantity (presuming the quantity constraint is 
binding). (Note that if both pollutants are controlled by a tax, and one of the taxes was at a suboptimal 
level, then it may be the case that the tax for the other pollutant should not be set equal to marginal 
damages in order to influence the emissions of the first pollutant.)  
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Table 4.2a: Model Results Summary given Expected Removal Efficiencies (2004 $) 
 Haiku Efficient Taxes (2020) 
 EPA  
CAIR+CAMR (2020)1 
Avg. Electricity Price ($/MWh) $83 $73 
Generation (1000 GWh)   
  Coal 2,428 2,365 
  Natural Gas+Oil 1,018 1,265 
  Nuclear 817 809 
  Renewables (Including Hydro) 552 408 
  TOTAL 4,816 4,847 
Emissions2   
  National 1.085 4.433 
  SO2 (million tons) 
  Policy Affected 1.057 4.214 
  National 1.533 2.212 
  NOX (million tons) 
  Policy Affected 1.170 1.254 
  National 34.27 28.28 
  Hg (tons) 
  Policy Affected 21.15 24.20 
Emission Tax/Allowance Price   
  SO2 (per ton) $3,911 $1,306 
  NOX (per ton) $1,229 $1,486 
  Hg (per pound) $40,940 $43,556 
Abatement Expenditure (billion $) $15.86 N/A 
Benefits (billion $)3   
  Consumer Surplus4 --- N/A 
  Producer Surplus $47.96 N/A 
  SO2 Revenue $4.13 $0 
  NOX Revenue $1.44 $0 
  Hg Revenue $1.73 $0 
  TOTAL --- N/A 
Damages (billion $)5   
  SO2  $4.13 $16.48 
  NOX  $1.44 $1.26 
  Hg $1.73 $1.98 
  TOTAL $7.30 $19.72 
1. Source: U.S.EPA 2005a and 2005b.  Allowance prices are for CAIR cap-and-trade programs for 
SO2 and NOX. These programs are not national in scope. 
2. Policy Affected emissions are those emitted by the sources subject to regulation. For example, in 
our analysis only coal plants are subject to the tax on NOX while in the EPA analysis large coal, 
natural gas and oil-fired units in the eastern and central U.S. are subject to the NOX cap-and-
trade program. 
3. The EPA’s electricity sector model does not report welfare estimates as an economist concieves 
of them. The EPA reports the cost of a policy as the increase in generation costs to meet a 
particular demand, not as changes in producer and consumer surplus.  
4. Haiku uses constant inelastic electricity demand curves. Therefore consumer surplus is 
unbounded. However, differences in consumer surplus can be measured. 
5. These are damages attributable to emissions from the policy affected sources. Furthermore, the 
EPA does not report damages from emissions. The total damage functions used to calculate 






Table 4.2b: Pollution Controls as a Share of Total Capacity given Expected Removal 
Efficiencies 
 Haiku Efficient Taxes (2020) 
 EPA  
CAIR+CAMR (2020) 1
Wet Scrubber Only/SNCR 8% 18% 
Wet w/ SCR 85% 49% 
Wet w/ ACI --- 2% 
Dry Scrubber Only/SNCR 2% --- 
Dry w/ SCR 3% --- 
Dry w/ ACI --- --- 
ACI Only  --- 2% 
SCR Only 0% 6% 
None/SNCR 2% 22% 
1. The EPA does not distinguish between scrubber type when reporting model results. 
 
4.4.3.2 Varying the Mercury Removal Efficiencies 
As discussed above, we solve the model using a few choice sets of Hg 
removal efficiencies and assign probability weights to them. Specifically, we estimate 
welfare for each instrument mix given three different sets of removal efficiencies. For 
each boiler category i, the removal efficiency (θi) can either be at its mean ( iθ ), mean 
plus standard deviation ( i iθ σ+ ), or mean minus standard deviation ( i iθ σ− ). As noted 
above we thus assume that all boilers within a particular category have the same Hg 
removal efficiency and that removal efficiencies are perfectly correlated across boiler 
categories. Furthermore, we assume a symmetric distribution of these errors for each 
boiler category. An exception is in cases where the standard deviation encompasses 
either a negative removal efficiency or an efficiency greater than one. In these cases 
the bounds of 0 and 1 are used instead. 
The next question is how we should weight the different welfare outcomes 
given each Hg removal efficiency realization. We propose two methods, both of 
which are necessarily approximations. One method is to find probability weights for 
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the discrete three-outcome distribution of θ that assure that its standard deviation and 
mean preserve the mean and standard deviation of the continuous removal efficiency 
distribution θ.  These probability weights are then applied to the three possible 
welfare outcomes to calculate expected welfare from each instrument mix. To 
preserve the mean of the continuous distribution, which we label ( )f θ , for the 
discrete distribution, labeled ( )g θ , the following must hold: 
 ( ) [ ]1 2fθ θ θ γ θ σ γ θ γ θ σ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ = + + − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫  (4.5) 
To make things easier, we have assumed that the discrete distribution is symmetric so 
that γ is the probability weight on the two tails of ( )g θ . Clearly the restriction (4.5) is 
not sufficient to find a unique γ. However, when we further assume that the standard 
deviation of the two distributions is the same, we obtain: 
 ( ) [ ]2 2 22 1 2fθ θ σ γ θ σ θ γ θ θ γ θ σ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≡ = + − + − − + − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫  (4.6) 
Solving (4.5) and (4.6) simultaneously we find that γ = .5. Thus, with this approach, 
the two extreme removal efficiencies cases are weighted by .5, while a zero weight is 
applied to welfare from the mean removal efficiency to find the expected welfare for 
each instrument mix. We refer to this as the “discrete distribution” approach below.  
The problem with the discrete distribution approach is that it is concerned 
with preserving the moments of θ and not in preserving the moments of the 
distribution of expected welfare, which is really the function we are interested in. The 
above approach would work fairly well as an approximation if there were little 
curvature in the objective function with respect to θ. A priori, there is no reason to 
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believe that this is a quality of the optimization problem represented by the simulation 
model and damage estimates with respect to θ (i.e., ( ), ;m sw I I θ ). Our second approach 
attempts to capture curvature in this problem using a second-order Taylor series 
approximation. 
We begin deriving the Taylor series approach with an expansion of the 
welfare function around the mean removal efficiencies for each of the N boiler 
categories: 
( )





m s i i m s j j i i
i i j
m s
m sw w I I w I I
w I I
I I θ θ θθ θ θ θθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ
θ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= =
≈
+ − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ∑∑
 (4.7) 
Thus expected welfare can be expressed: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2, ; , ; , ; .5 , ;
i j
N N
m s m s m s m s ij
i j
wW I I E w I I I I w I Iθ θ θ θθ θ θ θ σ
∂
∂ ∂ =
⎡ ⎤≡ ≈ +⎣ ⎦ ∑∑  (4.8) 
where σij is the covariance between the removal efficiency for the boiler categories i 
and j (or, when i = j, the variance of θi). As we do not explore the last term in (4.8) 
explicitly, we are not ready to make use of this form. First, we do not know the value 
of ( )2 , ;
i j m s
w I Iθ θ θ θθ
∂
∂ ∂ =
 for any boiler categories i and j, because we do not have an 
explicit form of the function ( ), ;m sw I I θ . We could linearly approximate 
( )2 , ;
i j m s
w I Iθ θ θ θθ
∂
∂ ∂ =
 if we solved the model for a set of each θi and θj, but clearly such 
an approach would be very model intensive given that there are multiple boiler 
categories. Given our assumption that the removal efficiencies are perfectly positively 
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correlated across the boiler categories (ρij = 1), we do know
2
iσ  for all i from the 
sample data and could find σij. We thus make a further approximation of (4.8): 
 ( ) ( ) 2ˆ ˆ, ; , ; .5m s m swE W I I I I w N θθ θ σ′′⎡ ⎤≈ +⎣ ⎦  (4.9) 
where the parameters N, ŵ′′ , and 2ˆθσ  require description. The parameter N is the 
number of distinct boiler categories. In the raw data, there are truly only 31 boiler 
categories for which the EPA collected data. As discussed above, for the categories 
where no data were collected, the EPA assigned the removal efficiencies for similar 
categories. Furthermore, we remove 15 categories for which there is little 
representation in the underlying data, given that we do not think changing these 
removal efficiencies would affect welfare significantly. “Little representation” is 
taken to mean less than 1% of capacity in the input data or potentially as a result of 
the policies. This leaves us with 16 distinct boiler categories. The parameter ŵ′′  is a 
linear approximation of the change in the increase in welfare as all of the removal 
efficiencies increase. Thus, ŵ N′′  is being treated as an approximate average of each 
term ( )2 , ;
i j m s




The parameter 2ˆθσ  is the variance of the realized average Hg removal 
efficiency for each instrument mix (these values are reported below) and is assumed 
to be the average variance and covariance across the removal efficiencies for the 
different boiler categories. Given that the observed removal efficiencies are 
endogenous to the model and affected by the particular instrument mix being applied, 
the variation captured by 2ˆθσ  may be lower or higher than what would be suggested 
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from equation (4.8). Admittedly, even with the appeal of this approach in capturing 
the non-linearity of the objective function, it is quite rough given the multitude of 
approximations required by (4.9). 
Before moving on to the results, we first note a few additional assumptions 
and modeling decisions for the model runs where the removal efficiencies deviate 
from their mean. In part, to further simplify the analysis and reduce the noise in the 
solutions and run times, the electricity generation, fuel prices, and inter-regional 
transmission are held constant at the levels found in the solution to (4.3).32 As 
discussed in footnote 26, by keeping electricity generation constant, the electricity 
sector model can be thought of as strictly solving a cost-minimization problem. 
4.5 Comparing Instrument Mixes 
4.5.1 Expected Welfare Comparisons 
We are now ready to look at the effect of the different instrument mixes on 
expected welfare. The first three rows of Table 4.3 report, for each instrument mix, 
welfare given each Hg removal efficiency realization as measured by the change in 
welfare from the case where removal efficiencies are at their means (expression (4.3)
). Let us first compare welfare across instrument mixes for each removal efficiency 
realization. When the removal efficiencies are both greater or lower than the mean, 
the instrument mix that yields the highest welfare is the one where each pollutant is 
controlled by a tax. This is to be expected given our assumption of constant marginal 
                                                 
32 A further justification for keeping fuel prices is constant is that one does not have to account for 
welfare changes in the fuel markets as a result of price effects. Essentially the supply of fuels is 
assumed to be perfectly elastic. 
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damages for these pollutants and that all other inputs are treated as if they are priced 
at their opportunity cost. Furthermore, the welfare ordering of the remaining 
instrument mixes is the same for the two extreme removal efficiency realizations. The 
{ },m sT Q  instrument mix yields the second-highest welfare followed by the 
{ },m sQ T mix and finally the { },m sQ Q mix.  
Table 4.3: Expected Welfare from Competing Instrument Mixes in 2020  
(Million 2004$) 
Instrument Mix  Hg Removal Efficiencies 
Tm,Ts Tm,Qs Qm,Ts Qm,Qs 
Mean $0 $0 $0 $0 
Mean + Std. Dev. $880 $840 $820 $800 Welfare1 
Mean - Std. Dev. -$530 -$670 -$760 -$800 




Loss Relative to 
Optimal Mix 2 
0 -$90 -$150 -$180 
Mean .745 .745 .745 .745 
Mean + Std. Dev. .844 .844 .761 .760 
Mean - Std. Dev. .637 .639 .709 .711 
Removal 
Efficiency  
Variance .0107 .0105 .0007 .0006 




Loss Relative to 
Optimal Mix 2 
0 -$160 -$170 -$190 
1. Welfare measured as change in welfare from average removal efficiency case due to 
unboundedness of consumer surplus. See Table 4.2a and 4.2b. 
2. Values may not sum due to rounding. 
 
Comparing across the removal efficiencies, we see that for three of the 
instrument mixes, raising the removal efficiencies by one standard deviation has a 
larger effect on welfare than lowering the removal efficiencies by one standard 
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deviation. This is somewhat surprising because one might imagine that there are 
diminishing marginal welfare benefits to increasing the removal efficiencies.33 
However, the Hg removal efficiencies are bounded between 0 and 1 and many of the 
boiler categories (on a generation capacity basis prior to adoption of the policies) 
have removal efficiency ranges that are constrained by the lower bound. 
As the { },m sT T instrument mix is the preferred policy regardless of the 
removal efficiency level, it is also the mix that maximizes expected welfare. Owing to 
the consistent ordering of welfare given the different Hg removal efficiencies, we also 
see that the { },m sT Q instrument mix yields the second highest expected welfare, 
followed by the { },m sQ T  and then the { },m sQ Q  mixes. The analytical model in the 
previous chapter suggests that this ordering of expected welfare is possible and 
indeed in the case of constant marginal damages is one of only two feasible orderings. 
It also appears that at these instrument levels it is more important to have the correct 
Hg control rather than the correct SO2 control, as expected welfare from the { },m sT Q  
mix is higher than that for the { },m sQ T mix. This is likely attributable to the significant 
amount of SO2 controls that are installed at this level of control. Changes in 
generation patterns, coal consumption and NOX control are relatively more important 
for the control of Hg than changes in the number of SO2 controls given that so many 
SO2 controls are installed. 
                                                 
33 Although this expectation is not as clean cut as the declining marginal welfare improvement from 
increasing the removal efficiencies must come from reduced benefits of emitting given that marginal 
damages are assumed to be constant.  
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The { },m sT T  instrument mix leads to a $90 million increase in welfare over 
the next-best instrument mix in 2020 using the discrete distribution estimate and $160 
million using the Taylor series estimate. If both pollutants are regulated by a cap and 
trade program, as traditionally has been the case in the U.S., the loss from not 
adopting the { },m sT T mix is $180 million using the discrete distribution estimate or 
$190 million using the Taylor series estimate.  
The expected cost of selecting the incorrect instrument may even be higher 
given that rarely are such regulations immediately changed. For example, it took 15 
years before the national cap on SO2 emissions was lowered. If we expect the 
expected cost of selecting the incorrect set of instruments to accrue annually for a 15-
year period starting in 2020, the expected current (2007) cost of selecting the 
{ },m sQ Q mix over the { },m sT T mix at a 5% social discount rate is $1,040 million or 
$1,100 million depending on the estimate used.  
4.5.2 Emissions, Allowance Prices and Emission Controls 
Table 4.4 reports the allowance prices and emissions of SO2, NOX and Hg 
for each instrument mix and each removal efficiency realization. The change in 
emissions and allowance price for each pollutant as a result of changing the Hg 
removal efficiencies varies based on the pollutant in question and the instrument mix. 
Clearly as the Hg efficiencies go up, we expect Hg emissions to fall if Hg is 
controlled by a tax or the allowance price to fall if Hg is controlled by a quantity. We 
see this outcome in Table 4.4. However, it is not clear what should happen to the SO2 
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emissions or allowance price or to NOX emissions when the removal efficiencies 
change.  
Table 4.4: Emissions and Allowance Prices for Each Instrument Mix1,2 
Hg Removal 
Efficiencies Variable Instrument Mix 
  Tm ,Ts Tm ,Qs Qm ,Ts Qm ,Qs 
SO2 Price/Tax (per ton) $3,911 $3,922 $3,911 $3,943 
SO2 Emissions (mil. tons) 1.053 1.057 1.214 1.057 
Hg Price/Tax (per pound) $40,940 $40,940 $14,340 $14,170 
Hg Emissions (tons) 13.24 13.23 21.15 21.15 
Mean+Std. Dev 
NOX Emissions (mil. tons)3  1.167 1.166 1.383 1.382 
SO2 Price/Tax (per ton) $3,911 $3,978 $3,911 $4,028 
SO2 Emissions (mil. tons) 1.156 1.057 1.161 1.057 
Hg Price/Tax (per pound) $40,940 $40,940 $65,570 $67,200 
Hg Emissions (tons) 29.18 28.84 21.15 21.15 
Mean-Std. Dev 
NOX Emissions (mil. tons)3 1.205 1.186 1.092 1.088 
1. Entries in Bold are endogenous given instrument mix. 
2. Emissions are from policy-affected sources. 
3. NOX emissions in the mean removal efficiency case are 1.170 million tons. 
 
To begin to understand these effects, let us first consider what may happen 
to SO2 controls and emissions if SO2 controls become more effective at abating Hg. 
Furthermore, let us consider the specific instrument mix where Hg is controlled by a 
quantity and SO2 is controlled by a tax. On one hand, the benefit of installing SO2 
emission controls goes up so there is a greater incentive to use these controls to 
comply with the Hg constraint. As a result SO2 emissions fall. On the other hand, 
when the removal efficiencies increase, fewer SO2 controls are needed achieve the Hg 
cap, so the incentive to install SO2 controls falls. In this case SO2 emissions may go 
up. On net, the effect of raising the Hg removal efficiency of SO2 controls on SO2 
emissions and the amount of SO2 controls installed is ambiguous. A similar 
ambiguity arises with respect to the allowance price when SO2 is controlled by a 
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quantity. This possible ambiguity in the effect of increasing Hg removal efficiencies 
on SO2 emissions and allowance prices is demonstrated using the simple analytic 
model in Chapter 2. 
Referring now to Table 4.4, let us first consider the instrument mixes 
where Hg is controlled by a tax. Note that the higher the Hg removal efficiencies are, 
the lower SO2 emissions are when SO2 is controlled by a tax. The relationship is not 
so straightforward when SO2 is controlled by a quantity. With Hg removal 
efficiencies lower than their mean, it is the allowance price of SO2 that increases (as 
opposed to emissions). Yet, the allowance price also increases when the removal 
efficiencies are higher than their mean. However, like the SO2 emissions decrease 
with the { },m sT T mix, this change is small.  
Things get a little more complicated when Hg is controlled by a quantity. 
With SO2 controlled by a tax, SO2 emissions are higher when the removal efficiencies 
are higher than their mean. Less SO2 scrubbing is needed to reduce Hg so SO2 
emissions increase. Yet, with this instrument mix, SO2 emissions are also higher when 
the Hg removal efficiencies are lower than their mean. What might explain this result 
is that the reduction in the effectiveness of SO2 controls in reducing Hg dominates so 
that less capacity is scrubbed. Hg is then abated in another manner (in particular we 
see more NOX controls in this case). We see a similar result when each pollutant is 
controlled by a quantity instrument. The allowance price for SO2 is slightly higher 
when the Hg removal efficiencies are higher than their mean. Yet, when the Hg 
removal efficiencies are lower than their mean, the SO2 allowance price again is 
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higher. In this case it is the reduced joint benefit of reducing SO2 emissions that 
dominates, shifting the marginal benefit of scrubbing towards the abatement of SO2.  
So, while it is possible for a change in the amount of capacity that installs 
scrubbers to explain the changes in SO2 emissions and prices, are we seeing such a 
change in the capacity of installed scrubbers? In fact, the reasons for the changes in 
SO2 emissions are more nuanced than comparing the shares of coal capacity that are 
scrubbed. There is a decrease in the capacity and generation of scrubbed coal-fired 
units as the removal efficiencies increase regardless of the instrument mix. It is 
changes in the coals that are fired, which have different Hg and sulfur contents, and 
the amount of NOX controls that explain the changes in SO2 prices and emissions in 
Table 4.4. 
For completeness, Table 4.5 is provided to show the different components 
of expected welfare for when the removal efficiencies are above and below the mean. 
The bolded lines in Table 4.5 correspond to the second through fourth row of Table 
4.3. There are a few items to observe in Table 4.5. First, regardless of the direction of 
change in the removal efficiencies, producer surplus falls in all but one case and 
consumer surplus always rises.34 This is a bit surprising; one would expect that 
lowering abatement costs given fixed demand would make producers better off, but it 
may be because the mean removal efficiency case was not fully converged and thus 
the relative distribution of consumer and producer surplus (but not the total) was not 
fully sorted out. 
                                                 
34 This is consistent with the fact that electricity price also falls relative to the mean removal efficiency 
case for all of the runs represented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: Decomposing Welfare Changes Relative to Mean Removal Efficiency 
Case (Million 2004$) 
Hg Removal 
Efficiencies  Variable Instrument Mix 
  Tm ,Qs Tm ,Qs Qm ,Ts Qm ,Qs 
Consumer Surplus 904 1239 1704 2122 
Producer Surplus -138 -588 67 -381 
NOX Tax Revenue -3 -4 262 261 
SO2 Tax/Permit Revenue -18 10 612 33 
Hg Tax/Permit Revenue -648 -648 -1125 -1132 
NOX Damages -3 -4 262 261 
SO2 Damages -16 -70 614 27 
Hg Damages -762 -762 -181 -186 
Mean+Std. Dev 
Net Benefits 880 840 820 800 
Consumer Surplus 1196 1539 641 276 
Producer Surplus -1972 -2398 -2628 -2503 
NOX Tax Revenue 43 20 -96 -101 
SO2 Tax/Permit Revenue 385 70 407 123 
Hg Tax/Permit Revenue 658 629 1042 1111 
NOX Damages 43 20 -96 -101 
SO2 Damages 387 125 407 -16 
Hg Damages 407 382 -180 -179 
Mean-Std. Dev 
Net Benefits -530 -670 -760 -800 
Consumer Surplus 1050 1389 1172 1199 
Producer Surplus -1055 -1493 -1281 -1442 
NOX Tax Revenue 20 8 83 80 
SO2 Tax/Permit Revenue 184 40 509 78 
Hg Tax/Permit Revenue 5 -10 -42 -11 
NOX Damages 20 8 83 80 
SO2 Damages 186 27 510 6 





Net Benefits 180 90 30 0 
 
An interesting result that can be seen in Table 4.5 is that consumers have 
the highest expected welfare from the { },m sT Q  mix (ignoring for a moment the 
distribution of government revenues). Thus consumers prefer an instrument mix that 
is suboptimal from the standpoint of society. In fact, the optimal mix is the least 
preferred by consumers. A key reason { },m sT T mix is optimal is that it places the 
lowest burden on producers. We make this observation without trying to explain its 
cause. However, it does suggest that perhaps greater attention should be paid in the 
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literature to the distributional effects of instrument choice under uncertainty (Kelley 
(2005) being a notable exception). 
4.6 Conclusions 
The preceding analysis demonstrates the importance of the joint selection 
of pollution control instruments for an important policy case. We estimate differences 
in expected welfare from different instrument mixes for controlling SO2 and Hg 
emissions from coal-fired power plants. Expected welfare is defined as the benefit of 
emissions as measured by the sum of welfare in the electricity market plus net 
government revenues minus the damages from pollution. As in the analytical model 
from the first half of the paper, the instrument levels are (roughly) chosen to 
maximize expected welfare. The specific source of uncertainty is in the effect of 
conventional pollution control technologies on Hg emissions. 
The optimal instrument combination places a tax on SO2 and a tax on Hg 
emissions. The expected welfare cost of selecting a suboptimal instrument mix in 
2020 is between $90 and $190 million (2004 $) depending on which suboptimal 
instrument mix is adopted. While these estimates are subject to important caveats 
described above, this analysis provides empirical support for the proposition that 
pollutants should not be regulated independently, as is the tradition in U.S. pollution 
control policy.  
An ancillary contribution of this analysis is that we see that the optimal 
level of Hg emissions, assuming it causes extensive mortality effects, is about 21 
tons. This suggests that the annual Hg allowance allocation of 15 tons (starting in 
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2018) from the recently adopted CAMR is too low. However, one should also 
account for the differences in the level of jointly controlled emissions before making 
this case. Furthermore, one should also explicitly take into account the fact that Hg is 
a stock pollutant with potentially very localized effects.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the key findings of the 
previous chapters and to offer some suggestions for future research. The last section 
provides some concluding thoughts. 
5.2 Summary of Results 
Chapter 2 opens with an exploration of whether emission taxes can yield a 
Pareto optimal outcome when an economy creates multiple pollutants. As shown, 
carefully chosen taxes may indeed yield an efficient outcome in this setting. The 
regulator must choose a suite of taxes where the tax on each pollutant equals the sum 
of the marginal damages imposed on every agent in the economy from an additional 
increment of that pollutant. This optimality condition for the level of each tax thus 
dictates the optimum in both the single and multiple-pollutant case. The simple yet 
encompassing form of the general equilibrium model also allows one to identify real-
world complications that may affect the ability of the regulator to set these taxes. One 
of the complications discussed in Chapter 2 (as well as in Chapter 1) is that the 
relationship between emissions and the pollutants that affect the welfare of agents in 
the economy may be complex. 
The second half of Chapter 2 presents a simple deterministic model of joint 
abatement. In this model, the joint abatement relationship is due to the presence of a 
technology designed to control one pollutant that happens to also abate another 
pollutant. I perform comparative statics on a parameter that captures the intensity of 
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this abatement relationship. Each pollutant may be regulated by an emission tax or a 
cap-and-trade program so there are four possible instrument combinations. While 
increasing this parameter has expected effects on the emissions or allowance price of 
the pollutant for which the technology was not designed (they fall) and in the use of 
the technology specifically designed for that pollutant (it too falls), the rest of the 
story is more nuanced. The change in the use of the technology that abates both 
pollutants is ambiguous and may even depend on how the pollutants are being 
controlled. Furthermore, the effect on the allowance price or emissions of the 
pollutant for which the jointly abating technology is designed is also ambiguous. This 
exercise assisted in our understanding of the results of the simulation study in Chapter 
4. 
The core analytical findings of this dissertation are found in Chapter 3. In 
the abstract model used therein, a regulator wishes to maximize welfare from the 
abatement of two jointly controlled pollutants where she is certain of the benefits of 
abating these pollutants but is uncertain of their joint abatement cost. She may use 
either a tax or a quantity to control each pollutant. A particular functional form is 
used that exhibits properties similar to the models used by Weitzman (1974) and 
others in the single pollutant case. The model shows that the instrument suggested by 
the analysis for a single pollutant may be inappropriate if joint abatement is not 
explicitly considered. However, an interpretation of the single pollutant model 
attributable to Yohe (1978) continues to suggest the optimal mix of instruments in the 
two-pollutant case. This said, our intuition regarding which instrument is optimal to 
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control one of the pollutants is still valid at the extremes of the shape of the joint 
abatement cost function and values of the slopes of the marginal benefit functions. 
Unsurprisingly, the two-pollutant model indicates that the relative 
efficiency of an instrument to control one pollutant depends on how other jointly 
abated pollutants are being regulated. Perhaps more surprisingly, I find that the 
optimal instrument to control one pollutant may be conditional on the way the other 
pollutant is controlled. In the most extreme case, pair-wise comparisons of instrument 
mixes may not suggest the optimal combination of instruments. For example, pair-
wise comparisons might suggest that it is better to use a cap-and-trade program to 
control both pollutants because this combination leads to higher welfare than the two 
combinations that tax one of the pollutants and control the other with a cap-and-trade 
program. However, it may be the case that in this setting taxing both pollutants yields 
the highest expected welfare. This very general finding is present despite the fact that 
a particular functional form is used in the analysis. 
This last finding also has implications for the theory of second best. If the 
regulator is restricted to controlling a pollutant by one type of instrument, then the 
optimal control on the other pollutant may change. This finding is novel. As is 
typically the case in the theory of the second best, it is levels of otherwise suboptimal 
instruments that change, not the actual type of instrument used.  
The analytical model demonstrates that theoretically the simultaneous 
selection of the instruments to control jointly abated pollutants is desirable when the 
regulator is uncertain of their control costs. However, a question remains as to 
whether this issue is empirically meaningful. In Chapter 4 I use a market simulation 
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model to explore a contemporary policy question as an example. Specifically, the 
EPA has recently adopted regulations on mercury (Hg), sulfur dioxide (SO2) and 
nitrogen oxide (NOX ) emissions from coal-fired power plants. One of the key issues 
in the development of these regulations was that EPA was uncertain of the extent to 
which technologies designed to abate SO2, NOX and particulate matter reduce Hg 
emissions. Using a market simulation model of the U.S. electricity sector, I estimate 
differences in expected welfare from different instrument mixes for controlling SO2 
and Hg emissions from coal-fired power plants. Expected welfare is defined as the 
benefit of emissions as measured by the sum of welfare in the electricity market plus 
net government revenues minus the damages from pollution. As in the analytical 
model from Chapter 3, the instrument levels are (roughly) chosen to maximize 
expected welfare.  
The optimal instrument combination places a tax on SO2 and a tax on Hg 
emissions. The expected welfare cost of selecting a suboptimal instrument mix in 
2020 is between $90 and $190 million (2004$) depending on which suboptimal 
instrument mix is adopted. An ancillary contribution of this analysis is that we see 
that the optimal level of Hg emissions, assuming it causes extensive mortality effects, 
is about 21 tons. While these estimates are subject to important limitations that 
deserve further attention, this analysis provides an empirical perspective on the 
importance of simultaneously selecting pollution control instruments for jointly 
abated pollutants in an important policy case. 
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5.3 Directions for Further Research 
Clearly there are some issues raised in the previous chapters that deserve a 
bit more attention. For example, more could be said about how the analytical results 
in Chapter 3 relate to our understanding of general equilibrium supply and demand 
functions. In this context, it is likely informative to contrast the results in Chapter 3 to 
the case where one of the two arguments in the abatement function is actually a 
private good, that the regulated firms are supplying, with market forces determining 
its level. With respect to the simulation modeling, it would useful to explore how the 
magnitudes of the welfare comparisons change given different beliefs about the level 
of the marginal damages of all three of the pollutants of interest. 
While there are clearly parts of the analysis in the proceeding chapters that 
could be extended a little further, the purpose of this section is to think even bigger.1 
As I worked on this dissertation a number of questions have struck me that deserve 
further inquiry.  While other researchers had already asked some of these questions 
(with different levels of completeness and success), others have not yet been 
explored. To start with, there are some game-theoretic and political economy issues 
worth exploring in the context of abatement cost uncertainty. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, using the model therein how might instrument choice be 
affected if the regulation for each pollutant were adopted in sequence by two different 
agencies? Presumably this depends on whether an agency responsible for one of the 
                                                 
1 Thinking the most broadly takes us outside the question of instrument choice under uncertainty for 
jointly abated pollutants. A similar multi-good extension might be useful to the tariffs versus quotas 
debate in the trade literature and the landing/hunting fee versus quota in the species management 
literature. 
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pollutants accounts for any consequent changes in the levels or cost of controlling 
jointly controlled pollutants. Oates and Schwab (undated) raise this point with respect 
to their model of two media-specific agencies where each regulate one of two 
pollutants that are substitutes in their control. In their model, one of the agencies is a 
follower in that it takes the other agency’s behavior as given. The agency that is the 
first-mover may choose suboptimal regulations for some exogenous reason. The 
choice of regulation of the follower depends on whether or not it takes into account 
how its regulation will affect the level of the pollutant it is not ultimately responsible 
for.2 Extensions might explore why the first-mover chose a seemingly suboptimal 
regulation in the first place. A further extension would be to consider the case where 
one of the regulators is simply uncertain about how the other regulator will control 
the pollutant it is responsible for.3  
It is even likely worthwhile to extend this question somewhat to include 
issues outside the setting of pollution control. For example, the environmental 
regulation may depend on how or whether the antitrust agency regulates a polluting 
monopolist. If the monopolist were unregulated, perhaps the environmental regulator 
would prefer allocating allowances based on the firm’s output. In a dynamic setting, 
this is equivalent to subsidizing and thus increasing production, which in a more pure 
setting is suboptimal. However, for a monopolist production is presumably 
                                                 
2 Studies in the double-dividend literature face a similar issue. Goods taxes causing preexisting 
distortions are often assumed out of the environmental regulator’s control, but that the environmental 
regulator still accounts for any change in the distortions they cause (for example, see Quirion 2004).  
3 A similar problem, but in the case of a single regulator, is where the regulator that does not yet have 
the authority (say because there is abatement benefit uncertainty) to control one of the pollutants but 
does have an expectation that he will be able to in the future. 
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inefficiently low in the first place, so the implicit subsidy may be welfare improving.4 
As described in Chapter 1 there other are papers on the topic of multiple agencies or 
jurisdictions regulating jointly abated pollutants, but again few of them incorporate 
instrument choice in a full game-theoretic framework and none with cost or benefit 
uncertainty. 
Extensions of the single pollutant model under abatement cost uncertainty 
that have proven worthwhile may also be worth exploring in a multiple pollutant 
setting. For example, Pizer and Newell (2003) point out in the context of regulating a 
stock pollutant under abatement cost uncertainty that it may be optimal to switch the 
instrument used to control the pollutant from a tax to a quantity at some point in 
time.5 In the case where one pollutant is a stock pollutant and the other is a flow 
pollutant, might it also be true that it is optimal to switch the instrument used to 
control the flow pollutant at some point? I think the second-best results of Chapter 3 
suggest that it might. As noted in Chapter 4, the case of one of the pollutants being a 
flow and the other being a stock is actual more relevant to the example of the joint 
control of Hg, which is a stock pollutant, and SO2 which essentially can be considered 
a flow pollutant. 
                                                 
4 Another example where the choice of instrument may not be tax or quantity set at the Pigovian level 
is when there is no regulation targeting externalities derived from research and development on 
abatement techniques. See for example Fischer et al. (2003). 
5 One question I have been asked regularly about the preceding analysis is how the introduction of a 
safety valve on one of the pollutants might fit into the welfare ordering of the instrument mixes. The 
answer is likely simple: it would yield higher expected welfare than any of the four instrument mixes 
as demonstrated by Roberts and Spence (1976) in the single pollutant case. This is because at least one 
of the damage functions would be more closely mimicked by the combination of instruments. Of 
course, if the safety valve were triggered the effect on the other pollutant would depend on the 
parameters of the model. 
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Even in the single pollutant case where there is abatement cost uncertainty, 
there are additional questions to be asked. As highlighted in Chapter 4 the ordering of 
expected consumer surplus and producer surplus does not follow the ordering of 
expected total surplus across the instrument mixes. It would be useful to explore 
systematically the conditions where consumers and producers prefer one instrument 
to another. The general equilibrium extension described in the first paragraph of this 
section could be applied to this question. 
There are also questions outside the instrument choice under uncertainty 
literature to be asked regarding the management of jointly controlled pollutants. For 
example, how do competing regulations perform if one jointly controlled pollutant is 
relatively more difficult to monitor than another? Might there be some mechanism 
that takes advantage of knowing that the emissions of one of the pollutants is more 
readily observable to achieve an efficient outcome in the regulation of both? Of 
course, if we just think of emissions as inputs, findings in the existing literature that 
note that a single pollutant can be indirectly monitored from observing the use of a 
particular input may be directly applicable. Another example is to evaluate critically a 
claim frequently made in favor of integrating pollution permits over a more piecemeal 
approach. Namely, that integrating the design and implementation of regulations 
across pollutants that are related in the generation is more likely to lead to the 
adoption of production methods that are less pollution-intensive (Davies, 2001). 
To me, one of the bigger issues in the preceding analysis is that the model 
used in Chapter 3 is somewhat unsatisfying in that the dual abatement cost function 
hides the underlying technological relationships and sources of uncertainty. By 
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sources of uncertainty I mean unknown goods or input prices, technological 
parameters, etc. So, despite the discovery that any welfare ordering of instruments is 
possible, suggesting a new result germane to the theory of second best, the model 
gives little tangible sense of when this might occur (particularly as these results 
depend on errors and the correlation of these errors whose origins are not 
transparent). A model that is less abstract and provides a specific technological form 
and source of uncertainty would be helpful in this regard. While such an analytical 
model could be designed to yield closed form solutions, the welfare comparisons of 
the different instrument mixes might not be transparent. For this I would use Monte 
Carlo techniques to estimate differences in expected welfare.6 Such a study would be 
a useful intermediate step between the model in Chapter 3 and the detailed simulation 
analysis in Chapter 4. Indeed, this was my original intent when I started constructing 
the model at the end of Chapter 2. I have even identified a useful functional form of 






that satisfies the assumptions (2.10)-(2.14) on page 35 when 0g >  and 0 1G< ≤ .7 Of 
course, I would also need to propose a form of the emissions damage function. Again, 
                                                 
6 Hannesson and Kennedy (2005) perform an analysis similar to the one proposed here in the case of 
managing a single-species fishery using quotas or landing fees. They are interested in what types of 
uncertainties, for example in the population dynamics of the species and the cost of harvesting, favor 
one of these instruments over the other. 
7 I briefly considered using estimated quadratic abatement cost functions to perform such an analysis. 
However, I could find only two studies that estimated abatement cost functions using a stochastic 
framework (I primarily reviewed the studies referenced in Pizer and Kopp, 2005). Hartman et al. 
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the purpose of such a study is to provide a more concrete understanding of when 
different instrument mixes might be preferred in cases of multiple pollutant control. 
An important policy issue is to understand the consequence of the EPA’s 
decision to regulate Hg using a single cap-and-trade program when its two forms or 
species behave quite differently. As discussed in Chapter 4, elemental Hg is relatively 
inert and has a wide deposition pattern while oxidized (speciated) Hg is readily taken 
up by aquatic animals and precipitates rapidly out of the atmosphere. This question is 
germane to the theoretical literature on uniformly regulating pollutants that have 
heterogeneous damages (Mendelsohn, 1986; Kolstad, 1987). The simulation model 
used in this dissertation is well suited for such an analysis. It is, relatively speaking, 
straightforward to account for both elemental and oxidized Hg emissions in the 
model. It is also possible to adjust the level of allowable NOX and SO2 emissions to 
see how such adjustments affect the relative emissions of the two different forms of 
Hg. The EPA’s recently adopted CAIR rule is expected to yield more post-
combustion control retrofits for NOX than SO2. This suggests that a small increase in 
the allowable NOX emissions may lead to a reduction in oxidized Hg, which is the 
more harmful form. To make this analysis more complete, rather than simply 
evaluating emission patterns, the market model could be linked to an air dispersion 
and health-effects model. It must be said, however, that this is an ambitious step, and 
                                                                                                                                           
(1997) appear to have estimated such function using the data from the Pollution Abatement Costs and 
Expenditures Survey (PACE) survey conducted by the U.S. Census for the EPA. However, the lead 
author is unsure that this is the case because the functions were not made publicly available and have 
been lost (personal communication with David Wheeler, Lead Economist, Development Research 
Group, World Bank, May 5, 2006). Newell, Pizer and Shih (2004) also use the PACE data to estimate 
a joint quadratic abatement cost function for the cement industry, but find that the unconstrained 
function is non-convex. This may be unsurprising as regulations in the U.S. are not designed to yield 
cost-effective emission reductions.   
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not simply because our understanding of the behavior of Hg in the environment and 
its health effects is relatively incomplete.  
A similar question that can be addressed with the electricity sector 
simulation model is what are the effects of recently adopted state controls on Hg 
emissions. Many states are adopting much tighter regulations on Hg than imposed by 
the recently adopted federal regulation. However, because the federal regulation is a 
cap-and-trade program, the Hg emissions that will not be emitted in one state will be 
emitted elsewhere. The simulation model can be used to estimate the resulting spatial 
and temporal pattern of Hg emissions, as well as for the jointly abated SO2 and NOX 
emissions, as a result of the adoption of the state regulations.  
5.4 Conclusions 
The motivation for this dissertation was to understand the consequences of 
uncertainty in control of Hg on the performance of competing regulations for the 
control of Hg and SO2. One question not yet addressed is whether the analytical 
model in Chapter 3 should have suggested to us something about the magnitude of the 
welfare comparisons in Chapter 4. As we will see, it would have been difficult to 
anticipate how varying the Hg removal efficiencies would affect the performance of 
the competing instrument mixes. Perhaps a simpler question is whether the model in 
Chapter 3 sufficiently represents the uncertain control cost relationship that is 
modeled in Chapter 4.  
To understand whether the model in Chapter 3 should have suggested 
something about the estimates in Chapter 4, we start by looking back to the Weitzman 
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single pollutant analysis. There, we derived a measure of the welfare cost of using a 
suboptimal instrument: 
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First, we see in this expression that the larger the variance, the larger the welfare 
difference. But note, this is not the variance of some primary parameter (like of the 
price of a fuel input). Rather, it is the variance of the intercept term of the marginal 
abatement cost function. How much the marginal abatement cost might deviate from 
its expected location depends on a number of factors, including all of the moments of 
the unknown parameters and their importance to the cost of controlling pollution.  
Of course, a similar argument can be made in the case of the two-pollutant 
model, where there are two uncertain parameters and a covariance between them. 
Even if we suspected that the functional form of the cost function in Chapter 3 would 
sufficiently represent the relationship between controlling SO2 and Hg, there still 
would have been no way for us to know ex ante how the uncertainty in the Hg 
removal efficiencies would manifest themselves in the uncertain parameters in the 
cost function. Therefore, we could not have known, using the model in Chapter 3, 
how important uncertainty in the removal efficiencies would be to instrument choice. 
However, now that we have our empirical results from Table 4.4 of Chapter 4, 
we can get a sense as to how much the demand for the pollutants move around as the 
removal efficiencies are changed. Recall that the Hg demand function is equivalent to 
the Hg marginal abatement cost function, where the dependent variable is 
“emissions” instead of “emissions reduced” (i.e., abatement). We see that the demand 
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for Hg does move around quite a bit, as the marginal value product of Hg emissions 
(given a quantity target for SO2) is more than four times higher when the removal 
efficiencies are low compare to when the removal efficiencies are high. The variance 
is 26,600 (in dollars). At the same time, the demand for SO2 does not move around 
much.8 
 Returning to expression (5.2), we see that if the marginal benefits of 
abatement are constant, then the welfare difference reduces to a ratio of the variance 
to the slope of the marginal abatement cost function, divided by two (i.e., 2 2m mmcσ ). 
In this case, the steeper the marginal abatement cost function, the lower the welfare 
difference between the two instruments. With a very steep slope, the difference in 
welfare from using the two instruments would be minimal.  A similar result holds for 
the two-pollutant model. The difference in expected welfare from using a tax to 
control each instrument and a quantity to control each instrument, when the marginal 
benefit of abatement of the two pollutants is constant, is: 
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As the partial slope of the marginal abatement cost of m goes to infinity (i.e., cmm→∞ 
), this expression converges to: 
                                                 
8 To take this analysis further, one could perform an estimation exercise using the results in Table 4.4 
of Chapter 4 to find parameter values for an emissions benefit function equivalent in form to the 
emission cost function in Chapter 3. There are 5 parameters to estimate in the demand function (not 
counting the uncertain parameters), and 8 sets of prices and quantities in Table 4.4. If the emissions 
demand functions fit the data well, and the parameter values of the second order terms do not vary 
much, then one could argue that the emissions benefit function is a reasonable approximation for the 
empirical question in Chapter 4. (We must be careful as to how we interpret these demand functions as 







σ  (5.4) 
Furthermore, if the slope of the marginal abatement cost of s also goes to infinity, 
then (5.4) converges to zero. So, with flat marginal benefit curves and steep marginal 
abatement cost curves, the expected welfare difference from the two instrument mixes 
is small. 
If we thought that the cost function in Chapter 3 was a sufficient 
representation of the cost relationship for the abatement of SO2 and Hg in Chapter 4, 
then from the observations from the proceeding paragraph we might expect that the 
welfare cost from choosing the wrong instrument would be fairly small. First, note 
that assuming a constant marginal benefit of abatement is equivalent to assuming a 
constant marginal damage function, as we do in Chapter 4. Furthermore, with policies 
as stringent as those modeled in Chapter 4, it is likely that we are in the steep parts of 
the partial marginal abatement cost curves for SO2 and Hg. Banzhaf et al. (2004) 
explore the entire shape of the marginal abatement cost function for SO2 and find that 
is very steep in the neighborhood where the tax on SO2 is $3,911/ton.9 For Hg, the 
slope of the demand curve can be estimated from Table 4.4 in Chapter 4, assuming 
that SO2 is controlled by a quantity. (Again, the slope of the emissions demand 
function is the negative of the slope of the marginal abatement cost function) The 
slope of the demand function for Hg, with either high or low removal is about -$0.1 
                                                 
9 There are numerous caveats that come with this observation given the different economic and 
regulatory conditions considered in Banzhaf et al. (2004). For example, they assume that no Hg 
regulation is in place. However, generally speaking it is safe to say that the SO2 marginal cost function 
is steep in this neighborhood. 
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per pound. In absolute terms, this is a small number, but to say whether it means that 
costs are relatively flat or steep requires additional context. A more informative 
statistic is the arc elasticity of the Hg demand function, which is between -.47 and -
.64 (for the high and low removal efficiencies, respectively). This range of the arc 
elasticity suggests that the marginal abatement cost function of mercury is fairly 
steep.  In sum, perhaps one should not be surprised then that the welfare differences 
measured Chapter 4 were not all that large. This all said, one should not make too 
much of these observations without knowing whether the functional form of the 
problem in Chapter 3 satisfactorily describes the joint control costs for SO2 and Hg. 
A related and important question is whether one would argue, given the 
welfare cost estimates in Chapter 4, that it should be a high priority for the EPA to 
spend more resources from a limited research budget to understand better the effect of 
controls designed to abate other pollutants on Hg emissions. That is, how might we 
think about the results in Chapter 4 if we viewed this problem as a value of 
information question? Frankly, I think it is probably not that important for the EPA to 
gather more data on the effect of the conventional pollution control technologies on 
Hg emissions. While I think that the estimate of the welfare loss from using the 
wrong instrument mix, $90 to $190 million a year, is nothing to scoff at, there are 
more important priorities. Furthermore, in some ways the deck was stacked in favor 
of finding a large welfare loss from using suboptimal instrument mixes in the 
simulation analysis of Chapter 4, because the variance in the removal efficiencies 
were assumed to be perfectly correlated across sources, which likely will not be the 
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case. At least with this particular source of uncertainty, in reality the real welfare 
consequence of choosing a suboptimal mix might be smaller.  
In my mind, the biggest priority for further research was just hinted at: the 
bounds of uncertainty on the damages from NOX, SO2 and Hg pollutants are large 
despite the numerous studies that have attempted to narrow these estimates. For 
example, Banzhaf et al. (2004) report standard deviation bounds of about $1,500 to 
$5,500 per ton of SO2 reduced and $800 to $1,700 per ton of NOX reduced (1999 $).  
While it may be true that measuring the damages from pollution deserves 
still greater attention from economists, there are many other potentially fruitful 
avenues for research. The purpose of this dissertation was to make a tightly focused, 
but thorough, contribution to our understanding of the optimal regulation of jointly 
controlled pollutants. As the research ideas proposed above and the research review 
from Chapter 1 both suggest, there is still much to understand. This is true even 
though issues that arise in the control of multiple pollutants have been acknowledged 
for a long time. 
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APPENDIX A: THE HAIKU ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
MODEL  
A.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the market simulation model 
used in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. This model, known as Haiku, is a simulation 
model of the electricity market in the contiguous states of the U.S. Its primary 
purpose is to facilitate the study of national and regional environmental and market 
structure policies that affect this sector. To this end, Haiku yields partial-equilibrium 
measures of welfare changes expected to result from policy and market changes in the 
electricity sector. The model also provides insights into the effects of these changes 
on production and prices in important related markets such as those for coal and 
natural gas. In this way Haiku can be viewed as a linked partial-equilibrium model 
with the links being the relationships between the markets. 
Haiku was developed and is maintained by research staff at Resources for 
the Future. The initial development of Haiku derived from a need to provide reliable 
emission estimates to study the effects of policies to reduce acidification. An 
expected attendant use was to analyze the environmental consequences of opening 
regional retail electricity markets to competition (Palmer et al. 2002). The model has 
been expanded and refined over time. Additional applications of the Haiku model 
include estimating reductions in conventional pollutants ancillary to reductions in 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Burtraw et al. 2003b), analyzing the efficiency and 
distributional consequences of alternative allocation schemes for carbon emission 
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allowances (Burtraw et al. 2002) and estimating the efficient national level of sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions from the electricity sector 
(Banzhaf et al. 2004).1 
Stewardship of the model is a collaborative effort led by Dallas Burtraw 
and Karen Palmer. Anthony Paul and I have major long-term responsibilities in the 
management, construction and design of the model. The model has also received 
major contributions from Ranjit Bharvirkar, Danny Kahn, David Lankton and Erin 
Mansur and a number of interns. 
My primary responsibilities include collecting, condensing, and assembling 
the raw supply and demand data. This includes the characterization of the operating 
costs and performance of all of the existing generators in the model. I also am 
responsible for characterizing the performance of many of the potential (new) 
generator types. For renewable technologies this includes determining their total 
regional availability. For nuclear technologies this includes tracking changes to the 
industry including the widespread adoption of capacity increases in recent years. I 
also have a lead role in developing the pollution control algorithms in the model, 
particularly in the characterization of the abatement technologies. It is also my 
responsibility to stay current with state-level environmental regulations affecting this 
                                                 
1 The emission estimates generated by Haiku were then used in the Tracking Analysis Framework 
model. The Tracking Analysis Framework model traces the effect of regional changes in emissions of 
SO2 and NOX to changes in environmental quality and health outcomes. The model also provides 
estimates of the welfare consequences of these changes. It was developed as part of the National Acid 
Precipitation Assessment Program to study the cost and benefits of the SO2 trading program created by 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The Tracking Analysis Framework model is still frequently used 
in studies that employ Haiku. 
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sector and where necessary assure that the effect of these rules are captured in the 
model. 
The following section briefly describes the philosophy of constructing a 
model like Haiku and using it for economic analysis. This is followed by a 
description of the major components of the model and an overview of how the model 
works. This section also provides insight into the sophistication of the model in the 
types of policies it can represent. The closing section of this Appendix briefly 
describes the software used to code, manage, and run the model. 
A.2 Modeling Philosophy 
A simulation model is a laboratory designed for the exploration of a 
particular set of research questions in an empirically representative way. In 
economics, simulation models are typically used because they allow a high level of 
complexity in the representation of affected markets. This allows the researcher to 
explore, that is simulate, states with conditions dramatically different than what has 
already been observed and to trace the effects of a policy through numerous linkages. 
The comprehensiveness of a simulation model is subject to constraints on funding, 
data, and computational power. The model must also remain manageable and 
interpretable to be of use. 
With all simulation models, decisions must be made about the information 
to include and the appropriate amount and method of data aggregation. The scope of 
information to include is, of course, greatly influenced by the intended uses of the 
model. For Haiku, a characterization of electricity supply and demand consistent with 
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economic theory is needed at the least. Yet questions remain about how completely 
one wants to represent these two sides of the market. For example, to what extent 
should associated fuel markets be accounted for in the determinants of electricity 
supply? This is a question of the appropriate breadth of the model. Another aspect of 
model scope to determine is the amount of information (unique variables) required to 
sufficiently represent each dimension of the market. 
The availability of data also influences the scope of the model. Data used 
to parameterize Haiku are drawn from a variety of sources. These sources generally 
fall into two classes. In some cases, parameters are estimated using data from 
individual agents. Estimates calculated for other simulation models, as well as those 
found in engineering and market studies, are also used. These alternative sources of 
parametric data have their pros and cons. Parameters calculated from raw, agent-
level, data can be tailored to specific needs of the model. While the relevance of these 
estimates is transparent to the researcher, challenges include building familiarity with 
the method of data collection and understanding what the data represent. Additional 
drawbacks include the need to maintain and check the accuracy of large data sets.  
With information gathered from engineering and market studies, much of the work 
collecting and aggregating raw data is already complete. The same can be said for 
parametric estimates culled from similar models. However, the researcher must still 
become familiar with how these estimates were generated in order to determine their 
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appropriateness for the model.2 The standard of appropriateness is not always strict: 
often the model structure is dictated by the estimates that are available. 
The researcher must also determine how to make use of large primary 
datasets to represent important market dynamics. A common technique in simulation 
modeling is using a representative agent to capture the behavior of a group of similar 
individual agents.3 The use of representative agents reduces solution times and the 
need for computational power. At the same time, the construction of representative 
agents presents two important data aggregation questions. The first is determining 
how many categories of individuals, and thus number of representative agents, the 
model should have. Often there are obvious criteria for establishing different 
categories, such as the existence of relevant discrete differences among individuals. 
However, discrete differences may be more important in one situation than another 
and not all meaningful variations are particularly discrete. 
There is also the matter of aggregating variables of interest into 
representative parameters when constructing representative agents. The appropriate 
method of calculating a representative value, usually some type of mean, is not 
always obvious and there can be a number of candidate weighting schemes. 
Additionally, while the criteria used to establish the categories of representative 
                                                 
2 For Haiku, existing parameter estimates are frequently drawn from other models and studies in cases 
where professional expertise or proprietary data are required to make reasonable performance 
projections. The performance functions for retrofit pollution controls in Haiku, described in later 
sections of this chapter, are drawn from the documentation of a similar simulation model. For each 
technology, the original source engineering studies were reviewed to determine how these functions 
should be applied in Haiku. 
3 In Haiku, ‘model plants’ are the representative agents that depict a category of similar individual 
generators. The following section includes a description of the model plants in Haiku. 
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agents are selected so that variations across the entire population are captured, it may 
still be worthwhile to capture important variations within the groups depicted by a 
single representative agent. Again, it is a challenge to know what types of variations 
are important and how best to represent them in the model.  
The previous paragraphs lay out some of the important general questions 
that a researcher faces when constructing a simulation model. The narrative describes 
each modeling decision as if it were a sequential step in the construction of the model. 
Yet these decisions cannot be so easily decomposed; they often occur simultaneously 
and iteratively. The discussion also avoided providing any particular decision rules 
that could be applied to answer these questions. There are rarely explicit rules that 
dictate the correct scope and structure of a model other than trying to remain 
consistent with economic theory and the incentives that the firm managers face. But 
note that, in economics, the challenge of knowing how completely to represent a 
problem is not unique to simulation modeling. The theoretician must decide which 
dimensions of a problem to include in the analysis, and the applied welfare economist 
must determine the appropriate set of markets to analyze. 
As a solution to the question of the appropriate method of aggregation and 
model design, one might conceivably test the multitude of competing model 
specifications and test the importance of every variable of possible influence. In 
addition, one could check the sensitivity of results to every reasonable method of 
representing and aggregating these data. Clearly such a process is not prudent. 
Practicality suggests that modelers must often use their own experience and intuition 
when determining appropriate model structure and methods of data aggregation. This 
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is not to say that different model specifications are not tested. But even then it is a 
matter of the researcher’s perspective and judgment in determining which competing 
specifications are worth testing.  
This discussion of how to test the specification of the model leads us to the 
question of the appropriate benchmark of performance to which the model should be 
compared. In the case of Haiku one can test the agreement between the predictions of 
different model specifications and actual market outcomes. Specifications that yield 
prices closer to what was actually observed are generally favored. Another test of 
model reliability is whether changes in model specifications yield results consistent 
with the researcher’s expectations.4 For example, in Haiku one could impose a 
decline in the supply of natural gas and see if the model predicts higher electricity 
prices and an increase in the consumption of substitute fuels as a result. These 
approaches are limiting in that they do not necessarily indicate which specifications 
maximize the predictive power of the model.  
One way to increase confidence in the predictions of the model is to 
compare them to forecasts from similar models. To this end, Haiku was among a 
stable of models evaluated through studies hosted by the Stanford Energy Modeling 
                                                 
4 I avoid using the phrase ‘consistent with economic theory’ here because it is too limiting. It is more 
like testing to see if the results of the model are consistent with economic doctrine, economic intuition, 
or with otherwise informed priors. Simply because some predictions of the model are unanticipated 
does not mean they are inconsistent with economic theory. Indeed the ability to discover unanticipated 
results that turn out to be theoretically consistent, simply in a less transparent way, is one of the virtues 
of simulation models. 
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Forum.5 The Forum brings together similar models to analyze a particular energy or 
environmental policy and compare their forecasts. The purpose of this effort is to 
bring attention to those salient insights common to the models. It also provides a 
structure to explore the advantages and drawbacks of competing modeling 
approaches. Haiku also is among the models being used in the Renewable Energy 
Modeling Analysis Partnership. The Partnership, which began in 2006 and is modeled 
after the Energy Modeling Forum process, brings together modelers and analysts 
from government and private institutions to compare a set of models and the results 
they generate with respect to policies promoting renewable energy. The purpose is to 
understand whether the results the models generate are generally due to structural 
differences or changes in assumptions (i.e., relative prices). I am a lead investigator in 
the use of Haiku for the Partnership. 
Since its initial development, Haiku has expanded along with the need to 
capture more subtle market dynamics. The development of a large simulation model 
is a continual process. As such, questions of scope, design, and aggregation are 
continually faced as the model is extended, modified, and updated. The following 
section sheds some light on a few of the most important solutions to these challenges 
in Haiku. It includes an outline of the key elements of the model’s structure and a 
description of the aggregation scheme of constituent generators to represent supply. 
Following sections explain how abatement controls for SO2, NOX and mercury (Hg) 
                                                 
5 Specifically, Haiku was among the models that participated in the fora on Prices and Emissions in a 
Restructured Electricity Market and A Competitive Electricity Industry (Energy Modeling Forum, 
1998; 2001).  
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are represented in the model. In addition, these sections serve to facilitate a more 
detailed understanding of the modeling results in Chapter 4. 
A.3 A Description of Haiku 
As mentioned in the introduction, Haiku is a simulation model designed to 
explore the affects of environmental and market structure policies on the U.S. 
electricity sector. The model is typically used to estimate changes in the sector over 
the next 20 to 25 years. The major elements of the Haiku electricity sector model are 
briefly described in this section. We begin with a description of how the national 
electricity market is separated into regional ones. This is followed by a brief 
description of the demand side of the electricity market. A more detailed treatment of 
market supply is then provided.  
A.3.1 Regional Markets 
Give that Haiku is national in scope, we need to aggregate electricity 
markets spatially to reduce the computational demands of the model. Figure A.1 
shows the boundaries of the 20 Haiku market regions. In most cases the regional 
electricity markets in Haiku are roughly defined by the historic boundaries of the 
regional (and sometimes sub-regional) councils of the North American Electric 
Reliability Council. These regional markets are used because there is readily available 
information on the transmission constraints between these regions and because they 
typically reflect a control area for management of the transmission grid. In some areas 
of the country, particularly in the Northeast, these regions have been split up further. 
For example, the Mid-Atlantic Area Council region has been further sub-divided into 
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areas based on whether or not the areas belong to states participating in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative.  
Intraregional electricity transmission is unconstrained. However, the model 
does roughly account for line-losses, the difference between electricity generation and 
consumption explained by the loss as heat in the transmission lines, within the region. 
Interregional trade is subject to constraints on the transmission capacity between 
regions. Subject to these constraints, the amount of trade between regions is 
determined endogenously.  
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Electricity demand is distinguished by consumer type, season, and time 
blocks that are constructed to capture important fluctuations in electricity demand. 
The customer types are residential, commercial, and industrial, and the seasonal 
periods are summer, winter, and spring/fall. The different time blocks represent base, 
shoulder, peak and superpeak loads (i.e., demand) for electricity. Respectively these 
represent 70%, 25%, 4% and 1% of the hours of each season. 
For each consumer class, time block, season and region demand is 
characterized using a constant elasticity functional form: 
 Q APε=  (A.1) 
The variables in Q and P have their standard interpretation. The elasticities, 
ε, are drawn from parametric data provided by the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). While the elasticities may be different for each separate 
consumer class and market, due to data limitations they often are not. The parameter 
A is calibrated using historic information on demand and prices along with the 
parameter ε. The parameter A is then adjusted to capture anticipated increases in 
demand over time. 
In addition to the markets for electricity generation, Haiku also captures the 
presence of capacity reserve markets in each market region. These markets exist to 
assure that there is reserve power on hand in case demand is higher than expected 
over a short time-scale (hourly or daily). While Haiku is deterministic, such that these 
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reserves are never tapped into, it is still necessary to account from revenues from 
these markets to fully capture the revenue sources of new and existing generators. 
A.3.3 Supply 
A.3.3.1 The Model Plant Approach 
To tractably depict the composition of electricity supply, generation 
sources are represented by ‘model plants’. The model plants are designed to be 
representative of a certain type of existing or potential generator capacity within a 
region.6 By capacity we mean the maximum potential generation, measured in the 
maximum number of megawatt hours it can produce in an hour, of the model plant. 
For existing capacity, model plants are constructed using information from a set of 
technologically similar constituent generators within each Haiku market region. 
Potential capacity is the electricity generation capability that the model can suggest 
would be built in response to demand growth or other changes in the market. Each 
potential type of generation technology is represented by a different model plant.  
Table A.1 lists the model plants used to represent existing capacity. Again, 
the characteristics and economic performance of each model plant vary by Haiku 
market region and depend on the characteristics of the constituent generators they 
represent. The existing generators are grouped by the following seven indices (other 
than market region and vintage), with all but the last four represented in Table A.1: 
prime mover, fuel used, relative efficiency, and for coal-fired boilers, coal demand 
                                                 
6 The term ‘model plant’ is a bit of misnomer. They are actually ‘model generators’ in that they are to 
represent a set of similar electricity generators, not plants.  
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region, size (capacity), and the presence of existing SO2 and NOX post-combustion 
control technologies as of 2010. Each of these categories will be discussed in turn. 
Table A.2 lists those model plants that represent potential capacity in Haiku. Potential 
generators are distinguished by prime mover, fuel used, relative efficiency and coal 
demand region. 
Table A.1: Model Plants Representing Existing Capacity 
Prime Mover Fuel Efficiency 
Combined Cycle Natural Gas  
Combined Cycle Oil  
Combustion Turbine Natural Gas Efficient 
Combustion Turbine Natural Gas Inefficient 
Combustion Turbine Oil  
Conventional Hydro Water  
Pumped Storage Water  
Renewable Wind  
Steam Biomass (Dedicated)  
Steam‡ Coal  
Steam Geothermal  
Steam Natural Gas Efficient 
Steam Natural Gas Inefficient 
Steam Nuclear Efficient 
Steam Nuclear Inefficient 
Steam Oil  
Steam/CT MSW/LFG  
‡ There are up to 15 different coal model plants in each Haiku market 
region. Coal units are grouped by the coal demand region they are located 
in, whether they have post-combustion SO2 and NOX controls (and if so, 





Table A.2: Model Plants Representing Potential Capacity 
Prime Mover Fuel Efficiency 
Combined Cycle Natural Gas Conventional  
Combined Cycle (Duct 
Burner) 
Natural Gas Conventional 
Combined Cycle Natural Gas Advanced 
Combustion Turbine Natural Gas Conventional 
Combustion Turbine Natural Gas Advanced 
Integrated Gasification 
Combined Cycle (IGCC) 
Biomass (Dedicated)  
Internal Combustion Landfill Gas  
Steam Coal  
Steam Geothermal  
Renewable Wind  
 
The primemover is the description of the technology or method used to 
generate electricity. The most common prime mover types are gas (combustion) and 
steam-driven turbines. As their name suggests, steam turbines are operated by steam 
generated from some heating processes. In the case of fossil fuels, combustion occurs 
in a boiler and steam is generated using the resultant heat. With combustion turbines, 
the exhaust gas from the combustion process is used to rotate the turbine directly. 
Combustion turbines typically use clean fuels because of the direct interface between 
the exhaust gas and the turbine.7 Combined cycle systems are essentially a 
combination of these two technologies. In these systems air heated to a high 
temperature is first used to turn a combustion turbine. The exhaust that exits the 
combustion turbine (often referred to as waste heat) is then used to create steam, 
                                                 
7 Internal combustion engines are grouped with combustion turbines in the creation of model plants. 
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which in turn is used to run a steam turbine. Other prime movers uniquely correspond 
to the fuel they use, such as wind turbines. 
The relevance of the fuel index is assumed to be self-explanatory. 
However, one may realize that the categories are somewhat limiting. For example, 
combustion turbines often can fire both natural gas and light oil. Such dual-fuel 
capability is not modeled in Haiku. Constituent generators are categorized by the 
primary fuel they combust, and the model limits them to consuming only that fuel. 
Similarly, the costly process of converting a coal-fired boiler to one that fires a liquid 
fossil fuel (called repowering) is not represented. 
In certain cases constituent generators are also distinguished by their 
relative efficiency. Existing natural gas-fired combustion and steam turbines are 
divided into efficient and inefficient model plants based on their heat rate.8 The 
purpose of this division is to capture the heterogeneity in the efficiency of these 
generator types. Units with a heat rate higher than the capacity-weighted mean heat 
rate of like units in the region are considered inefficient, while those with lower heat 
rates are considered efficient. The determination of the relative efficiency of nuclear 
units is based on a multi-factor analysis. The primary distinguishing characteristics 
between efficient and inefficient nuclear units are their relative fixed and variables 
operating and maintenance costs and their availability for generation through the 
1990’s. Finally, the relative efficiency of potential (new) generators is based on 
                                                 
8 The heat rate is the amount of energy, usually measured as million British thermal units (Btus), 
required as an input in order to obtain a certain number of kilowatt-hours of electricity. The lower the 
heat rate of a generator, the more efficient it is. 
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expectations of performance improvements over time. As such, the model cannot 
forecast the construction of “advanced” units until later years. 
For the purpose of constructing model plants, coal generators are divided 
into 15 different categories in each Haiku market region. The generators are grouped 
based on their combination of existing SO2 and NOX post-combustion controls, their 
capacity, and the “coal demand region” that they are located in. The coal demand 
regions are a construction that Haiku adopted from the National Energy Modeling 
System (NEMS) model.9 In the NEMS model the U.S. is divided into 13 different 
coal demand regions. These regions determine the types of coal available to the 
constituent generators. A Haiku market region may overlap portions of different coal 
demand regions. In each Haiku market region, potential coal units are usually allowed 
to locate in any of the coal demand regions. More will be said about the meaning and 
purpose of the coal demand regions in the section on fuel markets. 
A.3.3.2 Characteristics of Model Plants 
A.3.3.2.1 Data Sources 
Each model plant is represented by up to 85 unique parameters. These 
include the seasonal capacities, heat rate, operating costs, direct costs of pollution 
control retrofits, outage (availability) rates, and emission rates for each model plant. 
The performance characteristics and availability of generators that represent potential 
capacity are primarily adopted from the NEMS model. The performance of existing 
                                                 
9 NEMS is an integrated multi-sector simulation model of the key energy-intensive markets in the U.S. 
It is used to generate the projections found in the popular Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2007) as well 
as to perform policy analyses requested by Congress and various executive agencies. 
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generators is constructed from mix of survey and compliance data from the 
population of grid-connected generators, and, when such data is unavailable, 
parametric data drawn from other sources. 
The construction of existing model plants begins with a database of the 
entire population of grid-connected electricity generators in the U.S. The EIA collects 
prime mover, fuel, capacity, and location information from these sources via the 
Annual Electric Generator Reports (EIA 2000; 2002; 2005). When raw data is used 
to characterize the performance of model plants, the data are typically drawn from 
information collected by a variety of government agencies. Furthermore, when 
additional plant or generator-level data is available, it is typically from plants with 
large steam boilers due to their large share of total generation in the U.S. For 
example, fuel use and generation from all large steam boilers is collected by the EIA 
using the Steam-Electric Plant Operation and Design Report (EIA, 2001b). 
Information on the population and basic characteristics of generators, including their 
historic emission rates and fuel use, is supplemented by data collected by the EPA to 
monitor compliance with the acid rain program created by the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments (U.S.EPA, 2001). Information on operating and maintenance costs 
(O&M) for large steam plants is taken from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s Form 1 (Platts, 2002).10 
                                                 
10 These are the ‘big picture’ data sets in that they broadly cover a large share of generating capacity. 
However, many other data sets are used to construct components of the model. For example, survey 
data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is used to identify planned capacity increases to 
existing nuclear generators (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2005); data on historic availability of 
generators comes from North American Electric Reliability Council (North American Electric 
Reliability Council, 2003), and information on historic generation from hydropower comes from data 
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Due to restrictions in survey coverage, certain variables of interest are not 
available for all generators. Missing data are a particular problem for small generators 
or generators not historically subject to cost-of-service (i.e. average cost) pricing. 
Often, parametric estimates are drawn from the literature or other models to 
compensate for this missing information. The two models that are the most common 
sources of parametric data used in Haiku are NEMS and, to a lesser extent, the EPA’s 
Integrated Planning Model (IPM) model (U.S.EPA, 2002b, 2005d). When parametric 
data from other sources is unavailable, alternative sources include using industry or 
regional averages or other statistical techniques to impute the missing values from the 
available generator-level data. 
A.3.3.2.2 Data Aggregation 
The task of generating representative statistics for the model plants follows 
the preparation of the generator-level data.11 The method of calculating these statistics 
may have an important influence on model performance, as there is often 
considerable heterogeneity in the variables of interest among the generators that 
comprise a model plant. One must also be sensitive to how the constituent generator 
data were collected. For example, constituent generator observations are typically 
annual means. There are few data that capture the fluctuation in these variables over 
                                                                                                                                           
collected by EIA on the Monthly Utility Power Plant Report, the Monthly Nonutility Power Plant 
Report and earlier versions of these reports (EIA, 2001a; 2001c). 
11 The raw data are usually cleaned and compiled using the statistical program STATA. STATA is 
adopted for this task given its transparency, ability to handle large data sets, and ease in embedding 
documentation into the programs that construct the parametric data. 
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the course of the year. Also, typically the observations are based on one year of data; 
rarely are time-series data used to characterize an individual generator.12 
While the functional relationships underlying the constituent generator data 
are sometimes complex, typically simple aggregation schemes are used. The majority 
of the variables of interest are represented solely by capacity-weighted arithmetic 
means. This simple approach is sensible for variables that are themselves ratios to 
total capacity (such as fixed O&M costs). This is also a reasonable approach when the 
utilization of the constituent generators is expected to be proximate or when the 
variable does not fluctuate considerably with the utilization of a generator (at least 
within expected operating ranges). 
The heat rate and fixed and variable O&M costs of a model plant receive a 
more careful treatment. In addition to a mean, a standard deviation of these variables 
is also generated. This information is used to capture the expectation that as the 
utilization of a model plant increases, more costly and less efficient generators are 
expected to provide a larger share of total generation. The variances of these variables 
are used to create an increasing cost function for the model plant.  
Parametric estimates of operating costs and variances drawn from 
engineering studies are used to represent most generator types. Typically these costs 
are invariant across the country, although they do vary based on the generation 
technology being used and generator capacity. As mentioned above, given their large 
contribution to total electricity generation and, consequently, due to greater data 
                                                 
12 The costs of operating nuclear units are an important exception. 
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availability from these sources, the costs and efficiencies of fossil and nuclear steam 
model plants is based on data from their constituent units. The average and variance 
fixed O&M cost and heat rate for these model plants are capacity-weighted estimates 
from the average O&M costs of the constituent generators of the model plant. The 
average and variance of the variable O&M cost are capacity-weighted estimates from 
the constituent generators.13 
The aggregation scheme described in the previous paragraphs is considered 
acceptable as the model predicts production, prices and emissions sufficiently close to 
those observed historically. Clearly, in this case constituent generators are assumed to 
be operating close to their historic utilization, so perhaps this outcome is not 
surprising if the remainder of the model is constructed appropriately. Whenever 
forecasted utilization of the constituent generators deviates far from historic 
utilization the reliability of model estimates becomes more questionable. As 
discussed above, there are additional techniques to increase confidence in model 
performance, such as comparing results to the prediction of other models and testing 
whether model results are consistent with expectations.  
                                                 
13 Other candidate approaches are to calculate generation or capacity-weighted mean and variances for 
variable O&M cost. A generation-weighted mean would seem the most sensible as the variable O&M 
cost is reported per unit of generation (i.e, $/megawatt hour). This approach would put more weight on 
units with lower variable O&M costs because those are the units that run more. However, at levels of 
utilization exceeding historic utilization, these estimates would likely underestimate variable costs. A 
capacity-weighted variance would get around this problem by implicitly assuming that an increase in 
generation is shared evenly across all units (assuming variable O&M cost for each generator is 
constant in the relevant range, which is not a poor assumption). However, we might expect that units 
with historically lower utilization will be run more as demand increases over time, so we adopt an 
unweighted mean and variance as they are typically higher than the capacity-weighted mean and 
variance of the variable O&M cost. 
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A.3.3.3 Fuel Markets  
In addition to electricity, Haiku is capable of simultaneously solving for 
equilibrium prices in important fuel markets. The distribution and cost of coal, natural 
gas, and biomass fuels have historically been important factors in debates on how 
emissions from the electricity sector should be regulated.14 This is because fuel 
choice is an important factor in determining a generator’s compliance strategy with 
pollution control requirements. In the U.S., coal-fired generators are a significant 
source of CO2, particulate matter, NOX, SO2 and Hg emissions and are the primary 
source of all these pollutants from the electricity sector. Natural gas does not contain 
any Hg or sulfur and emits less CO2 and NOX than coal. Therefore, switching from 
coal to natural gas generation, through both changes in the relative utilization of 
existing generators and the turnover of the stock of generating capital, is an important 
strategy for complying with regulations that affect these pollutants. 
The supply functions for coal, natural gas and biomass fuels in Haiku are 
adopted from the NEMS model. For coal, there are separate supply functions for each 
major production regions in the U.S. Coal is treated as a heterogeneous commodity. 
The average heat content and levels of impurities distinguish the coal from each 
region. Heat content is a measure of the intrinsic energy stored in Btus, in this case, in 
a ton of coal. The impurities include the percentage of sulfur and Hg in a ton of coal. 
This information is used to calculate the uncontrolled emissions of these pollutants.15 
                                                 
14 While oil is used to generate electricity, it accounts for a relatively small share of total generation. 
15 The NOX emissions rate is not particularly sensitive to the coal used. Rather, uncontrolled emissions 
of this pollutant are particularly sensitive to the combustion temperature and characteristics within a 
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To simplify the model, the coal from each production (supply) region is not available 
in every coal demand region. Each coal demand region is limited to using those coals 
where transportation infrastructure exists to provide delivery or where transportation 
capacity is likely to develop in the face of tightening emission standards.  
A.3.3.4 Pollution Abatement Technologies in Haiku 
In addition to being able to adjust their fuel use, the model allows coal-
fired model plants to install post-combustion control technologies to reduce emissions 
of SO2, NOX and Hg.16 Of the 85 or so variables used to characterize each model 
plant, about 50 are used to capture the emissions and cost of controlling these 
pollutants, with over half of these associated with the emission and the cost of 
controlling Hg. 
The cost and performance of abatement technologies for these pollutants 
are taken from the assumptions in the EPA’s IPM model (U.S.EPA, 2002b; 2005d). 
This model is used to support EPA’s modeling of air pollution policies that affect the 
electricity sector. As such, many of the assumptions therein are publicly available. 
Furthermore, the studies that underlie these functions are publicly available, which 
allows us to gain a more complete understanding of their suitability for use in Haiku. 
Each model plant that has yet to retrofit a SO2 or NOX post-control may 
choose the types of controls it installs. For SO2 controls, which are often called 
                                                                                                                                           
boiler. Uncontrolled NOX emission rate for each coal-fired boiler is assumed to equal the compliance 
NOX emission rates required by the acid rain program of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
16 The model also accounts for the presence of existing and planned post-combustion controls. This 
information is collected and compiled from a variety of sources, including trade press, EIA (2000; 
2001b; 2002) and U.S.EPA (2001).  
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“scrubbers”, the model plants have a choice between two different types. These types 
vary in their cost of installation, operation, percentage of uncontrolled SO2 emissions 
reduced (the removal efficiency), and coal type that they may be used with. See Table 
A.3 for a description of these technologies (in Haiku, the cost and performance 
functions describing the two wet scrubber types are combined).17 For NOX controls, 
the model plant may install a Selective Catalytic Reduction system. This technology 
is assumed to remove NOX emissions by 90%. The model also tracks the presence of 
Selective Non-Catalytic Controls, which cost less than Selective Catalytic Reduction 
systems but are assumed to reduce NOX emissions by only 35%. The installation and 
operating costs of the SO2 and NOX controls are also a function of the capacity of the 
generator. When a model plant representing coal capacity adopts a particular control, 
it is assumed that all of the constituent generators adopt this control and that the 








                                                 
17 Note that the coal use restrictions are not applied to units constructed prior to 2010. 
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Table A.3: Characteristics and Applicability of SO2 Post-Combustion Controls in 
Haiku† 
Technology Type‡ Coal Sulfur Content Restriction  
Removal 
Efficiency Size Restriction 
Lime Spray Drying Dry Greater than .4%, less than <2% sulfur 90% 
Greater than 550 
megawatts 
Limestone Forced 
Oxidation Wet Greater than 2% sulfur
§ 95% Greater than 100 megawatts 
Magnesium 
Enhanced Lime  Wet Less than 2.5% sulfur 96% 




† Adopted from U.S.EPA (2002b), Table 5.2. In Haiku, the cost and performance functions 
describing the two wet scrubber types are combined. 
‡  The key factors distinguishing wet from dry processes is that in wet processes the scrubber waste 
is wet and the flue gas leaving the absorber, the compartment where SO2 emissions are taken up, is 
saturated with water. This distinction is important because the extent to which a scrubber reduces 
Hg emissions depends on the type of process. 
§ U.S.EPA (2002b) also indicates that this control is further limited to bituminous coal, but that is 
likely because only bituminous coals have a sulfur content this high. 
 
As alluded to above, estimating Hg emissions from coal-fired plants is 
more challenging than estimating SO2 or NOX emissions. Hg emissions are a function 
of the coal used, because of the coal’s Hg content and because of its heat content, and 
the other pollutant controls in use. As described in Chapter 4, each combination coal 
type and pollution control combination has its own removal efficiency, which is the 
percentage reduction in uncontrolled Hg emissions. The primary source of the 
expected (average) removal efficiencies used in the IPM model is U.S.EPA (2002a). 
U.S.EPA (2002a) also reports the standard deviations of these estimates, which are 
used in the analysis described in Chapter 4.  
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There is also an Hg-specific abatement technology, called Activated 
Carbon Injection, which Haiku typically allows coal-fired boilers to install. The cost 
function from this control is also taken from IPM. However, for reasons described in 
Chapter 4 this option was not allowed for the analysis in this dissertation. 
A.3.4 Regulatory Regimes 
Haiku is flexible in that it can incorporate and model a variety of 
environmental regulations and electricity pricing regimes. We discuss the electricity 
pricing polices first. 
A.3.4.1 Electricity Pricing 
The wholesale electricity market in the U.S. was opened to competition by 
legislation passed in 1992. The legislation requires owners of transmission assets to 
make their capability accessible, at cost-based rates, to other generators. Haiku 
assumes that this market structure yields competitive wholesale prices, where the 
prices are set at the marginal cost of generation.  
At the retail level, markets can be characterized by average or marginal 
cost pricing. Traditionally, electricity prices have been set at the average cost of 
service, and this is known simply as average cost or cost-of-service pricing. In 
average cost pricing regimes prices often vary based on season and by consumer 
class. Haiku is designed to capture these subtleties. 
Retail electricity pricing in some states is based on the marginal cost of 
generation. Here we are referring solely to the generation aspect of electricity supply. 
Electricity transmission and distribution services continue to be priced at the average 
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cost of providing them. In reality, and in Haiku, marginal cost pricing typically does 
not imply that consumers face the instantaneous marginal cost of generation. Rather, 
consumers are assumed to face one of two pricing mechanisms: one that captures the 
variation in the marginal cost of generation over the course of a day and another that 
does not. Under time-of-day pricing, consumers are assumed to face the marginal cost 
that occurs during that time block.18 Consumers are assumed to know these prices 
ahead of time. Where prices are assumed not to vary over the course of the day, the 
different consumer classes are expected to face an average of the marginal cost of 
generation over the time blocks that is weighted by their share of consumption in 
those time blocks. 
This simple description, while sufficiently informative for the purposes of 
becoming familiar with Haiku, belie the complexity of the different pricing regimes, 
both in the sense of how they are represented in Haiku and how they are implemented 
in practice. The importance of these different regimes is clear, however. As is well 
known, the method of electricity pricing has important static and dynamic efficiency 
implications on the performance of the electricity market. Recent research employing 
Haiku has shown that the method of electricity pricing also has important 
implications to the performance of pollution control policies (Burtraw et al. 2002). 
A.3.4.2 Environmental Regulation 
Haiku is particularly powerful in its ability to represent the variety of 
pollution abatement requirements that are proposed and adopted. The model estimates 
                                                 
18 Price differences across consumer classes can still arise from differences in the transmission and 
distribution costs of serving these customers. 
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CO2, SO2, Hg and NOX emissions from the sector.19 To comply with regulations 
controlling these pollutants, model plants may install post-combustion controls, 
reduce their generation, or sometimes change the fuel they use. The presence of cap-
and-trade and emission tax regulation can be represented for any of these pollutants. 
Prescriptive, or command-and-control, regulations may also be imposed on emitters 
of these pollutants. For example, all potential units are assumed to be subject to new 
source performance standards for these pollutants. Existing units may be subject to 
restrictions on their emissions per unit of fuel use or generation and/or a policy akin 
to the performance requirements for sources that make major modifications (i.e., New 
Source Review). This later approach takes the form of a limitation on how much a 
model plant can increase its generation above historic utilization without installing 
post-combustion controls. The model also allows these regulations to be limited to 
particular seasons and regions of the country or a particular set of model plants.  
Emission trading programs can be further distinguished by whether or not 
banking is allowed or by the method of allowance allocation. Allocation schemes 
using auctions, updating, gratis or a mix of these methods can be imposed. The 
auction approach assumes that the auction is efficiently designed in that the clearing 
price equals the marginal value product of emissions across affected generators. 
However, a variety of methods for the distribution of the auction revenues can be 
modeled, some of which may distort the market. Under an updating allocation scheme 
the share of total allowances received by a source is updated annually and based on 
                                                 
19 In addition to regulations on emissions, Haiku also has the capability of modeling national and 
regional subsidies (tax credits) of a variety of forms to encourage the use of particular technologies as 
well as restrictions on the composition of the generation mix, such as renewable portfolio standards. 
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its share of total generation or fuel use in some recently preceding period. With gratis 
approaches allocations for all future periods are fixed20 and known at the beginning of 
the program. Emission taxes can also be represented as having rebates schemes with 
similar incentive effects as these allowance allocation methods. 
Existing air pollution control requirements typically imposed in Haiku 
include regulations derived from Title I and Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.21 Title IV of the Amendments created the well-known SO2 emissions 
trading program. It also induced regulations limiting emission rates for NOX. Further 
controls on NOX derive from Title I of the Amendments, which is the section that 
addresses compliance with ambient air quality standards. Primary among these is the 
NOX SIP Call, a 22 state summer-time NOX cap-and-trade program designed to 
reduce interstate transport of this pollutant, a problem which confounds local efforts 
to comply with ozone concentration standards. As mentioned above, performance 
standards for new sources, as well as those sources that presumably undergo major 
modifications, are also imposed. Finally, a variety of other local and state-level 
requirements are also represented in the model. 
A.3.5 Equilibrium and Convergence 
The primary purpose of Haiku is to estimate partial-equilibrium welfare 
changes expected to result from imposing environmental and electricity pricing 
policies affecting the electricity sector. However, the goal in solving and coding the 
                                                 
20 That is, in terms of the incentives they generate, they are lump-sum. 
21 For reasons described in Chapter 4, these regulations are not imposed in the analysis in this 
dissertation. 
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model is to find simultaneous market equilibria by modeling incentive-compatible 
behavior on the part of electricity generators. The choice variables in the model 
include, for each model plant, capacity, generation, fuel (and fuel type for coal-fired 
boilers) and pollution control adoption. Generator dispatch is based on minimization 
of short-run variable costs of generation. That is, a plant’s decision to produce 
electricity at any instance is determined by its short-run operating cost. Capital stock 
investment and retirement, as well as investment in pollution control technologies, are 
determined by the expected profitability of generation assets over time.  
Haiku is an iterative tâtonnement model in the prices for both outputs and 
major inputs to this sector. At the beginning of each iteration, a set of prices is 
announced, with one price for each market. The model then determines the optimal 
quantities of generation, fuel use, etc. for each model plant at those prices. For each 
market, the model then compares evaluates the price electricity demanders are willing 
to pay (or, in the case of input markets, the price producers are willing to accept) at 
that quantity. A combination of this new set of prices and the original set of prices is 
used for the next iteration. The weight placed on the old and new set of prices in the 
determination of the set of prices used for the next iteration is a user input. The 
weights (or steps) are typically set to emphasize the new set of prices as the number 
of iterations increases. The model is determined to be in equilibrium when all of the 
prices are stable or fluctuate systematically around a fixed point for a large number of 
iterations. 
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A.4 Modeling Platform 
The Haiku model is coded using the software Analytica. Each variable, 
index, or result is illustrated by an object in Analytica that appears as a node within an 
influence diagram. Hence, the screen views of the model itself provide additional 
documentation, and each object in the model has a description field that provides 
detail about how each object is used. The model algorithm is managed from iteration 
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